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T H E PROTECTION OF W I L D L I F E HABITATS FROM 
HARMFUL DEVELOPMENT VIA L E G A L AND 
R E G U L A T O R Y PROCESSES 
by Kevin Richard Ross, University of Durham 
Almost fifty years since the introduction of official habitat protection and 
systematic town and country planning, wildlife habitats continue to suffer damage 
and destruction from development. In focusing upon development threat, this 
paper embraces the interaction between habitat protection law and the planning 
mechanism. 
This thesis aims to evaluate the role of legal and regulatory processes in 
protecting habitats from harmful development. After exploring the historical and 
political development of this field, current law and regulations are explained, and 
critically assessed. Consideration is then given to the operation of this protective 
regime in practice. Cases selected from the planning registers of two local 
planning authorities, and supported by other high profile planning cases from 
around the UK, are assessed to ascertain the weight attached to ecology in the 
consideration of planning applications. The thesis then turns to the enforcement 
process; two detailed studies facilitating investigation of this. Both cases concern 
development threats to habitats of international importance. Cardiff Bay Barrage 
focuses upon the role of the European Commission in enforcing Community law; 
Lappel Bank is the subject of litigation on behalf of a voluntary conservationist 
plaintiff. 
The main conclusion drawn is that wildlife habitats do not receive adequate 
protection from legal and regulatory processes vis-a-vis harmful development. 
The continuation of such a state of affairs will ultimately result in substantial 
losses of habitat types and species. However, the emergence of European 
environmental law, and the continued growth of voluntary organisations prepared 
to intervene in this field, give cause for optimism. 
i. 
The copyright of this thesis rests 
with the author. No quotation 
from it should be published 
r. 1 DEC 1998 
without the written consent of the 
author and information derived 
from it should be acknowledged. 
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Nature conservation is now well established as a legitimate aim of 
government and a popular avenue of recreation; it forms the basis of this research. 
I trust the following exordium will provide justification for this, and indeed outline 
the focus of the paper in more detail. 
The underlying premise of this work is that flora and fauna ought to be 
afforded legal protection in their own right. Mankind is not entitled to bring about 
the unnatural extinction of species; a process which, if continued, will severely 
restrict future evolution. Fewer types of organism subject to evolutionary 
pressures must ultimately result in less genetic material being available for 
evolutionary development; mankind cannot be insulated from such loss.1 
The essential factor in wildlife conservation is the protection of habitats. 
Indeed Stiling,2 in investigating the causes of recent extinction on a global scale, 
found that habitat destruction came second only to introduced species3 in the list 
of causal factors. Accordingly, in evaluating the protection of wildlife, this paper 
focuses upon threats to habitats; in particular land development. 
Ambit of Research 
The present century has witnessed an intensification of habitat destruction. 
Whilst protective provisions have had a degree of success, habitats continue to 
suffer from development pressure — as the large road building programme and 
urban fringe expansion of recent years testify. New roads by their nature often 
1 N.W. Moore, The Bird of Time: the science and politics of nature conservation, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p.8. 
2 P. Stiling, Ecology: Theories and Applications - 2nd Edition, New Jersey: Prentice Hall 
International, Inc., 1996. 
3 There are strict controls on the introduction of wild species to the UK; see S.14(1) 
Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 (WACA 1981). 
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result in fragmentation of habitats, damage that is often exacerbated by the 
attraction of new businesses contributing to 'ribbon development' along the 
routes themselves. Also, increased demand for recreation and a growing 
appreciation that the countryside has potential for meeting this has further fuelled 
habitat damage. Recreational pressure can ultimately lead to problems from 
vandalism and disturbance, as well as the loss of habitat to tourist developments. 
Habitats may also fall victim to other economic initiatives, such as port expansion 
or housing development. Destruction in such cases is usually absolute, and cannot 
continue indefinitely without an irreversible loss in the diversity of wildlife. 
The ambit is a narrow one; the protection of individual specimens, and 
indirect measures such as anti-pollution provisions — both of which are important 
elements of conservation law — are excluded. The research investigates the 
protection of habitats, including domestically and European designated sites, from 
development. Ultimately, the planning system's treatment of the ecological 
significance of land — the interaction between wildlife law and planning -- is the 
focal point of this paper. Continuing loss of habitat to development justifies this 
focus, and ensures that it proceeds upon an assumption that current protection is 
inadequate. This research will evaluate how well the legal and regulatory 
processes operate in this field. Enforcement is a potential weakness, as 
environmental issues do not fit easily into traditional rights-based litigation and 
complaints models; particular attention is therefore paid to this process. 
The Inadequacy of Habitat Protection Law 
The reality that almost all habitats are the product of man's interference in 
the natural world, and therefore require continued management to preserve them, 
is reflected in the significance accorded to management agreements by 
conservation law. Land management is no longer the main source of habitat 
threat. However, this position is undermined by there being little in law to prevent 
such well-managed habitats succumbing to development. As this paper 
demonstrates, even those habitats sufficiently important to qualify for the most 
rigorous legal protection remain at risk. 
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It is impossible to secure, via legal means, preservation of land ad infinitum; 
this is so in every context, not just nature conservation. Thus, in examining the 
ultimate efficacy of protection law we must investigate the planning mechanism's 
accommodation of the various protective designations of habitat. I submit that 
insufficient weight is attached to the ecological significance of land within the 
planning process. As this is so with internationally significant habitats, it follows 
that sites of mere national importance — a fortiori habitats without designation --
are particularly under-protected. The latter point is significant; we neglect 
common habitats at our peril, and risk making scarce that which hitherto was in 
abundance. 
In the absence of a doctrine of inviolability of land, conservation policy is 
trammelled with the inevitability of compromise within planning decisions. 
Continued deterioration and loss of habitat, particularly on a crowded and 
avaricious Isle such as Britain, are assured under law that accommodates 
economic ascendancy. With habitat loss having continued in Britain for such a 
sustained period, the time has long since passed when compromise could 
justifiably be a feature of development considerations over protected sites. 
The message of this paper is that insufficient significance is accorded to the 
ecological importance of land by the current legal and planning systems. There is a 
case for nature conservation law to be strengthened so that it may be genuinely 
capable of satisfying its designs. 
Methodology 
The research question demands an objective analysis of planning decisions in 
which wildlife habitat is an issue. Two approaches have been adopted: assessment 
of a range of cases from Wear Valley District Council, Co. Durham and the Peak 
Park Planning Board, Derbyshire; and detailed study of two internationally 
important cases. 
The former approach focused upon the salient considerations behind planning 
outcomes; in particular the weight attached to ecological factors. Whilst this 
inevitably touches upon social and political issues, these go to the foundation of 
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the local planning process and ultimately the merits of habitat protection law 
placing faith in the planning system. Both legally designated and non-designated 
habitats were covered, in order to detect any discernible difference in the 
treatment of statutory protected sites and other habitats. Additionally, focus upon 
a national park authority and local planning authority sought to expose differences 
in approach to conservation between the two types of organisation. This was 
supplemented by reference to other UK planning decisions, selected to illustrate 
particular aspects of the legal and regulatory processes. Official and voluntary 
conservation organisations, refereed journals and newspapers were also utilised 
for this purpose. 
The main body of research is concerned with two detailed case studies — 
both internationally important habitats — that facilitate investigation of the 
enforcement process. Lappel Bank, a case that progressed to the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ), provides the basis for critical assessment of the challenge and 
appeal process from the perspective of the plaintiff voluntary organisation. Cardiff 
Bay Barrage, where government support ensured the usual planning controls were 
avoided, allows an assessment of European Commission law enforcement. 
Detailed analysis of the case studies demanded a more broad-based approach than 
that appropriate to the range of planning authority decisions. Primary sources for 
Cardiff Bay Barrage included documents held by Cardiff Bay Development 
Corporation (CBDC) and the Cardiff Central Library; in respect of Lappel Bank 
access was gained to papers held by RSPB solicitors. Both studies also relied on 
law reports, Hansard, press releases and articles in newspapers and journals. 
Conclusion 
The foregoing summarises the focal points of this work, and gives some 
indication as to why the project is pertinent. 
The limits of space and time necessarily ensure that the ambit of this study is 
narrow. The field chosen is topical, and one in which much conflict is apparent. I 
am confident it succeeds in demonstrating the shortfalls of the legal and regulatory 
processes in protecting wildlife habitats from harmful development. 
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Such a study cannot be insulated from policy considerations behind the law, 
and a full understanding of policy here requires awareness of the historical 






This chapter places the current habitat protection code within its historical 
context, demonstrating the evolution of the conservation and planning 
relationship. The origin of this relationship can be traced to the pressure for land 
use planning that emerged during the inter-war years — this period will be the 
starting point for the discussion. 
By focusing upon prevailing philosophies, I will demonstrate the policy 
influences and social context that have ultimately delivered the current law. 
Accordingly, there is little emphasis upon actual legal provisions. However, the 
official reports that preceded legislation are referred to, as these provide insight 
into the rationale that guided Parliament. Essentially, each epoch of prevailing 
ideology is discussed in terms of its influence upon the development of nature 
conservation and planning law. 
In particular, the demand for planning and countryside preservation, both in 
terms of inter-war emergence and post-war activity, will be discussed. The link 
between nature conservation and amenity will also be explored, as this is a 
fundamental element of the conservation/planning relationship. Finally, the 
prominence of private property rights within the planning ambit, as a feature of 
1980s and 1990s official policy, brings us to the present day. 
However, emphasis upon philosophical development precludes discussion 
according to a strict chronological pattern — the tendency for ideologies to repeat 
and coincide over time militating against such treatment. The links between 
conservation and planning will therefore be explored without undue constraint by 
chronology. This analysis will ultimately assist in a fair and topical evaluation of 
the current law — which is the principal aim of this paper. 
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Habitat Destruction and the Need for Formal Planning 
Only during the early twentieth century did the management of habitats as 
reserves, as opposed to efforts merely protecting individual specimens, attain 
serious credibility.4 Nor was the link between habitat protection and wildlife 
conservation widely accepted until destruction of habitats reached a substantial 
scale. Thus a heightened appreciation of wildlife reserves' value became apparent 
during the inter-war years, stimulated by the loss of habitat through changes in 
land use and management.5 This was accompanied by a shift in the conservation 
role of those reserves that already existed, away from protection of individual 
examples and towards the preservation of total resources.6 
The crucial importance of habitat to nature conservation ensured that the 
latter was a factor in the land use and planning debates of the early to mid 
twentieth century. Like other resources, the countryside had suffered from the 
absence of a systematic approach to land use during the inter-war years. In 
particular, the period of agricultural depression following the break-down of the 
great estate system compounded the lack of effective planning controls — much 
agricultural land was sold for development.7 This was the catalyst for the urban 
sprawl that characterised the 1930s; with up to 25,000ha.8 of farmland absorbed 
each year by urban growth. 
It was widely felt that urban growth could be tackled on a regional basis and 
was thus an appropriate focus for regional town planning schemes.9 However, the 
period also witnessed a major shift in Britain's industrial power, with many 
J. Sheail, Seventy-Five Years in Ecology: The British Ecological Society, Oxford: 
Blackwell Scientific Publications, 1987, seep.131. 
J. Sheail, Nature in Trust The history of nature conservation in Britain, Glasgow: 
Blackie and Son Ltd., 1976 @ p.55. 
N.W. Moore, op. cit, p.69 
J. Blunden, N. Curry, T. Burrell, G. Smart, R. Smith & R. Steele; A People's Charter? 
Forty Years of the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949, London: 
HMSO, 1990, p.17. 
P.McAuslan, Land, law and planning cases, materials and text, London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1975, p.3. 
G. E . Cherry, The Evolution of British Town Planning. A history of town planning in 
the United Kingdom during the 20th Century and of the Royal Town Planning 
Institute, 1914-74, Leighton Buzzard: Leonard Hill Books, 1974, p.88. 
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traditional areas suffering from severe depression. Such conditions were far 
from conducive to detailed systematic planning, much less habitat conservation, 
occupying a prominent position in government priorities. The problems flowing 
from the 'uncontrolled fusion' 1 1 of town and country eventually drew an official 
response: the 'Report of the Royal Commission on the Geographical Distribution 
of the Industrial Population'.12 The Royal Commission recommended action to 
militate against the trend to large conurbations and highlighted 'The evils 
attendant on haphazard and ill-regulated town growth'. 1 3 The huge loss of 
agricultural land was lamented; though the Commission recognised that the 
countryside additionally represents '...amenities and recreational 
opportunities,...precious possessions for fostering and enriching the nation's well-
being and vitality'. 1 4 
The proposed planning system was seen as essential to achieving a more 
systematic model of land use, and ensuring appropriate balance between 
competing interests. Whilst expansion into the countryside was a means by which 
the social problems of urban intensification could be mitigated, it was also 
important to ensure that some rural land was preserved, both for the salubrity of 
agriculture and in response to the public demand for greater recreational outlet. 
The calls for planning reform went unheeded during the inter-war years — 
advocates of systematic planning would have to wait until after the second world 
war before such a system was operative. It has been suggested15 that this was 
because the degree of perceived damage to the countryside remained insufficient 
to justify significant positive action, at a time when the preservation movement 
lacked popular appeal. It was certainly the case that town and country planning, 
A. E . Telling, Planning Law and Procedure, 7th edition, London: Butterworths, 1986, 
p.7. 
D.L. Foley, 'British Town Planning: One Ideology or Three?' British Journal of 
Sociology Vol. 2, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1960, 211 @ p.221. 
Cmnd. 6153, 1940; [HC Sessional - 1939-40 (4) 263]; known as 'The Barlow Report'. 
Ibid p. 10. 
Ibidp.15. 
J. Sheail, Seventy-Five Years in Ecology: The British Ecological Society, Oxford: 
Blackwell Scientific Publications, 1987, p.132. 
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as it then was, remained insufficiently developed for any effective action to take 
place; whether there was significant support for it or not. 1 6 
Planning in the Reconstruction Context 
Peace in 1945 provided an opportunity to commit resources to civil matters -
- in particular rebuilding bombed cities. This facilitated formal planning for what 
would ultimately be a greatly improved environment. As Ashworth1 7 says, such 
plans not unnaturally endeavoured to improve upon those weaknesses whose 
origin lay deeper than bomb damage. War had demonstrated the practical utility of 
centrally co-ordinated planning, and as Cherry18 says, from this flowed a 
confidence that Britain could take the opportunity of reconstructing for the future 
via central intervention. 
An important element of reconstruction concerned the preservation of the 
countryside from the type of ad hoc development witnessed during the 1930s. 
This became a feature of the national plan concept, which had gained widespread 
support immediately after the war. Serious consideration of a national plan was 
undertaken by Lord Reith, Minister of Works in Churchill's coalition government, 
largely as a response to the influential 'Barlow Report'.19 This and the later 'Scott 
Report'2 0 were undoubtedly influential in curbing harmful development. Their 
recommendations; including a national plan, a central planning authority and the 
extension of planning control across the entire country; would ultimately prove to 
be a crucial part of the reconstruction blueprint. 
Barlow's non-interventionist ethos was reinforced by Scott. It was accepted 
that the proposed planning system would be sufficiently robust to reconcile rural 
conflicts and ultimately preserve the countryside.21 Fears of an anticipated post-
G.E. Cherry; Environmental Planning 1939-1969 Volume 2 National Parks and 
Recreation in the Countryside, London: HMSO, 1975; @ pp.9-10. 
W. Ashworth, The Genesis of Modem British Town Planning a study in economic and 
social history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul Ltd., 1972, p.227. 
Op. cit, p.155. 
Cmnd. 6153, 1940; see p.13 above. 
Lord Justice Scott chaired the 'Committee on Land Utilisation in Rural Areas'; Cmnd. 
6378, 1942 [HC Sessional -1941-42 (4) 421]. 
J. Blunden et al, op. citp.42. 
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war building boom were clearly evident in Scott's warning that 'The future of the 
countryside will be profoundly affected whether on the one hand there is a 
continuation of the pre-war trend of industrial and urban development...[or] a 
dispersal of the large concentrations of population...— in other words whether 
future constructional development is haphazard or planned.'22 
It was only after the publication of the Scott Report in 1942 that general 
countryside preservation and the establishment of specific nature reserves were 
considered to be separate strands of the same issue, and '...kindred functions 
appropriate to a central planning authority.'23 The policy that emerged from the 
reconstruction debates embraced the conservation of land. It sought to further the 
countryside as an amenity, and preserve good agricultural land for food 
production. 
War time blockades had fuelled unease with our dependency on food imports, 
and highlighted the long-ranning tendency of mdiscriminate transfer of 
agricultural land to other uses.24 Additionally, agriculture was regarded as being 
25 
entirely consistent with countryside preservation; as Scott confirmed '...the 
cheapest way, indeed the only way, of preserving the countryside in anything like 
its traditional aspect would still be to farm it.' The prevailing philosophy 
acknowledged no contradiction between agricultural progress and efficiency, nor 
between rural amenity and the rural economy.26 Agriculture accordingly benefited 
from special treatment after the war, with effective exemption from planning 
control. 
However, this policy was criticised as being ecologically harmful, and indeed 
by the 1970s it was widely accepted27 that agriculture represented the principal 
threat to wildlife. This realisation led to a shift in philosophy from which tighter 
controls and financial incentives served to temper the threat. As a result, 
Cmnd. 6378, 1942 @ p.39. 
'Town and Country Planning 1943-51', Progress Report by the Minister of Local 
Government and Planning on the work of the Ministry of Town and Country Planning, 
Cmnd. 8204, 1951 [HC Sessional 1950/51, 133] @ p.155. 
W. Ashworth, loc. cit. 
Cmnd. 6378, 1942, @ p.47. 
I. Hodge, "The Conservation of the Countryside', Town and Country Planning, Vol.66 
No.5; London: The Town and Country Planning Association; May 1997, pp.133-135. 
See M. Shoard, The Theft of the Countryside, London: Temple Smith, 1980. 
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development - for which there continues to be great demand - has re-emerged as 
the foremost menace to habitats. 
The Link With Amenity 
Amenity considerations have been instrumental in preserving land from 
development. It may be no coincidence that the inter-war years of rural 
destruction were accompanied by a period of renewed interest in the countryside, 
not least for recreational purposes. The creation in 1926 of the Council for the 
Preservation of Rural England28 was a response to both phenomena. During this 
period, voluntary organisations concerned with landscape and wildlife increasingly 
sought to acquire land of their own with which to pursue their interests. However, 
maintenance of these sites, and others such as the Forest Parks initiated by the 
Forestry Commission in 1936,29 was motivated not by any desire to protect 
wildlife per se; rather by a determination to gain further recreational access to the 
countryside. Except for limited specialist reserves, such as those of the RSPB, 
wildlife itself merely equated to a recreational resource. 
The inherent bond between wildlife and amenity was explicitly acknowledged 
by the British Ecological Society (BES) in 1942, when its Committee declared the 
first object of nature preservation to be the '...maintenance for enjoyment by the 
people at large of the beauty and interest of characteristic British scenery.'30 It is 
significant that nature conservation as an end in itself was not a tenet of the 
report; ecological values were decidedly subservient to the human benefits of 
having recourse to unspoilt countryside and nature. However, whatever the 
rationale behind conservation, the Committee acknowledged the already serious 
effects of increasing urbanisation and accepted the need to resolve the 
'...fundamental conflict between conservation on the one hand and development in 
its widest sense on the other.'31 
Later to become The Council for the Protection of Rural England (CPRE). 
D. Evans, A History of Nature Conservation in Britain - 2nd edition, London: 
Routledge, 1997, p.57. 
BES, 'Nature Conservation and Nature Reserves', Journal of Ecology (32) 1944-45, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, @ p.49. 
Ibid, @ p.52. 
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There have long been groups who support the preservation of wildlife for its 
own sake; the British Correlating Committee, who campaigned alongside the 
landscape and amenity organisations for legislation, being one example. However, 
during the inter-war years such organisations represented a relatively minor part 
of a wider conservation movement dominated by the amenity lobby. It was clear 
that naturalists' interests would be best served by co-operation with those 
representing amenity and outdoor recreation. Indeed, such a relationship is not 
unnatural; as Foley32 says: 'The preservationists may find a covering rationale in 
the guise of amenity.' 
The combined influence of wildlife and amenity groups eventually exerted 
sufficient pressure to influence government policy; the amenity lobby gaining the 
initial significant concession with the establishment of the National Park 
Committee33 in September 1929. Chaired by Christopher Addison, this considered 
the feasibility of establishing national parks. Its terms of reference also included 
preservation, on a national scale, of flora and fauna; thus demonstrating the extent 
to which nature conservation was subsumed within the national parks and amenity 
debate. National parks were a very important aspect of post-war amenity 
considerations — a means of refreshment for the four-fifths of England and Wales' 
population who were otherwise confined to an urban existence.34 Lamenting the 
rapid progress in recent years of urbanisation, Addison averred that 'The 
preservation of what is beautiful and pleasant in both town and country is a 
practical measure which is essential to a right economy and to the national 
welfare, and there is no doubt that by the exercise of wise forethought the forms 
of development can be made less objectionable.'35 The Committee summarised the 
general objectives satisfied by a system of national parks and nature reserves as 
the preservation of the countryside, improved recreational facilities and the 
protection of flora and fauna;36 the order in which these objectives appear in the 
report is significant. Whilst nature sanctuaries could prevent interference, planning 
3 2 D.L. Foley, op. cit, p.220. 
3 3 'Report of the National Park Committee' Cmnd. 3851, 1931 [HC Sessional 1930/31 
(16) 283]. 
3 4 See 'Report of the National Parks Committee (England & Wales)' Cmnd. 7121, 1947 
[HC Sessional 1946/47 (13) 303], p.8. 
3 5 Cmnd. 3851,1931 @ p.9. 
3 6 Ibidpp.8-11. 
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would ensure the protection of the countryside from harmful development. 
Addison concluded37 that planning powers could in many cases ensure 
preservation, and recommended that they be extended to all areas; irrespective of 
the likelihood of development. 
Government responsibility for national parks as an amenity provision was an 
assumption made in a planning White Paper,38 which called for the relief of urban 
congestion by providing open spaces. Indeed, an important role of government 
was '...the preservation of land for national parks and forests, and the assurance 
to the people of enjoyment of the sea and countryside in times of leisure.'39 As a 
later Ministerial pronouncement confirmed,40 the protection or enhancement of 
amenity is one of the main purposes of planning legislation. 
During these halcyon days for amenity groups, nature conservation remained 
on the fringes of conservation policy. As Dower4 1 said, despite the great voluntary 
efforts made, no national policy for wildlife conservation yet existed. Habitat 
protection efforts were almost entirely restricted to the maintenance of sites by 
well-established voluntary organisations such as the National Trust. That 
successes here were necessarily limited to certain areas and types of reserve 
further emphasised the increasing need for a national land use policy.4 2 This was 
acknowledged by the BES, 4 3 which concluded that reliance upon voluntary bodies 
and private management of land for conservation would no longer be sufficient. 
In 1945 the Nature Reserves Investigation Committee44 (NRIC) proposed a 
comprehensive plan to protect remaining wildlife. It recognised that continued 
preservation was of concern to those who derived pleasure from observing 
wildlife, and proposed selecting sites for conservation; including a national system 
of nature reserves. Whilst clearly guided by amenity considerations, such 
Cmnd. 3851,1931 @ p.39. 
'The Control of Land Use' Cmnd. 6537, 1944; [HC Sessional 1943/44 (8) 2731, see 
p.9. 
Ibid @ p.3. 
Cmnd. 8204, 1951; op. cit @ p.138. 
J. Dower, 'National Parks in England and Wales', Cmnd. 6628, 1945, [HC Sessional 
1944/45 (5) 283], p.40. 
J. Sheail, Nature in Trust The history of nature conservation in Britain, Glasgow: 
Blackie and Son Ltd., 1976, p.88. 
BES op. cit @ p.65 
NRIC, 'National Nature Reserves and Conservation Areas in England and Wales', 
London: The Society for the Promotion of Nature Reserves, 1945. 
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measures would provide ecologists with an opportunity to promote the scientific 
aspect of conservation. It was important that formal responsibility for nature 
conservation was accepted by government, and this was the main conclusion 
reached by the Committee. 
In August 1945 Sir Arthur Hobhouse45 appointed Dr. Julian Huxley to chair 
'The Wildlife Conservation Special Committee'.46 Huxley believed that wildlife 
sanctuaries should form an important element of the wider national parks 
question, and recommended that each national park should contain nature 
reserves as an addition to its amenities.47 He proposed to designate a small 
number of important sites for direct management by a 'biological service'. These 
'national reserves' would represent a series of typical habitats — 'Considered as a 
single system, the reserves should comprise as large a sample as possible of all the 
many different groups of living organisms...'48 Although a national scheme, the 
reserves would cover less than 0.00249 of the surface of England and Wales — the 
small scale reflecting the fact that direct control would effectively preclude 
economic development. The proposed network represented '...the minimum 
number of sites compatible with the formulation of a coherent and workable 
scheme'; which was itself designed '...to secure a balanced representation of the 
different major types of plant and animal communities existing in England and 
Wales...'50 This concept of a national network was very important; in its entirety it 
would protect not just the most important habitat types, but examples across the 
entire spectrum of native wildlife. Therefore, the choice of sites was not 
dominated by considerations of scarcity, rather by a desire to protect a 
representative series of habitats. The national scheme would be supplemented by 
powers of local authorities to establish and maintain 'local nature reserves' 
(LNRs), 5 1 thus extending potentially strict protection to locally significant 
habitats. 
Who chaired the National Parks Committee (England & Wales); Cmnd. 7121, 1947. 
Wildlife Conservation Special Committee (England & Wales), 'Conservation of Nature 
in England and Wales'; Cmnd. 7122, 1947, [HC Sessional 1946/47(14) 535]. 
Ibid @ p. 10. 
Ibid @ p.17. 
Ibid @ p. 16. 
Ibid @ p.49. 
Ibid @ p.33. 
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A further recommendation was that sites of special scientific importance lying 
outside the national reserves be protected; not via direct control but by listing, so 
that they could be taken into account by local planning authorities. Thus, 
protection here would rely upon the new planning mechanism. However, Huxley 
emphasised that 'It is not suggested that the existence of any such site should hold 
up plans for development, but that there should be machinery by which its 
existence could be made known at the earliest stage of planning so that such 
action as may be possible can be taken for its protection.'52 Designation was 
therefore the means by which the ecological significance of habitats could be 
accommodated by planning authorities; so that a decision on proposed 
development would take into account the scientific importance of the land. There 
was clearly an assumption in this recommendation that the new planning system 
would be equal to the task of respecting ecological importance. 
Huxley's biological service,53 regarded by Hobhouse54 as his most important 
proposal, would assist in habitat protection by making representations and 
providing advice to local planning authorities. Being in the public interest, nature 
conservation was a legitimate concern of the newly created planning mechanism; 
the Committee urged that nature conservation be recognised as a land use for 
planning purposes.55 The importance of the planning/conservation link was 
repeatedly emphasised by Huxley; 'Apart from the direct ownership or 
management by the State of selected areas, the greatest need in the conservation 
of nature is the recognition of its importance in the framing and exercise of any 
general planning powers for land use'.56 This axiom lies at the root of the site 
designation concept, and indeed is the means by which the majority of habitats, 
whether classified domestically or under European law, are protected. 
In urging government acceptance of a general responsibility for wildlife 
conservation,57 Huxley echoed previous calls by the NRIC. 5 8 However, W. S. 
Cmnd7122, 1947 @ p.69. 
Ibid @ p.53. 
Cmnd.7121, 1947; p.59. 
Cmnd. 7122, 1947; p.74. 
Ibid @ p.73. 
Ibid @ p.52. 
See above; p.19. 
21 
Morrison, Minister for Town and Country Planning, had in 1943 confirmed that 
the government accepted recommendations on the preservation of rural amenities 
and provision of improved access to the countryside; which necessarily involved 
wildlife. 
In April 194860 Herbert Morrison, Lord President of the Council, confirmed 
that the government accepted the recommendations of Huxley. There followed 
legislation that addressed nature conservation at a national level and founded the 
link with planning; the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949 
(NPACA 1949) was enacted in the 1948-49 session. The Nature Conservancy 
(NC), the biological service advocated by Huxley, was duly established in 
November 1948. 
Meanwhile, continued growth of pressure groups, which had originally 
assisted in delivering conservation legislation, was precipitating a relaxation of the 
link between amenity and ecology. With stronger support, the different factions of 
the conservation movement could concentrate on their own interests. Indeed, 
whilst the symbiosis between wildlife organisations and amenity pressure groups 
had been instrumental in promoting conservation, it was inevitable that the 
different perspectives of each would ultimately lead to their disjuncture. As 
Mabey61 was to comment, '...although the amenity organisations and the scientific 
conservation bodies often find themselves defending the same sites, their 
respective approaches remain as far apart as ever.' 
The weakening of the amenity/conservation link had commenced as early as 
the 1940s, when ecologists were gradually assuming leadership of the 
conservation movement,62 a development that explains the significant involvement 
of the BES within post-war planning discussions. Participation of scientists whose 
main interests were flora and fauna — in a scientific as opposed to recreational 
context — would inevitably lead to a greater acceptance of the significance of 
Written reply concerning the Government's response to the Scott Report 
recommendations; 30 November 1943 - HC Debates, Vol. 395; Col. 225, 
Oral reply of 29 April 1948; HC Debates, Vol. 450; Col. 600. 
R. Mabey, The Common Ground A place for nature in Britain's future? London: 
Hutchinson, 1980, p.225. 
See P. Lowe, G. Cox, M. MacEwen, T. O'Riordan & M. Winter; Countryside Conflicts 
The politics of fanning forestry and conservation, Aldershot: Gower Publishing 
Co. Ltd., 1986. 
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wildlife for its own sake at official levels. Indeed, with the independent 
establishment of the NC and National Parks Commission, scientific conservation 
became clearly distinguished from the national parks movement, a distinction 
which represented a tangible divergence of the conservation movement into its 
two main factions and which, as Dwyer and Hodge63 suggest, mirrored the 
original dichotomy in the voluntary groups. The unease flowing from this 
divergence was acknowledged by the Chairman of the NC in the early 1950s 
when he reflected that 'the Conservancy lays the greatest stress on the scientific 
value of nature conservation, in contrast to the 'amenity bodies', though it is 
difficult, or impossible, to keep the two interests strictly separate.'64 
Continued dedication to nature conservation by specialist official bodies, and 
sustained growth of voluntary organisations generally up to the present time have 
ensured that nature conservation has the necessary prominence to retain its 
independent representation in the long term. Indeed, the role of voluntary 
organisations in framing and implementing conservation policy is set to increase 
further. However, the divisions within the wider movement must necessarily 
restrict its ability to defend its interests against development threats. 
Private Property Rights Remain Dominant 
Interest in countryside matters, which had continued to grow from the inter-
war years, was further stimulated during the 1960s by several large-scale 
developments which raised the profile of habitat destruction.65 The controversy 
generated ensured that developers henceforth would be obliged to take far greater 
account of ecological considerations in order to avoid prolonged dispute and 
adverse publicity.66 Accordingly, a more positive approach to planning ensued 
J. Dwyer and I. Hodge, Countryside in Trust - land management by conservation, 
recreation and amenity organisations, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1996, p.9. 
A.G. Tansley, 'The Conservation of British Vegetation and Species' @ pp.189 & 190, 
in: The Changing Flora of Britain; [pp.188-196] J.E. Lousley (ed.); - report of the 
conference held in 1952 by the Botanical Society of the British Isles, Arbroath: T. 
Buncle & Co. Ltd., 1953. 
For example, destruction of the Upper Teesdale National Nature Reserve by the 
construction of a reservoir in 1966. 
J. Sheail, Seventy-Five Years in Ecology: The British Ecological Society, Oxford: 
Blackwell Scientific Publications, 1987, p.231. 
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during the 1970s, and it became increasingly apparent that proposals with an 
environmental impact would be accepted only on condition that subsequent 
restoration of the landscape followed; open-cast mining being an enduring 
example of this. 
However, proliferation of environmental awareness was not accompanied by 
concord between the conservation factions. This is relevant because suggestions 
made in response to perceived problems are determined by the viewpoint of the 
proponent; be it ecological or landscape; scientific or recreational. As Cox et al. 6 7 
say, the often fractured dialogue and tension between contrasting approaches to 
environmental problems remains a major component of environmental politics. 
Divergence within the wider conservation movement ensured that powerful 
economic forces met little opposition on ecological grounds; conditions under 
which development remained the principal means of habitat destruction. 
It is also prudent to examine the ideology behind the planning mechanism 
itself, as this is the forum in which decisions on development are taken. 
Environmental organisations and developers merely represent their own interests 
before the planning authority. Whilst McAuslan68 regards the preservation of the 
countryside and agricultural land as the raison d'etre for planning, such control is 
itself dominated by considerations of property rights. He lists the ideologies 
behind planning law as 'public interest', 'private property' and 'public 
participation'; the first two being dominant. However they are all overridden by a 
'community of interest' — an understanding that the existing balance of property 
must be maintained against radical attempts to alter i t . 6 9 Thus, if conservation 
groups are to prevail in a planning dispute, they must overcome the inherent bias 
towards property rights in land use planning. The ideology of private property 
also defines the issue of locus standi;70 traditionally it ensured that standing was 
confined to those with a proprietary interest.71 Whatever the intention of 
See G. Cox, P. Lowe and M. Winter; The Voluntary Principle in Conservation the 
Fanning and Wildlife Advisory Group, Chichester: Packard Publishing Limited, 1990. 
P. McAuslan, The Ideologies of Planning Law, Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1980; @ 
p. 160. 
Ibidp.213 
See p.54 below. 
This position has somewhat altered in recent times, with a wider interpretation of locus 
standi; see the judgment of Otton J. in R v. HM Inspectorate of Pollution and the 
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Parliament when it enacted planning and conservation legislation, subsequent 
years of practice demonstrated consistency with the ideology of private property. 
Land owners faced with intrusions on their property could turn to the courts, who 
would develop principles, precedents and rules of statutory interpretation to 
protect them from government interference.72 Maintenance of the private property 
system represents the outer boundaries of public involvement in this ambit, and 
ensures that '...coexistence between public interest and private property will 
always be on private property's terms; there will be no supplanting of the latter by 
the former.'73 This is to be expected since, as McAuslan74 says, the planning 
system supports the governmental and societal status quo — the reality is that 
political power is ultimately stronger than planning theory. The law is operated — 
even reformed — by precisely those people who can be relied upon to maintain the 
status quo because they and their successors continue to benefit from it. Thus, 
whatever efforts at reform are made, the outcome is unchanged: a process of legal 
adaptation and interpretation ensues so that planning controls remain virtually 
ineffective against the interests of the proponents of the ideologies of public 
interest and private property, etc. '...in short, the existing governmental and social 
structure of the country.'7 5 
This inherent frustration of conservation interests was exacerbated with the 
election in 1979 of a government that favoured centralised policy over local 
planning. For nearly two decades there followed a concerted movement away 
from planning control, which served to undermine habitat protection law. Just as 
the emergence of town planning had served to check social abuses flowing from 
the growth of Victorian cities,76 so a weakening of planning controls in the 1980s 
assisted in a return to dramatic economic growth and wealth generation; free from 
any 'public interest' constraints. 
Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex p. Greenpeace Ltd. [1994] JEL Vol.6 
No.2. 
P. McAuslan, op. cit p.3. 
Ibid @ p.145. 
Ibid @ p.268. 
Ibid @ p.213. 
J.T. Hughes, 'Economic Planning' @ p.140, in: The Spirit and Purpose of Planning -
2nd edition, ed. M.J. Bruton; London: Hutchinson, 1984. 
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As the decade commenced, the cornerstones of development policies 
remained dependent upon concepts relating to the immediate post-war era of 
population growth and decentralisation; clearly these were less relevant to the 
1980s.77 Like other aspects of the interventionist state, review was long overdue. 
This came with Mrs Thatcher's process of rolling back the frontiers of the State. 
A succession of Conservative governments during the 1980s and 1990s delivered 
rhetoric that spurned the post-war ideals of direct interference in economic 
activity, and demonstrated a lack of confidence in centralised controls over 
production and exchange.78 The resurgence of individualism and laissez-faire 
economic doctrine was clearly inconsistent with the ideology that had established 
and maintained the welfare state and town and country planning system. A less 
restrained attitude would now prevail, in which land use would be determined by 
the operation of market forces — not state intervention. As Thornley79 said, this 
encouraged the property interests to actively challenge planning. A more lenient 
approach to development ensued, with increased scope for property interests to 
over-ride statutory controls. This shift of philosophy is typified by Shankland's 
statement of 1981 that '...the essence of physical planning...is the management of 
investment.'80 A more pragmatic, though no less illustrative, declaration was made 
by Davies81 in the same year when he claimed the dominant purpose of planning 
to be the creation of conditions for and encouragement of development, so that it 
may '...take place with the least interference and delay.' 
Whilst Gilg 8 2 questions whether the rhetoric of the 1980s was matched by 
changes in planning law, it seems inevitable in any event that the financial cuts in 
public spending at this time would have had an adverse effect on the efficacy of 
local planning control. Furthermore, with the enactment of legislation such as the 
7 7 See E.A. Rose, 'Philosophy and Purpose in Planning' @ p.51; Ibid. 
7 8 J. Dwyer & I. Hodge; op. cit, p.13. 
7 9 A. Thornley; Thatcherism and Town Planning, London: Polytechnic of Central 
London, School of Environment Planning Unit - Department of Town and Regional 
Planning; March 1981, @ p.15. 
8 0 G. Shankland, 'Planners Promoting Investment?' The Planner, Vol.67 no. 4, p.90 -
July-August 1981, London: Royal Town Planning Institute, 1981; pp.90-92. 
8 1 H.W.F. Davies, 'Planning Practice' @ p.7; British Planning Practice and Planning 
Education in the 1970s and 1980s; Oxford: Oxford Polytechnic Working Paper No. 70; 
1983. 
8 2 A. W. Gilg, Countryside Planning Policies for the 1990s, Wallingford: C.A.B 
International, 1991; p.58. 
26 
Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980. which radically altered planning 
concepts,83 and the use of government circulars to effect a narrowing of planning 
limits, 8 4 the framework was in place for the implementation of non-interventionist 
policies during the 1990s. Indeed, much policy in the planning field is effected 
with subtlety, central government guidance notes being an obvious example. 
Thus, a Department of the Environment Circular85 urged local planning authorities 
to generally grant consent unless sound reasons for refusal existed. Countryside 
development was actively encouraged by the government at this time; especially 
residential building. Only the actions of an alliance of existing residents and rural 
campaigners86 prevented development on an enormous scale; although of course 
expansion into the countryside continues. 
Time will tell whether the recent election of a Labour government will 
ultimately lead to the emergence of a radically different philosophy of 
conservation vis-a-vis development. 
Conclusion 
The modern concepts of national planning and nature conservation emerged 
simultaneously as legitimate responsibilities of government, and have remained 
intertwined ever since. The period since the 1940s has witnessed a shift in the 
importance of voluntary organisations, and in the government's commitment to 
planning controls. With the rise and fall of the agricultural menace, the nature of 
the threat facing habitats has also changed. Yet the link between conservation and 
planning remains fundamental. 
Ultimately the planning system, throughout all its stages of evolution, has 
ensured that the entrenched rights of landowners have been maintained at the 
expense of the public interest. Nature conservation law is thus undermined by an 
unjustified degree of faith in the ordinary planning system.87 
For example, the introduction of Enterprise Zones; see Schedule 32. 
H.W.F. Davies, loc. cit. 
Circular 22/80; 'Development Control - Policy and Practice', London: HMSO, 28 
November 1980 @ para. 13. 
See A. W. Gilg, op. cit, p.62. 
Seep.31 below. 
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History has shown that nature conservation depends on the control of land 
use by the planning system. It has also been demonstrated that planning is a 
malleable tool in the hands of policy-makers; it can be made to work towards 
myriad purposes. Ultimately, political will is vital to the practical effectiveness of 
habitat protection law; a phenomenon difficult to readily discern at the best of 
times. 
We shall discover in the next chapter that the emerging environmental law of 
the European Community represents the most effective model of habitat 
protection. A full understanding of the legal and regulatory processes discussed 




T H E L A W 
Introduction 
This paper contributes to the field of environmental law by evaluating the role 
of legal and regulatory processes in protecting habitats from harmful 
development. In explaining habitat protection provisions within the planning 
context, this chapter serves as a basis for that evaluation. 
Categories of site designation are discussed,88 commencing with domestic 
designations and then considering European and international provisions; relevant 
case law and provisions of indirect benefit are also referred to. This is followed by 
an explanation of town and country planning vis-a-vis nature conservation. 
Finally, a summary of the means by which planning decisions are challenged 
and protective laws enforced lays the foundation for the principal critical strand of 
this work. 
Nature Conservancy Council 
There are three Nature Conservancy Councils (NCC); one each for England, 
Wales and Scotland pursuant to s.128 Environmental Protection Act 1990 (EPA 
1990) and s.l Natural Heritage (Scotland-) Act 1991. S. 132(1) EPA 1990 sets out 
the NCC's general functions, which include: the creation and management of 
National Nature Reserves (NNRs),8 9 notification and protection of Sites of 
Special Scientific Interest (SSSI)90 and provision of conservation advice. In the 
planning ambit, the NCC has a role in general development control and indeed is a 
statutory consultee of local planning authorities.91 It therefore provides a link 
Including the role of statutory conservation bodies. 
See below; p.32. 
See below; p.29. 
See below; p48. 
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between the habitat significance of a designated site and the planning authority 
considering development proposals over it. 
In England, ecological and landscape issues are divided between English 
Nature and the Countryside Commission, whilst in Scotland and Wales both 
aspects are subsumed within the NCC: Scottish Natural Heritage and the 
Countryside Council for Wales respectively.92 A degree of co-ordination is 
brought to this disjunctive arrangement by the Joint Nature Conservation 
Committee (JNCC), which is itself established by the NCC to undertake special 
functions pursuant to s.133 EPA 1990. These include responding to conservation 
issues affecting Great Britain as a whole; in particular matters of national and 
international importance. 
The NCC plays an important role in the administration of habitat protection 
law, and is pivotal in the protection of sites from development. Its detailed 
responsibilities within the planning system are discussed below at appropriate 
junctures. 
Designating Law 
1. Sites of Special Scientific Interest 
The basis of habitat designation in the UK is the SSSI,93 which preserves our 
best examples of natural heritage; viz. wildlife habitats, geological features and 
land forms. In respect of the former, the SSSI network represents the minimum 
area of habitat necessary to maintain the nation's current range and distribution of 
wildlife. 
Notification of sites is governed by s.28 WACA 1981 9 4 Where the NCC is 
satisfied that an area is of special interest by reason of its flora, fauna or 
geological or physiographical features, it must notify this to the local planning 
authority, owner or occupier and Secretary of State.95 A period of at least three 
s. 1(3) Natural Heritage (Scotland) Act 1991 & S.130(1) EPA 1990. 
All higher designations are also classified as SSSI; see p.64 below. 
As amended by s.2 Wildlife and Countryside (Amendment) Act 1985. 
s.28(l) WACA 1981; references in this paper to 'Secretary of State' are to the Secretary 
of State for the Environment, unless indicated otherwise. 
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months is specified for representations to be made; although notification will lapse 
under s.28(4A)(ii) where this is not confirmed within nine months. The duty to 
notify is triggered by s.28, and the NCC has no discretion where a site satisfies 
that provision's requirements. However, the prospect of a site losing its special 
qualities in the future is relevant to notification; and indeed it would be wrong to 
confirm notification if the special interest was doomed.96 The features justifying 
protection must be specified in the notification; including operations likely to 
damage them; s.28(4) WACA 1981. An owner, etc. is thus forbidden to undertake 
(or allow others to do so) such activities for the duration of the notification; 
s.28(5). 
SSSI designation allows the NCC to protect the ecological interest of a site 
without necessarily assuming direct control of it; a means of facilitating 
conservation management on a national scale. This is backed by the criminal law; 
undertaking notified activities incurring liability to a fine upon summary 
conviction not exceeding level four under s.28(7) WACA 1981. The NCC 9 7 in this 
instance will initiate prosecutions under s.28. 
However, the prohibition of notified operations is not absolute. Even 
damaging activities are permissible in the following circumstances per s.28(5)/(6) 
WACA 1981: the owner, etc. gives notice to the NCC and; that body consents in 
writing, or the work is in accordance with a management agreement,98 or — in the 
absence of NCC consent - four months elapse from the date of notice. We may 
therefore regard SSSI designation as a means of postponing harmful activity for 
four months. However, this position can be altered with the agreement of the 
NCC and owner etc.; whereby they agree that a certain operation will not be 
affected by the time limit, thus affording more time to the NCC to engineer a 
solution or find an alternative site before the work proceeds; s.28(6A) WACA 
See R v NCC, ex p. London Brick Property Ltd. [1996] J.P.L 227. 
And no-one else without the Director of Public Prosecution's consent; s.28(10) WACA 
1981. 
i.e., an agreement between the NCC and owners, lessees and occupiers whereby land 
use is regulated in the interests of conservation; s.l 5 Countryside Act 1968. 
This itself is restricted by s.28(6B) WACA 1981. which allows an owner etc. to 
terminate such agreement by writing and commence the operation after one month. 
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The protection of SSSI against harmful activities is punctured by s.28(8) 
WACA 1981; in particular (8)(a) provides that any operation authorised by 
planning permission under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (TCPA 
1990) qualifies as a 'reasonable excuse'. This fundamental exception provides a 
means of circumventing habitat protection law, so that even designated sites are 
potentially at risk from development; it is this loophole that provides the central 
focus of this research. Notwithstanding NCC recognition of the ecological interest 
present, planning permission sweeps away all constraints upon a SSSI so that the 
interest may be destroyed with impunity. 
A minority of SSSI qualify for the higher degree of protection afforded by 
Nature Conservation Orders (NCOs), under s.29 WACA 1981. Such habitats 
must be of national importance; and the Orders must be necessary to secure the 
survival of an animal or plant within Great Britain, to comply with an international 
obligation or to conserve the special features justifying designation; s.29(l). The 
Order is a matter for the Secretary of State's discretion;100 although he will 
consult the NCC in advance. Once operative, all persons are prohibited, subject to 
certain exceptions, from carrying out the damaging operations101 specified in the 
Order under s.29(3)(b); such operations being those likely to destroy the features 
prompting the Order; s.29(3)(a). However, as in the case of basic SSSI 
protection, prohibition of damaging operations is not absolute. Almost identical 
exceptions to those contained in s.28(5)/(6) WACA 1981 apply to NCOs by 
virtue of s.29(4)/(5); except that in the absence of NCC consent the activities may 
proceed after the expiry of three months, (as opposed to four months for basic 
SSSI protection). However, the advantage of obtaining a NCO is that it facilitates 
an extension of this time limit to twelve months under s.29(6) WACA 1981. 
Furthermore, this automatically occurs where the NCC, during the three month 
period, offers to buy or lease the land, or enters into a management agreement 
with the person giving notice. A NCO thus provides more time in which to 
His opinion on whether the order is justified will not be interfered with under judicial 
review provided it is a reasonable one supported by evidence; see North Uist Fisheries 
Ltd. v Secretary of State for Scotland [1992] J E L 241. 
As for basic SSSI, breach of the prohibition is punishable by a fine; s.29(8) WACA 
1981. 
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arrange a management agreement or land purchase; justified by the greater 
conservation need of those areas qualifying for it. 
Once either time limit has expired, further harmful operations can no longer 
be prevented. However, NCOs confer a power to compulsorily acquire the land; 
applicable upon Secretary of State consent during both the initial three month and 
extended twelve month periods under s.29(7) WACA 1981. Where this 
exceptional remedy is not pursued, the habitat remains at risk from potential 
development as 'reasonable excuses' under s.29(9) include: (a) operations 
authorised by planning permission. 
2. National Nature Reserves 
NNRs represent official habitat protection by direct control; such sites being 
held and managed by the NCC itself or managed as reserves with its agreement.102 
This degree of control over the small network of mainly NCC owned sites is 
justified by the national importance of such habitats -- a requirement of s.35 
WACA 1981. 
Designation is very simple; provided the NCC is satisfied a site justifies NNR 
status, a simple declaration103 to this effect is final; S.19(2) NPACA 1949. 
However, the NCC must also be assured that the site is being managed as a 
reserve; either under its direct ownership or via that of an approved body; s.35(l) 
WACA 1981. Where the NCC is unable to ensure satisfactory management of a 
site via a nature reserve agreement, compulsory purchase is available under s. 17 
NPACA 1949. 
The crux of the protection flowing from NNR designation is direct control. 
Indeed, the NCC may pass bylaws to regulate activity upon the reserves under 
s.20(T) NPACA 1949; although these cannot interfere with personal rights of an 
owner, etc. or public rights of way. 1 0 4 The chances of such a habitat succumbing 
In which case a 'Nature Reserve Agreement' is concluded between the NCC and 
owners etc.; s.!6(T) NPACA 1949. 
i.e. publication of a notice. 
Evans v Godber [1974] 1 WLR 1317. 
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to development are therefore much reduced compared to SSSI; where designation 
does not normally affect ownership or impose such close relationships.105 
3. The Wild Birds Directive 
The domestic law described above has been significantly strengthened by 
European provisions, through which entirely separate, though overlapping, 
designations have been created. Under s.2(l) European Communities Act 1972 
EU legislation is recognised as law in the UK. However, specific regulations also 
serve to implement the European initiatives across the domestic legal 
framework.1 0 6 
Two Directives are of particular relevance to this research: the 'Birds' and 
'Habitats' Directives. The former: Council Directive on the Conservation of Wild 
Birds, 1 0 7 promotes the conservation of all wild birds throughout EC territory, 1 0 8 
covering both species management and habitat protection. Its general policy, as 
stated in Art.2, is the maintenance of bird populations at levels consistent with 
ecological requirements. However, notwithstanding rulings in Commission v 
Germany109 and Commission v Spain110 — which restricted relevant criteria almost 
exclusively to ecological considerations — economic factors may also have a role 
to play. 1 1 1 
The Birds Directive requires Member States to take positive measures to 
ensure a sufficient diversity of habitats is maintained, including the creation and 
management of protected areas for bird conservation; Art. 3. Action must be taken 
to ensure that such sites do not deteriorate; a requirement that applies both to 
In addition to the above designations, there are two other habitat protection measures 
which merit an allusion. LNRs are the local equivalent of NNRs; designation being on 
grounds of local importance with control exercised by the local authority; s.21 NPACA 
1949. Marine Nature Reserves (MNRs) rectify the limitation upon SSSI designation 
below the low water mark; s.36 WACA 1981 providing for the establishment of these 
coastal equivalents to NNRs over land submerged by sea and tidal waters. 
See the Conservation (Natural Habitats & c.) Regulations 1994 SI 1994 No.2716 
(C(NH)R 1994): below pp.35-39. 
79/409/EEC; [1979] O.J. L103/1. 
Except Greenland, where the Directive does not apply. 
C-57/89 [1991] ECR883; 'Leybucht Dykes'. 
C-355/90 [1993] Water Law 209; 'Santona Marshes'. 
These are explicitly mentioned in Art.2; but see also Art.6(4) Habitats Directive; below 
p.38. 
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protected areas and other bird habitats under Art.4. The Directive acknowledges 
the increased vulnerability of some species; Annex I listing those whose rarity 
justifies special habitat protection.112 Additionally, regular migrants qualify for 
such treatment under Art.4(2). 1 1 3 
Each member State is obliged to select its most suitable territories for 
classification as 'Special Protection Areas' (SPAs) according to the above criteria; 
Art.4(1). 1 1 4 Details of such sites are then forwarded to the European Commission, 
who will monitor their impact on overall conservation under Art.4(3). Indeed, 
Member States are obliged to report trienniaUy to the Commission on their 
implementation of the Birds Directive. Other than the requirement to designate 
SPAs, the Directive is not specific as to the means by which its objectives should 
be accomplished. It was implemented in the UK via the SSSI requirements of the 
WACA 1981: although the CfNH)R 1994 also now apply, and these govern the 
protection of SPAs from development.115 
4. The Habitats Directive 
The 'Directive on the Conservation of Natural Habitats and of Wild Fauna 
and Flora' 1 1 6 is concerned with the habitats of wildlife per se. It seeks to achieve a 
coherent ecological framework of important sites across Europe; known as 
'Natura 2000'. 1 1 7 
Under Art.4 Member States assess sites for submission to the European 
Commission, using such criteria as the proportion of the country's entire habitat 
type represented and size and density of wildlife populations. The Commission 
will then assess the Community importance of sites submitted; which turns upon 
1 1 2 Relevant factors include: proximity to extinction, vulnerability to habitat changes and 
restricted local distribution; Art.4(l). 
1 1 3 Account is taken here of breeding, wintering and moulting areas and resting places; 
particular attention is paid to wetlands -- see The Ramsar Convention, below @ p.39. 
1 1 4 Classification must be in response only to ornithological criteria determined by the 
Directive; see 'Santona Marshes' [1993] Water Law 209, where the court condemned 
Spain for failing to classify the Marismas de Santona. A site important for just one 
endangered species will satisfy the criteria - almost all of the evidence submitted by the 
European Commission in 'Santona' concerned the Spoonbill. 
1 1 5 See Reg,10(l)(d); and for discussion of the Regulations in this context see below p.37. 
1 1 6 92/43/EEC(c); [1992] O. J. L206/7. 
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such things as geographical position relative to migratory routes, total area and 
global ecological value.118 Sites containing a 'priority natural habitat type' 1 1 9 are 
automatically granted Community importance. Sites accepted by the Commission 
as being of Community importance are protected as 'Special Areas of 
Conservation' (SACs). 
The Habitats Directive was brought into direct effect within the UK via the 
C(NH)R 1994; Reg.7(l) obliging the Secretary of State to furnish a list of suitable 
sites to the European Commission. Where the latter adopts a habitat as being of 
Community importance, the Secretary of State must designate this as a SAC as 
soon as possible, and in any event within six years; Reg.8(l). 
Art.6 Habitats Directive requires positive conservation measures to be taken 
in respect of SACs; an important departure from the merely passive protection 
adopted in respect of domestically designated sites. Both SACs under the Habitats 
Directive and SPAs under the Birds Directive are regarded as 'European sites' by 
the Q N f f l R 1994.120 Reg. 11(1) obliges the Secretary of State to compile and 
maintain a register of such habitats within the UK; this includes sites of 
Community importance both before and after classification. The inclusion or 
amendment of an entry within this register must be notified to the NCC under 
Reg. 12, who will in turn inform the owner, etc. and local planning authority; 
Reg. 13(1). However, in any event all register entries are local land charges under 
Reg. 14, so planning authorities are deemed to be aware of local sites of 
Community importance. 
Formalities applying to SACs under the C(NH)R 1994 are almost identical 
to those which govern basic SSSI. Thus, notification to a landowner under 
Reg. 18 that his land qualifies as a SAC will be in the format required by s.28 
WACA 1981 in respect of SSSI. The prohibition upon damaging operations is 
contained within Reg. 19; and the 'exceptions' and 'reasonable excuses' which 
apply to SSSI are repeated in Regs. 19(2) and 19(4) respectively, including the 
planning permission loophole. Enforcement of the provisions relating to SACs is 





See below; p.38. 
SeeReg.10. 
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However, extra protection is extended to all European sites by Reg.22 
C(NH)R 1994, which empowers the Secretary of State to make a Special Nature 
Conservation Order (SNC). Under Reg.22(l), this must specify the operations 
that are likely, in his opinion, to damage the features justifying European 
designation. Once a SNC is operative, the operations specified are prohibited 
under criminal law; Reg.23(1). This provision is therefore a means by which 
harmful activities may be explicitly forbidden by Ministerial Order, delivering the 
flexibility required to target anticipated threats. As in the case of NCOs, the 
potential impact of such Orders is limited by several exceptions. Provided an 
owner, etc. gives written notification of his proposed work to the NCC, he may 
proceed where the NCC consents in writing or where the work is in accordance 
with a concluded management agreement. However, unlike the situation 
pertaining to domestically designated sites, there is no automatic facility for 
proceeding with the work upon the expiry of three or four months. Rather there is 
a limited, although potentially indefinite, bar upon activity the NCC considers 
harmful to land over which a SNC applies. 
The limitation concerns development threats, from which SNCs alone 
provide no better protection than NCOs. Reg.23(4) CfNHIR 1994 provides that 
harmful work carried out under planning permission is excused. Therefore, the 
only absolute means of protecting a European site from the type of development 
activity targeted by SNCs is its purchase. This can be undertaken compulsorily 
under Reg.32; available in respect of those habitats where the NCC is unable to 
conclude a management agreement on reasonable terms, and in cases where such 
an arrangement has been in force but its breach impairs future satisfactory 
management. 
Whilst European site status does not close the planning permission loophole, 
it does intervene in the planning system121 to mitigate its potential impact. Reg.48 
C(NH)R 1994. which satisfies Art.6(3) Habitats Directive, requires the local 
planning authority to take account of environmental factors pertinent to planning 
applications. In particular, projects not part of ordinary management that are 
For a discussion of the general planning system, including its treatment of domestically 
designated sites, see pp.42-46 below. 
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likely to have a significant effect upon European sites must be subject to prior 
assessment; to ascertain their implications in view of the site's conservation status; 
Reg.48(l). In assessing this, a planning authority must consult the NCC and take 
account of public opinion under Reg.48(3)/(4). Prospective developers must 
provide authorities with whatever information they require for the assessment; 
Reg.48(2), and ultimately a project may proceed only when the authority is 
satisfied that it will not compromise the site's integrity; Reg.48(5). This will 
depend upon the manner in which the work will be undertaken and any conditions 
restricting the proposed consent; Reg.48(6). 
Consent granted during less environmentally aware periods can be 
particularly problematic;122 for this reason the C(NH)R 1994 facilitate its revision. 
The assessment requirements contained in Reg.48 are given retrospective effect 
by Regs.50 and 51; which require a prompt review of consent granted prior to a 
site gaining European status or prior to the commencement of the Regulations. 
Such review is undertaken with a view to the affirmation, modification or 
revocation of consent123 under Reg.50(1); and involves full assessment of the 
implications in view of the site's conservation objectives as if the project were 
subject to a fresh application under the Regulations; Reg.50(2). The emphasis 
here is upon avoiding revocation, for where mitigation of any adverse effects is 
practicable the consent should be affirmed; Reg.51(3). Indeed, the planning 
authority is under a duty to investigate whether adverse effects can be overcome 
by planning obligations. However, where these persist, consent must be revoked 
or modified under s.97 TCPA 1990124 or discontinued via s.102; compensation 
will be appropriate in such an event. In any case, review cannot affect 
development that has, by that time, been completed or is no longer an issue due to 
the expiry of time limits; Reg.55. 
The safeguards represented by assessment and review are limited by Reg.49 
C(NH)R 1994. This permits harmful development of a European site where there 
are no alternatives to the project and it is essential for 'imperative reasons of 




See pp.71-72 below. 
Review proceeds under normal planning procedures. 
See below; p.46. 
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health and defence issues, and indeed social and economic considerations -- which 
are explicit within Reg.49(l). Where a planning authority proposes to authorise a 
project with adverse impact upon a European site, it must consult the Secretary of 
State and then wait for twenty-one days before doing so; Reg.49(5). The 
Secretary of State may direct the authority not to authorise the development; for 
the duration of a specified period or indefinitely. 
The exceptional development of European sites for social and economic 
reasons has generated a substantial amount of case law, and indeed forms the 
backdrop to the main case studies of this research.125 Commission v Germany126 
concerned the reinforcement of Leybucht dykes, leading to a reduction of SPA 
boundaries. The work was necessary for public safety, a reason accepted as being 
sufficiently serious by the ECJ. The court went on to hold that SPA reduction 
could only be justified on very limited grounds: those corresponding to a general 
interest that is superior to the general interest represented by the Directive's 
ecological aim. Development could not be permitted for economic or recreational 
reasons. This approach was underlined in Commission v Spain,127 which applied 
the Leybucht principle to habitat degradation by pollution. However, these rulings 
were rendered impotent by enactment of the Habitats Directive; Art.6(4) 1 2 8 of 
which now governs European site development and indeed permits it 
exceptionally on economic grounds. However, notwithstanding the facility in 
Reg.49 to develop European sites, the general prohibition of projects 
compromising their integrity serves to afford them better protection than that 
extending to SSSI. 
Furthermore, the situation under Reg.49 C(NH)R 1994 is altered where the 
site in question contains a 'priority natural habitat' or 'priority species'.129 In this 
event, the imperative reasons justifying development may relate only to human 
health, public safety, important environmental issues or other reasons the 
European Commission considers imperative. Thus, the Leybucht position 
See pp.90-97& 97-109. 
[1991] E C R 883. 
[1993] Water Law 209. 
Reflected in Reg.49 C(NK)R 1994. 
Defined by Art.l Habitats Directive. 
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continues to apply to such exceptional habitats, which are therefore insulated from 
most sources of development pressure. 
Another European protective initiative is the compensation requirements 
attendant upon European site development under Reg.53 C(NH)R 1994; a benefit 
denied to domestically designated habitats.130 For all sites developed under 
Reg.49 C(NH)R 1994. the Secretary of State must take appropriate 
compensatory measures by providing an alternative site for European designation. 
This ensures that the overall integrity of the Natura 2000 network is maintained. 
5. The Ramsar Convention 
Legal protection of wildlife habitats has been further augmented by several 
Conventions; the means by which international intent and policy are formalised. 
The most important for our terms of reference is the 'Convention on Wetlands of 
International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat';1 3 1 adopted at Ramsar 
in 1971 to protect the increasingly vulnerable habitats of wedand birds. 
Under the Ramsar Convention each Signatory promises to protect important 
wetland habitats, known as 'Ramsar sites', within its territory. The meaning 
ascribed to the term 'wetland', as defined by Ar t . l , is in keeping with the broad 
sense of the word and thus will include what is ordinarily considered to be 
wetland, such as marsh and fen; both natural and artificial. The emphasis within 
the Convention is upon protecting those sites that support waterfowl. 1 3 2 As in the 
case of the above provisions, protection is effected by site designation; Art.2. 
However, the details of designated sites are maintained by the International Union 
for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, which administers the 
Convention under Art.8. Habitats selected are of international importance; such 
status being detennined by scientific criteria under Art.2(2). Each Signatory must 
list at least one site when signing or ratifying the Convention. 
Ramsar acknowledges the crucial role played by planning in habitat 




See p.44 below. 
Cmnd.6465, HMSO; 1976; as amended by Protocol of 3.12.82. 
That is, birds ecologically dependent on wetlands; Art.l. 
40 
promote the conservation of Ramsar sites, and encourage the wise use of 
wetlands generally. Indeed, Art.4(l) obliges Parties to establish reserves on 
wetlands, whether listed under Ramsar or not, in the interest of waterfowl 
conservation. The UK government is therefore obliged, as a Signatory, to 
positively avoid land development that has harmful impact upon not only listed 
Ramsar sites but all wildfowl habitats. This provision is thus material to planning 
policy generally, in addition to protecting specific habitats. 
However, the Ramsar Convention also acknowledges the unfeasibility of 
preserving habitats indefinitely. Art.4(2) permits the deletion and restriction of 
Ramsar boundaries; although this must be justified by urgent national interests. A 
Signatory resorting to Art.4(2) is obliged, as far as possible, to compensate for 
the loss; in particular by creating an alternative reserve for waterfowl so an 
adequate portion of original habitat type survives. Compensatory land may, or 
may not, be in the same area as the habitat lost. In this respect, Ramsar enhances 
SSSI protection in a similar manner to the European provisions discussed above. 
The means by which the Ramsar Convention is accommodated by the existing 
legal and planning framework affects the promotion of conservation in the context 
of Art.3(1). The UK has chosen to designate as Ramsar sites only those habitats 
that already have national legal protection; thus designation follows the SSSI 
formula, with all terrestrial sites concurrently listed as SSSI. The Convention 
therefore contributes to the overlapping of site designations; not least because 
many Ramsar sites additionally qualify as SPAs on ornithological grounds. Whilst 
they do not constitute European sites per se under the C(NH)R 1994. the 
government currently133 applies the same considerations in respect of potential 
and classified European sites to listed Ramsar sites. There is additional support for 
the view that Ramsar sites enjoy much the same level of theoretical protection as 
European sites in the Recommendations of the Cagliari Conference.134 Thus, 
under Recommendation 1.5 the wise use of wetlands requires maintenance of 
ecological interest as a basis for conservation and sustainable development. 
See JPL April 1997; pp.373-379. 
A meeting held in November 1980 of the Parties to the Ramsar Convention, at which 
several Recommendations were made to improve its effectiveness — these do not bind 
the Parties in the same way as Articles do, but should nevertheless be complied with. 
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Furthermore, assessment should be undertaken prior to planning decisions, and 
ecologists ought to be involved in the planning process -- as per Recommendation 
1.6.135 
The above requirements are clearly conducive to full consideration of Ramsar 
sites' ecological significance by planning authorities. However, in terms of 
ultimate protection from development, Ramsar sites rely entirely upon the SSSI 
system.136 
6 Indirectly beneficial provisions 
The following legal measures, whilst not principally concerned with habitat 
protection, serve to indirectly assist that cause. They reflect the link between 
conservation and amenity; a connection that has existed since the introduction of 
protective legislation in the 1940s.137 Clearly, provisions aimed at protecting the 
countryside per se, and indeed encouraging a sensible balance of land uses 
generally, will benefit habitats. For example, s . l l Countryside Act 1968 
specifically obliges all Ministers, government departments and public bodies to 
have regard to conserving the natural beauty and amenity of the countryside when 
carrying out their duties over land; local planning authorities fall under this 
provision. 
The tighter planning controls in respect of national parks, introduced for 
purposes of amenity by the NPACA 1949, are clearly not inconsistent with nature 
conservation; the maintenance of countryside for whatever reasons assisting in 
habitat preservation.138 Furthermore, their original purposes have subsequently 
been extended to embrace conservation and enhancement of natural beauty, 
wildlife and cultural heritage; and the promotion of opportunities for public 
S. Lyster, International Wildlife Law, Cambridge: Grotius Publications Ltd, 1985; 
pp. 196-198. 
Also applicable to habitat protection but not relevant to the cases researched, are: the 
'Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats' (Cmnd 
8738, 1982; the 'Berne Convention') and the 'Convention on the Conservation of 
Migratory Species of Wild Animals' (Cmnd. 1332, 1990; the 'Bonn Convention'). 
See pp. 16-22 above. 
This is also a benefit of Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB); see s.87 
NPACA 1949. 
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enjoyment and understanding of such special qualities.139 National park planning 
authorities must have regard to these purposes; and where there is conflict 
between conservation and amenity, greater weight must be attached to the former 
under the 'Sandford principle' enshrined within s. 11 A(2) NPACA 1949. 
Similarly, designation of Environmentally Sensitive Areas under s. 18 
Agriculture Act 1986 assists habitat protection. Indeed these may be designated 
upon consultation with the NCC specifically to conserve wildlife and landscape;140 
although they are primarily aimed at checking the excesses of agriculture. 
Nevertheless, it is a designation to which the attention of planning authorities will 
inevitably be drawn where development is proposed. 
Habitat protection is also a feature of the 'Convention on Biological 
Diversity'. 1 4 1 which promotes the conservation of biological diversity and 
sustainable use of its components. In addition to developing strategies to facilitate 
this under Art.6, Parties are obliged to establish a system of areas that are either 
protected per se or benefit from conservation measures; Art.8. Indeed, para.(d) 
explicitly encompasses habitat protection in this context. At the very least, the 
Convention represents a fetter upon government planning policies in the interests 
of ecology. Furthermore, the planning process is enhanced by the requirement in 
Art. 14 to establish procedures assessing the environmental impacts of projects 
likely to have significant adverse effects on biological diversity. This supports the 
earlier formal requirements of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), 1 4 2 which 
represent a valuable tool of habitat protection in the planning ambit. 
The Planning Process 
1. General Planning Control 
As it is the planning system through which conflicts between conservation 
and development are resolved, and by which the prohibition upon damaging 
s.5(l) NPACA 1949: as amended by s.61 Environment Act 1995. 
See s.l8(l)(b) Agriculture Act 1986. 
Cmnd. 2127,1992 (HMSO 1993). 






protected habitats may be circumvented, an explanation of its operation is an 
essential objective of this chapter. 
Both designated and non-designated habitats fall to be considered by the 
ordinary town and country planning system when targeted by development; this is 
currently based on the TCP A 1990. The pivotal feature of planning control is the 
pre-condition that any proposal constituting development requires planning 
permission from the relevant planning authority. 'Development' is defined in 
s.55(l) TCPA 1990 as 'the carrying out of building, engineering, mining or other 
operations in, on, over or under land, or the making of any material change in the 
use of any buildings or other land'. Thus, any activity that falls prima facie within 
this broad definition requires advance consent; notwithstanding an applicant has 
absolute ownership of the land in question. The term 'material change in use' 
concerns the character of the proposed land use. Many considerations apply here, 
and it is a question of fact and degree in each case whether an operation ultimately 
constitutes development and thus requires a planning permission application.143 
Certain activities, such as agriculture and forestry,1 4 4 are excluded from the 
definition of development by s.55(2) and therefore fall outside the planning 
permission requirements. 
Where an application is required, this is made to the relevant local planning 
authority and must include details of the proposed development and land to which 
it refers. In considering the application, the authority is guided in the factors to be 
taken into account. In particular, it must have regard to the provisions of the 
development plan, in so far as these are material to the application; s.70(2) TCPA 
1990. Development plans contain the development policies145 of the planning 
authority in question; and are a requirement of s. 12(1) TCPA 1990. They 
represent official policy on development and thus reflect current national and 
regional standpoints, taking into account guidance received from the Secretary of 
State; S.12(6). However, the authority is entitled, under Art. 17 Town and Country 
Such application is not required where consent is deemed under a general development 
order (GDO); see below p.46-47. 
Notwithstanding their potential for habitat damage. 
See ss.10-28 TCPA 1990. 
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Planning (General Development Procedure) Order 1995. (TCP(GDP)O 1995)1 4 6 
to grant consent that conflicts with the development plan; in this event the 
Secretary of State may impose conditions. Clearly, each application will raise its 
own issues and it is prudent that the planning authority, in the exercise of its 
discretion, has regard to all material considerations; a requirement of s.70(2) 
TCPA 1990. 
SSSI status may 1 4 7 constitute one such factor. Other influences within the 
decision-making process are representations received in response to notice of the 
application being displayed or served on an interested party; the planning 
authority must take these into account under Art. 19 TCP(GDP)Q 1995. 
Where SSSI status is a material consideration, the fate of the habitat will 
effectively depend upon the net result of a balance between the conservation 
interest on one hand and the benefits of development on the other. Basic SSSI 
designation is a means of ensuring that the special interest of a site is brought to 
the attention of the planning authority. It is important to note that, 
notwithstanding the SSSI network is crucial to mamtaining the nation's current 
range and distribution of wildlife, there is no legal requirement to consider 
development of one site as being potentially detrimental to the integrity of the 
overall network. Each site is considered independently on its merits, and where 
development is authorised there is no requirement to designate a replacement 
SSSI. 
Whilst all SSSI are potentially at risk from authorised development, the 
plarining authority will have regard to any other designations concurrently 
benefiting the site in question. NNRs are nationally important, a factor justifying 
Ministerial intervention under s.77 TCPA 1990; although the fact that many are 
owned by the NCC will better insulate such sites from development pressure.148 
Ultimately, the relative status of the habitat in question is a material factor to be 
1995, No. 419; this is actually a GDO, which contains procedures in respect of 
planning applications. 
See p.76 below. 
Ownership of habitats, however, is no guarantee of their preservation, as all land is 
potentially subject to compulsory purchase orders; see the Acquisition of Land Act 
1981; s.2. 
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weighed against other pertinent issues; which may or may not prove more 
influential than ecology. 
Where planning permission is granted, it may be unconditional or subject to 
specified conditions under s.72 TCPA 1990. Any conditions attached must be 
reasonably related to the development in question; and indeed under s.91 all 
permission is deemed to include a condition that development must commence 
within five years from the date of consent; or some other period stipulated by the 
authority.149 Planning permission enures for the benefit of the land and thus 
applies to all subsequent owners under s.75. It cannot be extinguished by mere 
conduct, such as a commercial decision to cease the use, unless the terms of the 
permission explicitly provide for i t . 1 5 0 This may prove especially problematic in 
cases where consent has been granted in less environmentally aware periods, and 
where land has acquired habitat significance subsequent to the planning 
permission.151 
Many development proposals raise issues of national importance; not least in 
the field of nature conservation. It is therefore appropriate that the Secretary of 
State is empowered to intervene in the local planning process. S.77 TCPA 1990 
entitles him to 'call-in' an application for his own determination — his decision 
being final; s.77(7).152 In this event, the applicant and local planning authority are 
entitled to appear before an inspector appointed by the Secretary of State, though 
the latter is not bound by the inspector's conclusions and is indeed required to 
form an independent view. 1 5 3 The involvement of the Secretary of State in a 
planning matter is testimony to the importance of issues raised by that case. For 
this reason, when utilising powers under ss.77-78,154 he may refer questions to a 
Planning Inquiry Commission under s.101 TCPA 1990; these must be of national 
or regional importance, or be considerations of a scientific nature justifying special 
inquiry; s.101(3). 
s.91 does not apply to permission granted by Development Order; see below, p.46. 
Pioneer Aggregates (UK) Ltd. v Secretary of State for the Environment [1985] A C 132. 
For an example of this see the case of Hartshead and Ivonbrook quarries @ pp.71-72 
below. 
But see the challenge procedure below; pp.53-57. 
Nelsovil Ltd. v Minister of Housing and Local Government [1962] 1 All E R 423. 
s.78 provides an applicant whose application has been refused, or granted subject to 
conditions, with a right of appeal to the Secretary of State. 
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Although planning permission prima facie enures ad perpetuum, it is clearly 
prudent to provide for subsequent variation in order to meet changed 
circumstances. This is possible under s.97 TCP A 1990. which empowers the local 
planning authority to modify and indeed revoke consent. The authority must have 
regard to the development plan and other material considerations in doing so, and 
the Secretary of State's approval is also required; s.98(l). 1 5 5 Prior to the latter's 
confirmation there is a right to a hearing before an inspector under s.98(4). The 
practical impact of the power to revisit consent is significantly limited by two 
provisos: it cannot affect activities which have already proceeded under the 
consent, s.97 (4) TCP A 1990: and the planning authority will be liable under s.107 
to compensate an applicant who has suffered financial loss as a result of the 
modification or revocation. The financial implications flowing from s.107 
represent a very substantial disincentive to interfere, with the result that s.97 is 
used most sparingly in practice. Indeed, this provision effectively renders the vast 
majority of planning permissions final and permanent. 
2. General Development Order 
Not all development requires planning permission; an important exception to 
the general principle enunciated above156 is the phenomenon of the development 
order. Under s.59(l) TCP A 1990. the Secretary of State is empowered to grant 
planning permission by development order; which may be general to all land or 
specific to a parcel referred to in the order. As in the case of consent granted to an 
applicant, it may be unconditional or subject to specified conditions; s.60(l). 
Art.3 Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) Order 
1995 (TCP(GPD)O 1995)1 5 7 thus grants planning permission to an entire range of 
development classes; and as such this GDO facilitates circumvention of the usual 
planning process. Indeed, it was in order to mitigate the potentially draconian 
Indeed the Secretary of State is himself empowered to intervene under s.97, via s.100 
TCPA 1990: before doing so he must consult the local planning authority; s. 100(3). 
p.43. 
1995, No. 418; as amended by Town and Country Planning (General Permitted 
Development) (Amendment) Order 1997. SI 1997 No. 366. 
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controls implicit in the introduction of wholesale planning in the post-war years158 
that GDOs were made.159 They are also capable of promoting certain activities, as 
the agricultural exemption demonstrated, and thus represent an important tool in 
the planning process. The example of agriculture clearly demonstrates that GDO 
exemption may have an extremely dramatic effect on habitat. 
Schedule 2 TCP(GPD)Q 1995 grants deemed consent to a list of 
development classes; it also itemises exceptions for which ordinary planning 
applications are required. Thus, Class A of Part 4 grants consent to temporary 
buildings and uses, with the exception of mining activities; there are also 
conditions, (e.g. reinstatement of land) attached to the consent. Agricultural 
consent is granted by Part 6; and a no less ecologically significant exemption — 
activities necessary for forestry — is found in Part 7. Other relevant classes 
include: Part 13 Class A — works to maintain or improve a highway on adjoining 
land, Part 15 Class A — development to improve land drainage works and Part 17 
— development by Statutory Undertakers. The GDO also makes provision for 
designated habitats that might be affected by deemed consent. For example, Part 
22 Class A consents to work pertaining to mineral exploration, but this is not 
permitted where the operation would be within, inter alia, a SSSI; A.l.(c). 
Although potentially of wide-ranging effect in the consent it may deem, the 
GDO is limited in its operation. Consent granted in respect of Schedule 2 Classes 
cannot permit that which has been restricted by a condition contained in other 
planning permission; Art. 3 (4) TCP(GPD)Q 1995. Furthermore, the requirement 
of full planning permission may be imposed under Art.4, where the planning 
authority1 6 0 or Secretary of State so direct; this will render deemed consent under 
Art.3 inapplicable to the development specified. Thus, notwithstanding the 
significant influence GDO exemption may have upon habitats, full consideration 





The first GDO was made as early as 1948; SI 1948 No. 958. 
A planning authority's direction must be approved by the Secretary of State; Art.5. 
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3. Planning Policy Guidance 
Central government policy on planning is furnished to the local authorities by 
means of planning policy guidance notes (PPG). Although guidance across several 
areas has an impact upon nature conservation,161 'PPG9 Nature Conservation'162 
is specifically concerned with this field, and thus represents current policy on 
development where habitat is an issue. 
PPG9 seeks to ensure that an appropriate balance is struck between 
conservation and development — two potentially conflicting courses that, with 
careful planning, are considered broadly compatible (para.3). Where conflict is 
unavoidable, para. 2 seeks to rninimise the adverse effects on wildlife. The 
guidance accepts that the key to wildlife conservation is the protection of habitat 
on which it depends (para.4). Nature conservation should be taken into account in 
all planning activities affecting rural and coastal land, and in urban areas hosting 
wildlife of local importance; para. 19. Expert advice is therefore essential; a factor 
acknowledged by para.20, which directs planning authorities to the advice 
provided by both the NCC and voluntary organisations such as the RSPB and 
County Wildlife Trusts. Consultation is crucial to the successful balancing of land 
use conflicts, and indeed the NCC plays a consultative role where nature 
conservation is an issue.163 A planning application in respect of a SSSI must not 
be determined within fourteen days of initiating consultation. Indeed, consultation 
is appropriate wherever a development proposal affects a NCC consultation 
area164 surrounding a SSSI -- whether the habitat itself is directly affected or not. 
As SSSI are the basis for site designation in the UK, the consultation 
requirements attaching to them thus apply across all higher designations also; 
essential to an environmentally responsible planning process. 
E.g. PPG12, February 1992; (para. 6.24-5 re. environmental appraisal of proposals), 
London: HMSO. 
London: HMSO, October 1994. 
Before granting planning permission over a SSSI, the local planning authority must 
consult with the NCC unless the latter dispenses with that requirement; TCP(GDP)Q 
1995 Art.10 Table para.(u). The authority will thereafter inform the NCC of the 
decision made (para.33 PPG9). 
This may extend up to 2km from SSSI boundaries; para.31 PPG9. 
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Para. 12 PPG9 expresses the government's commitment to meeting the 
obligations flowing from designation of sites, ensuring their protection from 
damage and destruction. Additionally, the guidance acknowledges that areas of 
conservation interest exist outwith statutory designated sites; para. 14. Indeed, 
whether designated or not, features of critical importance for wildlife in terms of 
migration and dispersal, etc., such as hedgerows and rivers (often referred to as 
'wildlife corridors'), will benefit from careful management and ought to be 
accommodated by planning policy; paras. 16 & 23. 1 6 5 
PPG9 aims to ensure that habitats receive appropriate recognition within the 
planning process, in particular that the account taken of a site's ecological value is 
proportionate to its relative importance — planning authorities must therefore 
have regard to the various designations before them. Particular emphasis is placed 
upon the protection of internationally important sites, with provisions of the 
Habitats and Birds Directives explicitly referred to in para.8. Proposals affecting 
SACs and SPAs must be considered in the light of obligations imposed by the 
Habitats Directive; para.37 directs planning authorities to the appropriate 
procedures within this and the C(NH)R1994, and indeed these should be reflected 
in structure, development and local plans. Furthermore, when considering 
proposals affecting potential European sites whose details have been forwarded to 
the European Commission, para. 13 requires that such habitats must be treated in 
the same way as those whose classification is complete. Government policy thus 
pays great heed to sites qualifying for European site status; a theme evident 
throughout the guidance. 
PPG9 also extends to nationally important habitats, though with much less 
enthusiasm than in respect of internationally significant ones. Planning authorities 
must have regard to the national significance of NNRs when balancing 
development against conservation interests, although such applications will 
usually be called-in (para.36). 
The extraction of minerals166 underlying habitats has potentially grave 
environmental consequences, and this is acknowledged by the guidance. Such 
This reflects the obligation in Art. 10 Habitats Directive - see Reg.37 C(NH)R 1994. 
See also Minerals Planning Guidance Note 6, April 1994 (paras. 72-74); London: 
HMSO. 
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proposals affecting SSSI must be subject to rigorous examination; still more 
stringent requirements apply where the site is also a SPA, SAC or Ramsar.167 
Ultimately, the need for the mineral must be balanced against environmental 
considerations, and where consent is granted conditions will normally be attached 
to both the winning of mineral and restoration of the site subsequently; para.40. 
PPG9 favours a restrictive approach in the extent to which nature 
conservation ought to be allowed to interfere with development; and indeed 
para. 18 stresses the need to avoid unnecessary constraints in this ambit. Planning 
authorities are urged generally to consider the use of conditions to mitigate 
habitat damage; and where these do have a role to play consent should not be 
declined on ecological grounds (para.27). In any event planning permission ought 
to be granted wherever other factors outweigh conservation considerations; 
implicit in this approach is the fact that there are circumstances in which 
destruction of habitats — even internationally significant ones — may be justified. 
4. Environmental Impact Assessment 
Crucial to development decisions over habitats is the anticipated impact of 
projects upon the scientific interest in question. Ascertaining this has always been 
a fundamental part of planning authority responsibility. 
In recent times there have been measures to formalise this process; in 
particular EC Directive 85/337 on the assessment of the effects of certain public 
and private projects on the environment168 was introduced entirely to facilitate 
prior formal assessment of environmental effects1 6 9 -- a process known as EIA. It 
applies to both public and private projects170 with likely significant impact on the 
environment; Ar t . l . These must be assessed under Art.2 before planning 
permission is granted, with a view to identifying both the direct and indirect 
effects upon, inter alia, fauna and flora, soil and water and the interaction of such 
factors (Art.3). 
1 6 7 CIO Annex C. 
1 6 8 O. J. L2/175/40; as amended by E C Directive 97/5011: O. J. L73/5. 
1 6 9 Such assessment was also a requirement of the later 'Biodiversity Convention'; see p.42 
above. 
1 7 0 Though not those adopted by specific national legislation; Art. 1(5). 
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The test in Art . l of the Directive: 'likely significant environmental effects', is 
further refined so that not all developments that appear to satisfy this general 
definition are subject to assessment. The applicability of EIA is determined by the 
type of project in question: those listed in Annex I (such as motorway 
construction and trading port development) are subject to Art.4(l) and must be 
assessed. Those listed in Annex I I (such as mineral extraction and urban 
development) are subject to Art.4(2) and will be assessed only where States 
consider such action appropriate.171 Furthermore, Art.4 provides that States are 
ultimately empowered to specify the Annex I I projects subject to EIA, and 
additionally to establish criteria with which to determine the applicability of Annex 
I I . The Convention is thus extremely flexible in the means by which its 
requirements may be implemented. 
Clearly, the quantity and quality of information supporting EIA is crucial to 
its effectiveness as a planning instrument. This is governed by Art.5, which 
provides that the developer must supply the data172 necessary for assessment to be 
undertaken. Annex IV contains guidance on the type of information relevant, 
which includes: details of the project itself, alternatives considered by the 
developer, environmental impact and mitigation measures. Data thus supplied 
must be taken into account in considering the planning application (Art.8); and 
those exercising environmental responsibilities affected by the project must be 
identified and consulted during this process under Art.6. EIA therefore serves to 
place the fullest relevant information available before the planning authority, and 
ensure it is accommodated within the planning process. 
However, not all developments with potential environmental impact will 
benefit from assessment; as a project may exceptionally be exempted from EIA 
under Art. 2(3) of the Directive. In this event a Member State must consider the 
benefits of some other form of assessment, make public the reasons pertaining to 
the exemption and inform the European Commission of such reasons before 
consenting to the project. 
i.e. Where significant environmental effects are anticipated. 
Including a 'non-technical summary'; Annex IV, para.6. 
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EC Directive 85/337 was given direct effect within the UK by the enactment 
of The Town and Country Planning (Assessment of Environmental Effects) 
Regulations 1988.173 S.71A TCP A 1990 permits regulations to be made to extend 
the requirements of environmental assessment in this field. However, the Town 
and Country Planning (Assessment of Environmental Effects) Regulations 1988 
directly incorporate various Articles of the Directive. Thus Reg.4 requires the 
consideration of environmental information as a pre-requisite to granting planning 
permission — the decisions of the Secretary of State or inspector being open to 
challenge on such grounds under Reg.25. The types of project which fall under 
the EIA requirements of Reg.4 are listed in Schedules 1 and 2; which reproduce 
the contents of Annexes I and I I respectively — Schedule 2 is relevant only where 
the development in question would be likely to have significant effects on the 
environment by virtue of factors such as nature, size and location. 
In the UK, the data required to undertake EIA is submitted by the developer 
in the form of an environmental statement (ES); and a Schedule 1 or 2 application 
not accompanied by an ES will result in a request by the planning authority to 
rectify this under Reg.9. The content of the ES must conform with Schedule 3, 1 7 4 
which requires such information as a description of the work and likely impact, 
mitigation details, a non-technical summary and indeed data facilitating the 
assessment.175 
The mechanics of assessment and collection of information supporting it 
clearly represent an expensive and time consuming aspect of the planning process. 
For this reason a prospective developer may seek the planning authority's opinion 
as to the applicability of EIA under Reg.3 Town and Country Planning 
(Environmental Assessment and Permitted Development) Regulations 1995.176 An 
opinion thus obtained may be referred to the Secretary of State by an applicant 
under Reg.4 for the former's consideration. 
1 7 3 SI 1988, No.1199 as amended by: SI 1990/367, SI 1992/1494, SI 1994/677 and SI 
1996/972; see also: The Town and Country Planning (Environmental Assessment and 
Permanent Development) Regulations 1995 (SI 1995/417); p.52 below) and The 
Town and Country Planning (Environmental Assessment and Unauthorised 
Development) Regulations 1995 (SI 1995/2258). 
1 7 4 Which corresponds to Annex TV to the Directive. 
1 7 5 The local planning authority, Secretary of State or inspector may require further 
information in addition to the ES; Reg.21(2). 
1 7 6 1995, No.417. 
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In any event, the Secretary of State is empowered to rule that a proposal 
satisfying Schedules 1 or 2 does not require EIA due to its being exempt or not 
falling within the definition of 'development'; Reg. 14(2) TCP(GDP)Q 19951 7 7 
This provision takes advantage of the Art.2(3) exemption within EC Directive 
85/337, and introduces considerable flexibility into EIA. It also represents a 
means of circumventing EIA, thus denying its benefits to the decision-making 
process. 
Enforcement and Challenge 
The overlapping web of protective laws generates a myriad of enforcement 
procedures, involving the NCC, European Commission178 and various 
international organisations. However, of equal importance to habitat protection is 
the enforcement of planning law; which ultimately relies upon enforcement notices 
pursuant to ss. 172-173 TCPA 1990.179 These address those situations in which 
development proceeds without consent. 
However, the enforcement of habitat protection law also depends upon the 
challenge of planning decisions taken in breach; usually brought by voluntary 
conservation groups. In this context the publicity ensured by compulsory entry in 
a public register under s.69 TCPA 1990 is important. Such challenge to the 
exercise of administrative power, known as judicial review, must follow a specific 
procedure — which involves obtaining leave and adhering to time limits. To satisfy 
the pre-requisite of leave, application is made ex parte to a single High Court 
judge under s.31(3) Supreme Court Act 1981 (SCA 1981). However, this is not 
necessary where challenge is by way of the standard 'six weeks' procedure'; an 
example being s.288 TCPA 1990. S.288 facilitates High Court challenge to 
planning decisions of the Secretary of State, local authority and inspector. It is not 
a re-examination of the issues — merely an investigation into whether the action 
1995, No.419. 
See below, p.56. 
Non-compliance with which entitles the local planning authority to directly enforce the 
law - s.178; although their issue may be subject to Secretary of State appeal. 
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taken was within the powers conferred by statute. Thus, 'any person aggrieved'180 
may bring such a challenge, and i f so within six weeks. 
The wider powers of judicial review may be invoked under the procedure 
contained within Order 53 Rules of the Supreme Court (RSC)1 8 1 and s.31 SCA 
1981. Unlike review under s.288 TCP A 1990, this is not restricted to evaluating 
the legality of individuals' actions. Time limits are important here: s.31(6) SCA 
1981 providing that the court can refuse leave, or indeed the relief sought, in the 
event of undue delay where it feels relief would be likely to cause hardship, 
prejudice rights or be detrimental to good administration. This provision is 
without prejudice to other time limit rules; in particular Order 53 r.4 RSC requires 
an application to be made promptly and in any event within three months from the 
date when grounds for the application arose — although the court can extend this 
period. The practical effect of these provisions is summarised in the case of 
Caswell v Dairy Produce Quota Tribunal:1 8 2 leave may be refused where an 
application is not made promptly, and in any event within three months, unless the 
court is satisfied of a good reason to do otherwise. Notwithstanding such good 
reason however, leave and relief may still be refused where its granting would be 
likely to cause hardship or prejudice, or interfere with good administration. 
An applicant must additionally have locus standi; i.e., an interest in the 
exercise of power challenged.183 This requirement of sufficient interest may be 
pitched at a different level, depending on the remedy184 sought. Also, as it can be 
adequately determined only in the context of the wider application itself, this issue 
cannot usually be treated as a preliminary matter because full details are not 
before the court on an application for leave. Thus, sufficient interest is a relevant 
factor to determining the application itself.1 8 5 It ultimately depends upon various 
factors, such as the terms of the legislation in question and the nature of the act 
A term including both those aggrieved in the ordinary sense of the word and those who 
made representations at inquiry; Turner v Secretary of State for the Environment 
(1973) 28 P&CR 123. 
These are made under s.84 SCA 1981 -- see SI 1965 No.1776 as amended; Order 53 is 
now in the form prescribed by SI 1977 No. 1955. 
[1990] 2 AC 738. 
See Ord.53 r.3 RSC & s.31(3) SCA 1981. 
IRC v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd. [1982] AC 
617. 
D. Foulkes, Administrative Law- 8th ed., London: Butterworths, 1995, p.356. 
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leading to the complaint.186 In the planning context, both an amenity society187 
and rival developer188 have been held to have sufficient interest; as well as the 
actual participants in the development.189 Each application will turn upon its own 
facts. 
Where an applicant satisfies the requirements for judicial review, any remedy 
granted to him is entirely at the court's discretion. There are three prerogative 
orders available -- only in respect of the exercise of public power -- and these may 
be supplemented with declarations or injunctions;190 available to both the public 
and private ambits. The court may grant certiorari to quash an unlawful decision; 
although this is not a substitution of the court's decision for that of the body in 
question. It may also grant a prohibition, to prevent a body from acting 
unlawfully; thus restraining the continuation of unfair procedure.191 The third 
prerogative order is mandamus, which compels the performance of a duty on pain 
of contempt of court. 1 9 2 Additionally, declaration is available — a means of 
clarifying parties' legal rights. This remedy has no coercive force; unlike an 
injunction, which requires a party to refrain from acting (or more rarely to 
undertake positive action). The court is also empowered, in an application for 
judicial review, to award damages193 in addition to the above remedies. 
Thus, where the court is faced with unlawful action by a public body, it has 
an arsenal of potential remedies on which to rely. Flexibility is ensured by the 
possibility of combining such remedies; for example, the court can quash a 
decision via certiorari and by mandamus order its re-consideration. However, in 
addition to the discretionary nature of these remedies, it is extremely difficult in 
practice to establish something capable of vitiating the decision of a public 
See IRC v National Federation of Self-Employed & Small Businesses Ltd. [1982] AC 
617. 
Covent Garden Community Association v G L C [1981] JPL 183. 
R v Canterbury City Council, ex p. Springimage Ltd. [1994] JPL 427. 
R v Camden London Borough Council, ex p. Comyn Ching & Co. (London) Ltd. 
[1983J47P&CR417. 
See s.31(2) SCA 1981. 
R v Liverpool Corporation ex p Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators' Association [1972] 2 
QB 299. 
See R v Poplar Borough Council ex p L C C (No.2) [1922] 1 KB 95. 
s.31(4) SCA 1981. 
See R.v Poole Borough Council, ex p. Beebee et al. [1991] J.P.L. 643. 
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Where the provisions in question are European, issues of Community law 
enforcement also arise. The basic principle here is that, in the absence of specific 
Community rules, national remedies should be sought.195 A UK plaintiff should 
therefore seek judicial review. However, the European Commission and Member 
States also have a potential involvement in law enforcement. Art.169 1 9 6 facilitates 
action by the Commission against a Member State for failure to fulfil a 
Community obligation. Action may also be brought by another State under 
Art.170; 1 9 7 although this has proceeded to judgment only once thus far. 1 9 8 There 
are three stages in Art.169 enforcement: formal notice from the European 
Commission to the State, allowing two months for observations to be submitted; 
the Commission's reasoned opinion as to breach; and ultimately, referral to the 
ECJ where the State fails to comply. Where settlement is reached during the 
proceedings, the action will be formally withdrawn. I f not, the ECJ will rale upon 
the infringement of Community law and the State will be obliged to comply with 
this judgment.199 
In respect of breaches, the European Commission's main source of 
information is complaints; which may be raised by individuals. However, a 
complainant cannot force the Commission to launch, or indeed continue, 
enforcement proceedings;200 the latter thus enjoys in practice a degree of 
discretion in enforcement. 
Finally, a provision that plays an important role in the enforcement and 
challenge process is Art. 177.201 This empowers a national court faced with a 
problematic Community law issue to seek a preliminary ruling from the ECJ. 
Discretion here is upon the national court alone; it is not obliged to refer at the 
parties' request. However, where that court is one from which there is no appeal, 
C-33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz and Rewe-Zentral v Landwirtschaftskammer fur das 
Saarland [1976] E C R 1989. 
The following Article references are to Part 5 Treaty Establishing the European 
Community; 25 March 1957; see 'Treaties Establishing the European Communities', 
London: HMSO; Cmnd. 455, 1988, (Art.169 @ p.135). 
Ibid @ p.135. 
In C-141/78 France v UK [1979] ECR 2923. 
Failure to comply would lead to a second judgment; through which a lump sum or 
penalty payment could be imposed -- Art.171 (Cmnd.455, 1988 @ p.136). 
C-48/65 Lutticke v E E C Commission [1966] E C R 19. 
Cmnd.455, 1988 @ p.137. 
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it must refer -- unless the issue has already been decided by the ECJ or the correct 
application of law is so obvious as to leave no reasonable doubt.2 0 2 Art. 177 
provides a vital link between the national courts and the ECJ and is of crucial 
importance to the enforcement process. 
Conclusion 
An explanation of the area of interaction between wildlife law and planning 
generates several observations. The most obvious is the substantial degree of 
overlap between the various protective provisions. Some of these are of direct 
relevance, others less so; some permit derogation only very exceptionally and then 
require compensation, others are little more than a means of bringing ecological 
significance to the attention of planning authorities. Whilst European provisions 
offer better protection from development, all are of benefit to nature conservation. 
Conservation law must be assessed in the context of the planning mechanism 
with which it dovetails in protecting habitats from harmful development. There is 
enormous reliance upon the controls and safeguards of town and country 
planning; demonstrated by the fact that planning permission may excuse harmful 
activities over SSSI under s.28(8)(a) WACA 1981. 
Of great practical importance are enforcement provisions and the law 
governing challenge within the planning ambit. It is clearly vital to the interests of 
habitats that protective laws are capable of being properly enforced. The lack of 
an obvious complainant with a vested interest in habitat preservation brings a 
unique dimension to enforcement in this field; voluntary conservation 
organisations play a crucial role here. This will be seen in the following chapter, 
which presents the research findings and facilitates an evaluation of the legal and 
regulatory processes outlined above. 
202 'Acte clair' - see C-283/81 CILFIT v Ministero della Sanita [1982] E C R 3415. 
58 
Chapter 4: 
C R I T I Q U E 
Introduction 
Evaluation of the legal protection of habitats from harmful development 
demands both an analysis of relevant planning decisions, and investigation of the 
litigation and complaints' processes. 
This chapter combines research findings with a general critique of the current 
protective regime, reflecting the underlying critical stance of this work. However, 
laudable elements of that regime are acknowledged; appearing in the first section 
of the chapter. 
Thereafter, critique of the NCC and designating law precedes treatment of 
research into the general planning process; the latter supported by criticisms of 
planning guidance and EIA. Then the principal emphasis of the research is 
discussed: enforcement and challenge; which includes the detailed studies of 
Cardiff Bay Barrage and Lappel Bank. 
Finally, this large single chapter is closed with a brief summary of the various 
strands of criticism explored. 
Effective Wildlife Law 
The critical approach of this paper must not be allowed to obscure those 
commendable aspects of relevant law. The establishment of an independent NCC, 
with advisory and management responsibilities over habitats, has been crucial to 
the successful administration of protective law. Indeed, its continued pivotal 
position within wildlife legislation is reflected by its responsibilities under our 
most stringent protective provisions; those relating to European sites.203 
203 See e.g. Reg. 18(2) C(NH)R 1994. 
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The emergence of European environmental law is one of the most significant 
developments of conservation jurisprudence, with the Habitats and Birds 
Directives aspiring to permanently preserve a network of our most important 
habitats. Designation determined wholly by ecological criteria,2 0 4 and supported 
by very restrictive controls equates to the greatest level of habitat protection 
reasonably practicable. Indeed, European law may also extend restrictions to land 
surrounding habitats. For example, in April 1995 the Secretary of State for the 
Environment refused consent for residential development of a site adjoining a 
proposed SPA in Yateley, Hampshire; on the grounds that this would add 
significantly to recreational pressure on the SPA, thereby threatening the breeding 
success of nightjar, woodlark and Dartford warbler.205 
Furthermore, the compensation requirements attending exceptional 
destruction of European sites ensure that the Natura 2000 network remains intact, 
even if actual constituent sites alter over time. This notion of a permanent habitat 
network is a vital commitment to practical conservation in this era of increasing 
land pressure, and points the way forward in the conservation-development 
relationship. 
Nature Conservancy Council 
Notwithstanding the valuable conservation work undertaken by the NCC, its 
effectiveness is inherently limited. In particular, its dependence upon public funds 
represents an impediment to genuine independence. Furthermore, there have even 
been suggestions206 that the NCC has suffered at the hands of political masters 
consumed by improper motives. However, it remains theoretically free to raise 
objections and criticise government policy, and indeed government-backed 
developments; but its practical ability to influence decisions inevitably depends 
upon its resources. The NCC, as a public sector institution, has not escaped the 
R v Secretary of State for the Environment ex p. RSPB [1997] 4 J E L 139; see below 
pp.97-109. 
RSPB; 'Conservation Planner 6,' Sandy: RSPB, 1996. 
By Mr Davies in Parliament over the conduct of Mr Redwood, Welsh Secretary, in 
relation to the Countryside Council for Wales; HC Debs. March 2 1995, Vol.255, 
Col.1232. 
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restrictions on public spending of the 1980s and 1990s; it is thus unable to 
actively take an interest in all planning cases in which important habitat issues 
arise. 
It is submitted that resource shortfalls prevent the NCC from discharging its 
legal responsibilities. In the planning cases analysed, it very rarely even 
commented unless a nationally designated site was involved. Thus, decisions 
concerning important natural habitats that are not yet designated do not generally 
have the benefit of NCC input; notwithstanding its responsibility to give general 
advice on nature conservation to local authorities,207 and guidance on the need to 
acknowledge the importance of nature conservation outside designated sites.208 
The planning authority in such cases must rely heavily upon their own ecologist — 
if one is appointed; an onerous responsibility indeed for that officer. This is 
illustrated by the case of Wraggs Quarry, Derbyshire. Notwithstanding the 
considerable ornithological importance of the proposed development site, no 
comment was made by the NCC. The Peak Park Planning Board's ecologist, who 
concluded that the proposal would not have a significant detrimental effect upon 
the habitat, therefore had a crucial input to the eventual decision to grant consent 
in September 1996. 
Even where the NCC is prepared to oppose developments, the extent and 
nature of such opposition are determined by its resources. In almost all cases 
studied where the NCC took an active interest, it aspired towards compromise 
from the outset. Whilst compromise is a worthy aim of planning, not least in the 
current climate of intensified pressure of competing uses, there will inevitably be 
occasions where the nature conservation interest ought to be regarded as having 
priority; and a proposal rejected on the basis of unacceptable habitat impact. It 
would be naive to impute to developers the public spirit and local environmental 
awareness necessary for site avoidance or application withdrawal where the 
ecological importance of a site becomes apparent. It thus falls to the NCC, as 
official conservation body, to act as guardian of habitats; making representations 
to the planning authority as the circumstances demand. An unflmching attitude of 
Para. 10 PPG9. 
Para. 14 PPG9. 
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compromise, from which a certain amount of habitat loss or damage is inevitable, 
is inconsistent with this duty. 
The NCC's attitude to a proposal to develop the largest colony of Great 
Crested Newts in the UK, near Peterborough, demonstrates this. Notwithstanding 
this species' status as a 'European Protected Species' in Annex IV(a) Habitats 
Directive.2 0 9 the NCC formally considered designation as a SSSI only in May 
1995,210 coinciding with the controversial development proposal. The timing of 
designation betrayed its real purpose as a bargaining tool, as the NCC shortly 
thereafter concluded an agreement with the developers providing for half of this 
habitat to be destroyed. The resulting habitat creation measures, not without risk 
themselves, could not condone the NCC's failure to protect an endangered 
species' largest habitat from partial destruction. 
Such apparent inability to contemplate total opposition to development 
proposals also extends to high profile internationally important habitats. The 
Cairngorms, the last area of genuine wilderness in Britain, were the subject of a 
proposal to replace a 1960s down-hill ski development with modern facilities; thus 
greatly increasing potential visitor numbers. The development site adjoined, in 
addition to a NNR and SSSI, a candidate SPA and possible SAC. 
It was envisaged to replace the ageing equipment with a funicular railway, 
appropriate for transporting large numbers of non-skiing visitors to the summit of 
Cairngorm. This would be supplemented by increased visitor facilities; aiming to 
attract over 225,000211 people per year during the summer months. This 
substantial increase in non-skiers visiting areas adjacent to internationally 
important habitats generated much controversy; including NCC objections on the 
grounds of unacceptable impact on habitats. Such objections, pertaining to 
erosion and vegetation loss due to visitor pressure and construction, were echoed 
by many conservation groups and individuals. Also raised were doubts over 
proposed habitat reinstatement — due to the altitude; and over the effectiveness of 
And thus in Schedule 2 C(NH)R 1994. 
See J. Theobold 'Colonial Struggle' The Guardian 10.5.95. 
The applicants' own figures of 225,000 - 250,000 represent the projected annual 
summer usage; adopted in the planning summary by the Highland Regional Council; 
Planning Committee 4.3.96, BS/1994/254: 'Application for Planning Permission for a 
Funicular Railway and Related Development at Cairngorm'. 
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subsequent monitoring. Kincardine and Deeside District Council feared that 
restricted access from the summit station, a vital environmental protective 
measure, could prove too onerous if actual financial returns fell short of those 
anticipated. However, further discussion between the planning authority, 
developers and landowners; and the adoption of a visitor management plan; 
eventually led to the NCC supporting the development. Notwithstanding other 
objections, not least from the RSPB as conservation experts and adjoining 
landowners, this was enshrined in an agreement under s.50 Town and Country 
Planninp (Scotland) Act 1972. to which the NCC was bound via S.49A 
Countryside (Scotland) Act 1967. The Scottish Secretary, Mr Michael Forsyth, 
had declined to call-in the application, thus terminating objectors' hopes of further 
effective opposition. 
The planning authority accepted212 that, in view of the requirement to 
maintain the European site at a favourable conservation status, increasingly 
substantial investments would be required for environmental management if the 
1960s' development remained un-improved. The funicular proposal was a means 
of generating these extra funds. Of course, by implication a termination of skiing 
activity entirely and suitable management would also achieve favourable 
conservation status; however, it is submitted that the NCC did not seriously 
contemplate opposing these proposals. Indeed, the replacement of old skiing 
equipment would have been a convenient juncture at which to rectify the harmful 
1960s' development by pressing for an end to skiing on the mountain. The 
planning authority, with its own agenda of local economic health to promote, was 
never likely to raise this issue. Whilst such an outcome is perhaps unrealistic, the 
significance of the habitat justified its being raised; only the NCC was in a position 
to do so, and it failed. 
Financial limitation within the NCC was a factor alluded to by Mr Williams2 1 3 
of that organisation. He conceded that resource constraints did indeed interfere in 
his ability to partake in planning cases. Whilst funds could be sought from central 
Planning Committee 4.3.96, BS/1994/254: 'Application for Planning Permission for a 
Funicular Railway and Related Development at Cairngorm'; para. 9.10. 
Interview with Mr R. Williams of English Nature; Peak District & Derbyshire Team; 
21.2.97. 
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office, scarcity of staff generally discouraged involvement in planning enquiries. A 
case could clearly involve staff in lengthy proceedings; prudence therefore 
discouraged involvement unless this was unavoidable. 
Intervention was therefore a matter of NCC discretion. Mr Williams referred 
to a case of 1990 in which it was decided not to oppose the fragmentation of a 
SSSI by an extension of the A564 in Derbyshire. The NCC merely submitted brief 
written evidence seeking mitigation and did not appear at the Public Inquiry. Mr 
Williams conceded that the NCC should, in principle, have objected to this clear 
case of loss. However, a cost/benefit analysis dictated that this was not viable --
expectations of success against the Department of Transport were not high. 
Notwithstanding the active opposition of Derbyshire Wildlife Trust, the 
development proceeded; although the NCC won substantial mitigation. 
However, even where the NCC's objections to a proposal prevent it 
remaining passive, its advisory relationship within the planning process restricts its 
influence over the decision. Indeed, its advice to government departments, 
Ministers and developers is often ignored, and sometimes even contradicted or 
opposed.214 It is, at best, an influential voice to be heard in the overall planning 
process; no more than one strand of argument. Over proposals to develop Selar 
Farm Grasslands SSSI in 1994, its objections proved futile. A request to the 
Secretary of State to call-in the application was denied and consent granted. 
Strong representations from the NCC, including opposition on scientific grounds 
to the mitigation proposal, had no impact upon the planning decision; nature 
conservation is merely one land use to be considered by an authority composed 
entirely of lay members. In such a scenario, the official conservation body's 
powers and resources are wholly inadequate to fully represent the conservation 
interest. The only effective check upon developers' abuse of economic power in 
this ambit comes from voluntary conservation organisations. 
M. Havard & P. Ferns; 'Cardiff Bay: a cautionary tale', ECOS 14(2) 1993, p.51. 
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Designating Law 
The loophole within s.28(8) WACA 1981. whereby planning permission 
excuses otherwise forbidden activities in respect of SSSI, places great faith in the 
planning system. It embraces an assumption that that system is capable of 
accommodating nature conservation, and reduces the NCC to an advisory role --
even where proposals threaten to destroy a site for which it otherwise has 
responsibility. Such an arrangement potentially undermines designation of 
habitats, because there can be no guarantee the conservation interest will be 
adequately considered by the planning authority. 
However well-intentioned an authority's conservation policies are, these 
cannot be entirely insulated from political influence. Indeed, its approach to 
planning is moulded by central planning guidance. Planning authorities must 
actively consider all relevant factors, and nature conservation should not be 
accorded greater significance relative to other considerations. In any event the 
ultimate decision is taken by non-specialist authorities driven by their own 
objectives for the well-being of the area. Economic and social considerations are 
never far from the minds of reasonable authorities. It is therefore unsurprising that 
development continues to claim important habitats, decades after legislative 
attempts to preserve wildlife were introduced. 
As the basis of nature conservation in the UK, all nationally and 
internationally designated habitats - whatever other classifications they 
concurrently hold — are SSSI. Indeed, the law protecting habitats is complex, 
with a plethora of potentially overlapping designations. This inevitably results in a 
hierarchy of sites, with European ones at the top, and habitats of local significance 
at the bottom; those without formal designation represent an underclass within the 
planning and conservation relationship. Inevitably, planning authorities will feel 
more disposed towards sanctioning the development of domestic sites than 
European sites; a fact not likely to be lost on developers. There may be at least a 
sub-conscious influence on authorities where sites lower down the hierarchy are 
the subject of planning applications. Thus, the hierarchical structure of designation 
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fuels the phenomenon referred to by Owens215 as the inexorable erosion of lesser 
sites. 
Hierarchical problems are compounded, and clarity frustrated, by the 
overlapping nature of designation. This confuses decision-makers attempting to 
follow planning advice.216 Furthermore, whilst all SSSI are equal under law, those 
with European site status must be positively managed in the interests of 
conservation. This uneasy distinction threatens the integrity of the national SSSI 
network, conflicting with the rationale behind Huxley's2 1 7 recommendation of a 
single system of sites to preserve wildlife. Also, whilst compensatory measures 
attend the exceptional development of European sites, no such requirements 
govern the development of nationally important habitats. In none of the planning 
decisions studied involving SSSI did the authority even refer to the fact that loss 
of one site would corrupt the national network; compensation measures adopted 
were never done so on the basis that the ecology lost should be wholly 
reproduced. The law on domestic designation thus fails to reinforce what is 
essentially a network of habitats vital to the sustainability of flora and fauna. 
The Planning Process 
An examination of planning decisions where nature conservation is a factor 
permits an evaluation of the extent to which the latter influences those decisions. 
Ultimately this aspect of the study considers how much weight planning 
authorities give to ecology relative to other considerations; and how well habitats 
fare under this process. 
In reaching decisions, pragmatic factors were generally very influential. This 
is not necessarily consistent with due consideration of conservation issues; but 
authorities can be expected to favour outcomes that are practically acceptable to 
their constituents at large. Practical issues guided the Planning Board in the case 
2 1 5 S. Owens; 'Planning and Nature Conservation - the Role of Sustainability'; ECOS 14 
(3/4) 1993 15, @ p.19. 
2 1 6 E . Bichard and P. Davies, 'Appraisal of Major Hazards in Environmental Statements: 
The Assessor's Dilemma'; JPL August 1997 706 @ p.709. 
2 1 7 Cmnd. 7122,1947; whilst this initially concerned NNRs (p.17), SSSI (p.69) have 
subsequendy come to share this function; see also p. 19 above. 
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of Mandale Rake, Derbyshire; which concluded that an application to extract 
fluorspar via open cast mining simply could not be resisted. This refusal to 
consider the proposals with an open mind overrode the ecological significance of 
the unimproved grassland and indeed Ashford residents' concern over the 
generation of heavy goods traffic. Consent was duly granted in January 1997. 
In all cases, the attitude of individual authority members will be instrumental; 
a factor that cannot be legislated for. Indeed, planning is traditionally a process 
generating local hostility and controversy. Such was the effect of comments made 
by David Buckle, Chief Planning Officer of Stroud District Council. These 
concerned proposals to create a residential and industrial settlement within an 
AONB in the Cotswolds. Although local opposition was largely on landscape 
grounds, the proposed site was also of ecological significance due to the presence 
of unspoilt meadow. At a meeting of the Planning Committee, an objector 
complained that developing an AONB would mean nowhere was safe. Buckle 
replied that 'we already can build where we like' . 2 1 8 Whilst this inflammatory 
response over-simplified the relationship between designation and development, it 
also betrayed a disturbing approach to the exercise of wide discretion. Such an 
attitude to designated sites is potentially very damaging to conservation. 
Occasionally, local opposition may be sufficiently organised and stentorian to 
prevail in a planning dispute; a factor of increasing importance in the current era 
of NCC impotence. Proposals to build a fifth London airport within the Vale of 
The White Horse, Oxfordshire, were abandoned in 1995 in response to vociferous 
local objections. Such action, which in this case saved thousands of hectares of 
meadow and woodland, including the important Ock plain, is vital to influencing 
the political dimension that is always proximal to the decision-making process in 
this field. 
It is doubtless tempting for a planning authority to allow itself to consider 
factors not strictly relevant to the merits of an application. This is illustrated by 
the case of Winster Bank, Derbyshire; where the Planning Board sought to avoid 
the difficult decision which full consideration of the facts would have demanded. 
Permission was sought to renew previous consent for fluorspar extraction; 
21 D. Hart-Davis, 'Valley in the shadow'; The Independent, 14.6.97. 
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threatening to harm wildlife that had colonised the area during its dormancy. The 
prevailing influence here is evident from the acknowledgement in the file that 
refusal of consent would probably lead to 'an appeal...[and] enforcement action 
which itself may take time to resolve'. Such observations, however accurate, have 
no place in the consideration of a planning application; which should proceed 
exclusively upon its merits in the context of the target site. Also, whilst the 
District and Parish Councils emphasised the need to take account of wildlife, the 
Planning Board regarded the main issue as likely landscape impact. In an 
undesignated site such as this, it is perhaps unsurprising that this was where the 
national park authority's loyalties lay. 
However, examination of Wear Valley District Council's planning register for 
non-designated habitats revealed the same disposition. Reclamation of land at 
Leasingthorne Colliery, Co. Durham, necessitated felling existing woodland. 
Whilst provision was made for habitat creation, this was entirely driven by 
concern for visual amenity. Indeed, landscaping was a major consideration in all 
applications with habitat impact. Conditions to replace felled trees at 
Edmundbyers and Crook were attached to planning permission wholly for 
landscape reasons; coincidental ecological benefits were not even referred to. The 
concern for visual amenity manifested itself in an almost routine consideration of 
landscape issues; an outline application for residential development at Coundon 
was accepted on condition a scheme of re-planting was given prior approval. This 
strict approach is clearly of indirect benefit to wildlife, as schemes for re-planting 
ensure at least the continued presence of flora. Furthermore, the customary 
consideration of landscape impact outwith national parks and AONB provides a 
valuable blue-print for such treatment of ecological considerations outside 
designated habitats — provided of course the necessary political support for this 
can be raised. 
However, indirect ecological benefits may be minimal, as measures 
determined by landscape considerations will not necessarily be consistent with 
habitat requirements. Also, it was apparent that Wear Valley's preoccupation with 
visual amenity sometimes obscured ecological issues. An application to construct 
a road at Low Willington raised landscape concerns over trees and hedgerows. 
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The Environment Agency requested, in the interests of conservation, that the 
authority discourage the developer from culverting a section of stream. Consent 
was granted in August 1996 with strict conditions on landscaping; but there were 
no conditions attaching, or indeed any references to, culverting. Similarly, a 
proposal to construct the West Auckland bypass involved developing a disused 
railway partially covered with naturally regenerating birch and willow; 
construction would destroy much of the scientific interest. An ecological study 
recommended preserving as much of the existing flora as possible. In approving 
the scheme, the Planning Committee meeting of 24 September 1997 
recommended several landscape measures; vegetation that was preserved was 
done so for visual reasons and very little heed was paid to the habitat 
recommendations. 
It was clear that, providing the target site was un-designated, landscape 
impact represented the overwhelming ancillary concern; notwithstanding any 
ecological interest. Wear Valley was therefore no less concerned with the amenity 
dimension of the countryside than the Peak Park Planning Board. Its approach 
demonstrates that, unless a site has SSSI designation, scant attention will be paid 
to ecological impacts. Whilst this attitude testifies to the significance attached to 
formal designation, it conflicts with the emphasis in official planning guidance219 
on the importance of nature conservation outside designated sites. 
In the ethos of compromise pervading the planning system, conservationists 
must make concessions in order to maximise their realistic expectations. These 
tend to establish precedents; ultimately becoming a further permanent hurdle that 
the conservation cause must clear. Such a precedent was set in the case of 
Thrislington Quarry, Co. Durham; in all other respects an example of successful 
co-operation between developers and conservationists. 
Capable of producing the best quality dolomite in the UK, Thrislington was 
included in the County Council development plan as a dolomite reserve area. The 
site was also the best example of magnesium limestone grassland in existence. 
Whilst the NCC was aware from the outset that Thrislington would ultimately be 
quarried, it was felt that its ecological value justified recognition as a SSSI; if only 
219 See para.14 PPG9; and p.49 above. 
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temporarily. The developers were confident of obtaining consent for continued 
expansion as the quarrying progressed; indeed, an extension had been granted in 
1970 on the understanding it would be very difficult to refuse consent for 
extraction at any time in the future. 2 2 0 Thus, as quarry workings approached the 
SSSI, the only option available to conservationists, after their attempts to 
purchase the land failed, was negotiation to safeguard the ecological interest. 
By the late 1970's experiments were taking place with translocation of the 
vegetation, a method pioneered by Dr David Bellamy involving cutting 1' square 
turves and planting them, in their original order, at an alternative site. Although 
the NCC remained unconvinced that translocation could meet the fundamental 
requirements of nature conservation, it was included within the developers' 
mitigation proposals. At the Local Inquiry that commenced on 7.4.81, the short-
term need for dolomite and quality of that present at Thrislington were 
emphasised as being prevailing factors; the latter precluding consideration of an 
alternative site. The inspector considered the likelihood of future workings 
influencing the site, a factor known by the NCC at notification, to be relevant; and 
that the NCC's objections would be overcome by the developers' willingness to 
adopt modified working methods. He also noted that the SSSI had deteriorated 
and lacked positive management at the time of the Inquiry.2 2 1 During the Inquiry 
the planning authority concluded an agreement222 with the developers to establish 
a nature reserve on undeveloped land and translocation of vegetation into it. The 
NCC expressed reservations about translocation; including the inherent difficulty 
in placing turves in the same relationship as previously, the risk of introducing 
alien species with the soil infilling required in the interstices of turves and the 
potentially slim likelihood of recreating the microtopography of the donor area. 
However, as it represented the only viable conservation option for a site whose 
development was settled, translocation commenced. 
This opinion of the planning officer, contained in a letter of 20.3.62, was based on the 
demand for, and limited supply of, dolomite. 
Indeed, there are problems in relying upon the future potential of a site for its SSSI 
status; see R v NCC ex p, Bolton B.C. [1996] J.P.L. 203. 
Under: s.126 Housing Act 1974 re. translocation; and s.52 Town and Country Planning 
Act 1971 re. controlling the excavation of mineral from the extended quarry. 
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The developers took their responsibilities seriously, appointing a resident 
ecologist and funding conservation management. The process, although time-
consuming, ultimately proved successful. The new site sustained all one hundred 
and forty plant species of the original, plus the Castle Eden argus butterfly which 
had also been displaced. Indeed, recognition of the ecological importance of the 
translocated habitat came with designation as a NNR and proposed SAC status. 
Whilst Thrislington demonstrates that SSSI are not inviolable, its successful 
use of translocation has also set a dangerous precedent. Developers and planning 
authorities alike have since grasped the measure to facilitate development of 
ecologically important target sites. As a result, in situ protection has become a 
less feasible option. The danger is that translocation is unlikely to be as successful 
elsewhere as it was at Thrislington. This was a special case, where the best 
example of rare magnesium limestone grassland coincided with the only known 
supply of magnesium limestone sufficiently pure for use in the sea-water 
magnesium extraction process; a process undertaken by only one company in an 
economically depressed area. Planning and execution of the translocation itself 
benefited from vast resources, and both donor and receptor sites, merely eight 
hundred metres apart, shared the same geology. In 1993223 the NCC confirmed 
the view that translocation is not an acceptable alternative to in situ habitat 
conservation; rather a measure of last resort preferable to total loss. It is likely to 
result in a considerable reduction in the conservation interest of a habitat, as the 
original species composition at the donor site is unlikely to be maintained at the 
receptor site.2 2 4 This view is still maintained by the NCC, whose current policy is 
to oppose such measures.225 However, translocation was regularly proposed — 
and when so, adopted — within the cases studied during this project. Thus, the 
enduring legacy of Thrislington has been the practice of proposing translocation in 
ESs to ensure proposals purport to accommodate conservation needs; a practice 
making it difficult to resist applications on ecological grounds alone. 
Letter from Ms S.F. Collins of English Nature; Peterborough, 30.11.93. 
For a discussion of the inferiority of created habitats see P. Hopkinson & J. Bowers, 
'Sustainability, Roads and Nature Conservation' ; ECOS 13(4) 1992 11 @ p.13. 
Interview with Mr R. Williams of English Nature; Peak District & Derbyshire Team; 
21.2.97. 
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Planning authorities' willingness to consider fresh applications in 
conjunction with extant permission on separate sites is also potentially damaging 
to habitats. Such was the approach of the Peak Park Planning Board over 
Hartshead and Ivonbrook quarries. Consent to extract mineral from Hartshead 
had been granted by Interim Development Order in 1946; in keeping with the 
poor environmental awareness of that period, few environmental conditions were 
made and very little stipulated about restoration. Several extensions of consent 
followed, although eventually the site became dormant and remained so for many 
years. 
By 1994 the quarry was under new ownership, and discussions were 
proceeding with the Planning Board over alternative schemes at neighbouring 
quarries. The developer was prepared to relinquish the extant consent at 
Hartshead providing an extension was granted into Ivonbrook quarry; he thus 
sought to have the sites considered concurrently. It was generally agreed that 
Ivonbrook was grassland of little ecological value; the board's ecologist 
acknowledging that the interest present was insufficient to justify an objection. 
The NCC commented on the site's proximity to the Via Gellia SSSI but did not 
consider the development likely to effect it; no objections were made. Hartshead, 
in contrast, had significant ecological value; albeit of a temporal nature due to its 
dependence upon old quarry workings. 
The proposals generated much interest; mainly on grounds of landscape and 
amenity from walking groups. The CPRE argued that permission ought to be 
refused; that individual applications should be considered on their own merits and 
the essential issues should not be obscured by association with other sites — 
Hartshead should not be a factor in the decision over Ivonbrook. It is submitted 
that this is the correct approach; revocation of potentially harmful consent would 
prevent developers using it as a threat. 
However, the Planning Board considered Hartshead and Ivonbrook 
together. Its Director referred to the limited ecological value of much of 
Ivonbrook and emphasised what he referred to as a potential 'net wildlife benefit'; 
i.e. the site would eventually be restored to new habitat including a lake, scrub 
and limestone grassland. When considered in conjunction with the Hartshead 
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proposal, this amounted to a substantial environmental benefit. Accordingly, in 
December 1996 consent was granted with conditions providing for progressive 
reclamation of the site and conservation management; including translocation and 
habitat recreation. The agreement concluding the above measures, made under 
s.106 TCPA 1990, duly provided for revocation of the Hartshead consent under 
s.99 TCPA 1990. 
The case demonstrates the ease with which a developer, who has acquired a 
site with consent, may use this as a bargaining tool to secure permission for 
another site. The financial implications of revoking planning permission assist such 
a developer; whose case is further strengthened where the original consent 
contains few environmental concessions. A planning authority, with finite 
resources, is pressurised to accept the least objectionable alternative, and grant 
the consent sought where environmental harm can be mitigated. Such an enforced 
choice between the lesser of two environmental evils betrays a low priority for 
conservation issues generally. 
Landscape, not wildlife, suffered most from this decision; the ecological 
interest ultimately benefited from expert advice and the developer's co-operation. 
However, it is clear that had habitat been gravely threatened by this development 
the decision would have been no different. The national park authority, whose 
decisions reveal a propensity to protect landscape, was unable in this case to 
avoid its degradation. In any event it cannot be denied that the overall ecological 
position will be less favourable than would have been the case had Hartshead's 
consent been revoked and both sites managed in the interest of wildlife. 
Mitigation and compensation measures, instrumental to the Hartshead and 
Ivonbrook outcome, were indeed important generally in the cases researched. 
Planning authorities take these very seriously because they provide a potential 
means of developing a habitat whilst retaining an element of conservationist 
virtue. Their principal concern in the cases studied was that mitigation should 
feature in the decision; not that it should necessarily be very effective. Certainly 
there was little sign of critical, in depth examination of such measures. 
Furthermore, authorities tended to be influenced more by the fact that mitigation 
was on offer than by the ecological interest at stake. The fact a habitat was 
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irreplaceable was not a consideration that deterred the use of questionable or 
untested measures. 
This is linked to another general observation -- authorities seldom even 
contemplated declining a proposal on ecological grounds. The Peak Park Planning 
Board did so occasionally on landscape grounds; although it always consented 
ultimately. The role of economic considerations in planning outcomes was 
conspicuous across all decisions. Employment benefits were extremely influential, 
and were rightly accorded much attention by the authorities. 
Such findings betray the prevailing ideologies within planning. As 
McAuslan 2 2 6 says, the administration of development control is a story of triumph 
of the ideology of private property over that of public interest. Many guidelines in 
the public interest will be inconsistent with the important consideration not to 
impede with planning conditions the commercial success and judgement of the 
developer. As Shankland227 claims, the planning system is indeed a capable 
channel for investment and an effective instrument for change. As the 
development excesses of the 1980s demonstrated however, this is not necessarily 
consistent with conservation. Indeed, it may not be compatible with the neutral 
and consistent reconciliation of competing claims for land use — planning's main 
task according to Foley.2 2 8 
Consultation is an important part of planning; a requirement that brings 
expertise and diverse viewpoints to the decision-making process, and allows 
interested parties to partake. However, there is evidence that consultation is not 
treated with the gravity it deserves; both by planning authorities and the courts. 
An example of the impunity with which an authority may disregard this 
requirement, even where a legitimate expectation exists, is the case of R v Swale 
BC ex. p, RSPB.2 2 9 Litigation centred on correspondence between the planning 
authority, Swale, and the RSPB; over proposed development. Dr Clark requested 
consultation on behalf of the RSPB at the earliest opportunity; Swale's Mr 
P. McAuslan, op. cit, p. 147. 
See G. Shankland, 'Planners Promoting Investment?'; The Planner, 1981, vol. 67, No. 
4 pp.90-92. 
D.L. Foley, 'British Town Planning: One Ideology or Three?'; British Journal of 
Sociology, 1960, vol. 2 p . l l . 
[1991] JPL 39; an early stage in the 'Lappel Bank' litigation, see below pp.97-109. 
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Harman promised to keep him informed. When Dr Clark persisted in requesting 
consultation in the event of a planning application being received, Mr Harman 
assured him of consultation in this event. However, when a planning application 
was received, Swale duly neglected to consult. The High Court declined to grant 
judicial review; citing undue delay on the part of the RSPB in bringing the action. 
Brown J's sympathies lay with Swale, which apparently deserved the courtesy of 
a warning of litigation from the organisation it had wronged. His attitude betrays 
a lack of judicial respect for conservation per se; and illustrates its subservience to 
planners' discretion within a property-orientated environment. Indeed, the 
judgment also referred to the substantial financial loss that would have been 
suffered by third parties if the consent had been quashed. Relevant also was the 
nature of the relief sought and what it could achieve; i.e. at best a re-
determination of the planning permission. Brown J's reluctance to interfere with 
the lawful conduct of third parties acting in good faith is cited as justification to 
deny an enforceable right of consultation; and indeed to deny relief to a party that 
has suffered. Yet to have found for the RSPB would not have precluded a right of 
action to the third parties. Such an outcome would indeed have ensured that 
liability lay with the blameworthy party. Judicial support for consultation would 
also have delivered a clear message to the planning authorities that this is an 
important aspect of planning; not something to be taken lightly. The court's 
refusal to do so on grounds of financial loss to third parties and alleged delay 
merely betrays judicial empathy with economic and property priorities. 
Like consultation, the Public Local Inquiry is an important aspect of planning; 
it is a valuable means of ensuring those without a tangible interest in a planning 
application can participate. 
Newbury Bypass, a proposed dual carriageway avoiding Newbury but 
crossing important habitats, is synonymous with controversy and confrontation. 
Alternative routes were initially examined at a Public Inquiry in 1988; consent 
being granted in 1990 after consideration of an ecological appraisal report.2 3 0 The 
thoroughness of this report, and thus its reliability, was seriously questioned by 
the discovery in February 1996 of the rare Desmoulin's Whorl Snail. This 
230 This did not amount to full EIA. 
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vindicated earlier claims231 that the decision at the Public Inquiry was taken on the 
basis of weak data. Notwithstanding this, construction of the bypass resumed after 
mass-eviction of protesters in April 1996. Such reliance on incomplete 
information, and failure to reconsider when this became apparent, is disturbing. 
Newbury almost certainly will not be an exception. In cases where full EIA is not 
compulsory — and these represent the majority of cases involving habitats — the 
risk of ill-informed decisions is far from negligible. 
Oxleas Wood, an ancient woodland SSSI and LNR in south east London, 
was threatened by a road development. Before it was reprieved by a change of 
policy, two Public Inquiries were held. The first recommended a 'cut and cover' 
tunnel to minimise environmental impact; this was rejected by the government. 
The second Inquiry proved to be a parody of the first; its terms of reference being 
rigidly set to exclude any realistic appraisal of environmental impact.232 Indeed 
Oxleas Wood inspired descriptions of the planning system supporting Public 
Inquiries as inequitable, and the Department of the Environment as judge and jury 
in its own closed court.2 3 3 
A further criticism of the Public Inquiry forum is that, far from facilitating a 
balanced appraisal of the facts, it is open to domination by those with access to 
greater resources. This was a factor of the Public Inquiry into the construction of 
a second run-way at Manchester Airport; development which threatened, inter 
alia, 4ha. of ancient woodland, 4km of high value hedgerow and seventeen ponds 
containing great crested newts.234 The evidence submitted by objectors, although 
costing several hundred thousand pounds, was outweighed by counter-claims 
backed by the Airport Consultants' budget of millions; including assurances that 
translocation and habitat creation measures would ultimately result in a 
significantly improved overall ecological position. The Public Inquiry does not 
address the inherent resource in-balance between conservationists and developers, 
and its decisions must be judged in this light. Furthermore, conservation issues do 
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire Naturalists Trust Limited; 'Position 
Statement A34 Newbury Bypass', 30.9.94. 
See D. Black, 'Oxleas Wood: A Common Inheritance'; ECOS 12(4) 1991 35 @ p.37. 
Ibid, p.37. 
'Manchester Airport Second Run-way'; Environmental Statement, Non-Technical 
Summary. 
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not always coincide with the parameters of a formal Planning Inquiry — a source 
of frustration to the Cheshire Wildlife Trust in the instant case. As Weldon 2 3 5 says 
'...in conducting themselves according to the rules of Inquiry rhetoric, the Wildlife 
Trust was unable to discuss how its interpretation of conservation values differed 
from those adhered to by the 'technological f ix ' mentality of the developer'. 
Planning Policy Guidance 
The accommodation of conservation by the planning process is a product of 
the policy followed by planning authorities at any one time. This is moulded by 
central government guidance; PPG9 covering nature conservation. 
In purporting to reconcile conservation and development, an aim that it 
regards as achievable,236 PPG9 nevertheless favours economic interests over the 
former. Only in respect of European sites does the balance shift towards nature 
conservation — and even here the possibility of development is not ruled out. 2 3 7 
Para. 27, whilst conceding that nature conservation can be a significant material 
consideration in planning decisions, exhorts authorities to avoid refusing consent 
on ecological grounds by the use of mitigating conditions. It also reminds them 
that other material factors may be sufficient to override nature conservation. Such 
encouragement to look to conditions238 explains the eagerness with which 
authorities adopt even doubtful mitigation measures like translocation. Warren 
and Murray 2 3 9 rightly criticise para. 27 for the implication that nature conservation 
need not be a material factor -- even in relation to SSSI. This attitude reflects the 
prevailing ideology of the 1980s and 1990s, whereby economic factors were 
accorded almost unqualified precedence.240 However, as Southgate241 says, the 
S. Weldon, 'Judging by experts: news from Manchester airport'; ECOS 18(1) 1997 20, 
@ p.24. 
Seep.48 above. 
L . Warren and V. Murray, 'PPG9 Nature Conservation - A New Initiative?'; [1995] 
JPL, 574 @ p.577. 
This is also a feature of advice on recreational development consent affecting SSSI; see 
para.34. 
Op. cit @ p.576. 
See p.25 above. 
M. Southgate, 'Nature Conservation and Planning: Implications of recent guidance and 
the Habitats Directive for planners'; Sandy: RSPB Report, June 1995, p.4. 
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considerable emphasis upon economic growth within the guidance is not refined 
by an explanation of how this should relate to nature conservation policy 
commitments. 
Indeed, one of the principal criticisms of PPG9 is its lack of detailed advice 
on implementing policy. Guidance is largely descriptive, being little more than a 
useful source of information on relevant legislation.242 Although it emphasises the 
need for developers to be given clear criteria for estimating the likely weight to be 
accorded to conservation, very little assistance is provided for planning authorities 
to draw up such criteria. Thus, para. 18, which stipulates that the designation of 
LNRs must be justified by substantive nature conservation value, contains no 
advice as to the meaning of the word 'substantive'.243 PPG9 therefore endows 
planning authorities with substantial discretion in implementing conservation 
policy. This was confirmed by the Secretary of State for the Environment, Mr 
Gummer,244 who said that the general approach is not to interfere with local 
plarining authorities' jurisdiction unless necessary. Generally, applications will 
only be called-in where they raise planning issues of more than local importance; 
each case must be considered on its individual merits. Whilst such an approach 
gives planning authorities the flexibility required to implement appropriate 
guidelines, it also facilitates consideration of in-apposite factors and allows the 
basis of decisions to be obscured; characteristics of some of the cases examined. 
The guidance contains no reference to the fact that habitats are potentially 
irreplaceable; an omission mirrored in the registers of local planning authorities. 
Indeed, para.3 reveals the rationale behind official nature conservation policy: to 
ensure that attractive environments are available to enhance the nation's social 
and economic well-being. Such emphasis upon amenity, where landscape and 
wildlife are maintained principally in order to generate economic returns, is not 
necessarily conducive to preserving the current range of habitats at a sustainable 




L . Warren and V. Murray, op. cit @ p.577. 
Ibid @ p.578. 
January 26 1995, H.C. Debs, Vol. 253 Col. 314-315. 
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in the old PPG7 — which contained a presumption against the development of 
agricultural land due to its being irreplaceable — was not adopted. 
The negative aspects of hierarchical treatment of habitats have already been 
outlined.2 4 6 This system is reinforced by PPG9; para. 18 in particular urging 
authorities to have regard to the relative significance of designations in 
considering the weight to be attached to nature conservation interests. The 
guidance places enormous emphasis upon European sites; and was indeed delayed 
to ensure it contained advice on the implementation of the Habitats Directive. 
Disproportionate focus upon European sites relative to other designations and 
conservation in general risks leaving other habitats in a worse position per 
development threats than was the case pre-PPG9.247 
Conservation should be considered within the wider context of the myriad 
non-economic factors that influence planning decisions. However, PPG9 is 
specialist guidance concentrating almost exclusively upon nature conservation. 
Failure to refer to related aspects like landscape and amenity, which often raise 
identical issues and lead to the adoption of positions diametrically opposed to 
proposed developments, potentially weakens its efficacy. Such a narrow approach 
is also a feature of PPG1, which is concerned with general planning policy. Whilst 
it recognises the role of planning in regulating development via a sustainable 
framework, including the need to conserve natural resources,248 there is little 
direct attention paid to wildlife habitat needs. However, this piecemeal approach 
to planning policy has not manifested itself in the cases studied as a constraint 
upon the authorities. Guidance shortfalls were generally overcome, not least in 
decisions of the Peak Park Planning Board, by a pragmatic 'common-sense' 
approach. 
PPG9 contains several anomalies: para.29 refers to subjecting proposals 
likely to affect SSSI to 'special scrutiny'; yet mineral extraction proposals 
affecting such sites must be, per para.40, subject to 'the most rigorous 
See P. Hopkinson and J. Bowers, 'Sustainability, Roads and Nature Conservation'; 
ECOS 13(4) 199211. 
See pp.64-65 above. 
L . Warren and V. Murray, op. cit @ p.578. 
Para.5 PPG1 'General Policy and Principles'; February 1997 - London: HMSO. 
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examination'. The latter test is, as Southgate claims, more onerous. This 
distinction cannot be justified; mineral extraction is usually followed by 
satisfactory reinstatement, and in any event may often lead to the emergence of a 
new ecological interest. Other forms of development, particularly road and 
residential construction, almost invariably result in permanent and irretrievable 
habitat loss. 
Finally, PPG9's preoccupation with European sites invites an interpretation 
of Annex CI — which provides for extant consent to be taken into account when 
designating SPAs and SACs -- as further proof of habitat protection law's 
subservience to economic interests. 
Environmental Impact Assessment 
Whilst perhaps inviting charges of 'instrumentalism',250 EI A has become an 
increasingly important aspect of the planning process in recent years. Initiated by 
the EC, 2 5 1 it has been implemented in the UK by a large number of regulations — 
thus compounding the general complexity of habitat protection law. 2 5 2 As Bichard 
and Davies253 suggest, EIA would operate more smoothly if procedures were 
based on one pre-existing planning statute or operated within an entirely 
integrated system. 
The assessment of environmental impact is a crucial aspect of responsible 
planning. Formal requirement of a specific ES focuses the minds of planners and 
developers on this issue and generally raises the environment's profile — 
something that, after years of habitat degradation, is long overdue. It ensures that 
environmental concerns generated by a proposal must be at least addressed. Since 
the introduction of EIA, it is apparent that the quality of ESs has been improving 
M. Southgate, op. cit @ p.3. 
i.e. The folly of addressing environment issues by a single instrument of environmental 
evaluation; see N. Gligo, 'Sustainabilism and Twelve other 'Isms' that Threaten the 
Environment' @ p.64, in: A Sustainable World Defining and Measuring Sustainable 
Development; ed. T.Trzyna, Sacramento: International Center for the Environment and 
Public Policy, 1995. 
E C Directive 85/337, O. J. L2/175/40. 
See p.64 above. 
E . Bichard and P. Davies, op. cit @ p.706. 
80 
as more experience of the process has been gained. This is an observation 
supported by the RSPB in a recent study255 of thirty-seven EIAs within the 
context of wildlife habitats. It found that EIA was generally influential as to 
whether a project proceeded, and to the extent of any modifications and 
mitigating measures incorporated into the consent. This finding is to be 
welcomed, as it is important that the results of EIA are taken seriously and 
genuinely influence decisions. However, the fact that this is so emphasises how 
vital it is to ensure that assessments are undertaken objectively, competently and 
on the basis of accurate data. 
Notwithstanding the good intentions with which EIA was conceived, its 
potential benefits are inhibited in practice by operational constraints of the 
planning process. The time-scale of the assessment itself is determined by financial 
resources and planning application timing; with the result that EIA expertise often 
arrives too late to make an adequate contribution to the project.2 5 6 
A fundamental weakness of EIA is its inherent lack of independence. With no 
obligation upon planning authorities to commission independent assessments, an 
ES accompanying development proposals is, in reality, part of the developer's 
case. It is therefore extremely unlikely to conclude that potential impact justifies 
refusal of consent. Although it may be, as Jones and Wood 2 5 7 suggest, unrealistic 
that an ES should be prepared independently, the relationship between EIA and 
the furtherance of the developer's cause is not always acknowledged by the 
decision-makers. Indeed, as Manchester airport demonstrates,258 the submission 
of an ES as part of a multi-million pound budget is more likely to precipitate 
congratulations for thoroughness than caution over potential partiality. We must 
remember who is responsible for submitting the ES; it is analogous to an expert 
medical report submitted by the plaintiff in a personal injury action; it should be 
viewed as such by planning authorities and inspectors. 
C. Jones & C. Wood, 'The Impact of Environmental Assessment on Public Inquiry 
Decisions'; [1995] JPL 890 @ p.891. 
RSPB (1995) Wildlife impact - the treatment of nature conservation in environmental 
assessment, Sandy: The RSPB. 
R. Therivel, E . Wilson, S. Thompson, D. Heaney & D. Pritchard; Strategic 
Environmental Assessment, London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 1992, p.21. 
Op. cit @ p.903. 
S. Weldon, op. cit @ p.23; per inspector's comments. 
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Practical repercussions flow from the relationship between EIA and the 
promotion of development. The RSPB 2 5 9 found evidence of partiality in its 
survey. Nature conservation featured in almost all assessments, but predictions 
were often heavily biased in favour of possible beneficial consequences — even 
where negative impacts were likely to be very significant. Indeed, only a minority 
offered unbiased advice. The lack of independence also influences levels of detail 
and general input to EIA; as Therivel et al . 2 6 0 say, there is little that developers 
can gain by going beyond the minimum statutory requirements. Thus, although 
obtaining and taking account of local people's views would increase the 
effectiveness of an assessment, such action would be unlikely to find favour with 
proponents due to the time and cost involved; there would also be concern at 
making potentially commercially confidential information available to public 
scrutiny. 
The lack of inducement for developers to enter into the spirit of EIA also 
extends to post-assessment activity. The EIA process is essentially a tool with 
which developers convince planning authorities that any harmful environmental 
effects that cannot be denied will be adequately dealt with. Developers have 
nothing to gain by monitoring the situation after development is complete; 
accordingly it is rare that EIA predictions are tested against eventual 
implications.261 Indeed, the necessary techniques to monitor and audit 
environmental impacts are not yet fully developed. Such criticisms are supported 
by the RSPB's study,262 which concluded that post-project monitoring was the 
most inadequately addressed aspect of the EIA process. Very little real 
commitment was shown, with monitoring referred to in only 38% of the ESs 
examined; and then in a vague or incomplete manner. Yet this process is vital to a 
full evaluation of EIA quality. A requirement to remain involved after the project 
is completed would also encourage a more responsible attitude to the assessment 
itself and indeed any mitigation measures proposed. 
Op. cit, paras. 4.14 & 6.5. 
Op. cit @ p. 17. 
Ibid, p.17. 
Op. cit @ paras.7.10-7.12. 
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Reliance on irrelevant factors, as highlighted by the RSPB, is a weakness 
of EIA. Where public objection to a proposal is anticipated, a proponent will 
often present an environmentally worse scenario as the natural consequence of his 
application being refused. This is clearly an abuse of the assessment process. 
However, there is no doubt that anticipated objections are taken very seriously by 
proponents, and it is inevitable that this will influence their actions. Indeed, 
Bichard and Davies264 refer to the direct link between the level of detail required 
by EIA and the level of perceived risk expressed by third party locals and 
objectors. 
There are criticisms of the quality of information generally relied on within 
EIA. It is apparent that poor quality data within the process is undermining the 
quality of planning decisions based upon it. This '...frequently creates situations 
that allow skilful manipulation of the [assessment] rather than promote its use as a 
tool for incorporating the environmental dimension into decision-making'.265 It is 
a grave weakness, as the quality of information behind EIA determines how well 
informed the decision-makers are; and is thus crucial to the ultimate choices made 
and the applicability of the precautionary principle.266 The RSPB found that where 
specialist data was referred to, it was often done so primarily to impress non-
scientific consultees, decision-makers and the public.2 6 7 Without further 
elucidation, such information is meaningless to non-experts and as such 
contributes nothing to the assessment process. Indeed, there is an inherent risk 
within EIA, particularly in the nature conservation ambit, that specialist subject 
matter may obscure the real choices facing planning authorities. Similarly, the use 
of experts in EIA may give the impression that assessment is conducted in '...a 
remote domain of expertise' , 2 6 8 
Mitigation measures are also problematic. Whilst all ESs will address this 
issue, it is not uncommon in practice for this to happen only after the major 
decisions have been taken. 'It is even questionable whether in practice mitigation 
(1995) Wildlife impact; para.4.28. 
Op. cit @ p.707. 
N. Gligo; op. cit @ p.65. 
This holds that it is unwise to proceed with development where the potential damage to 
the environment is uncertain. 
Op. cit @ para.6.9. 
S. Weldon, op. cit @ p.20. 
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measures are used to counter the most negative impacts of a project, or whether 
they are simply used for those impacts that can be most easily ameliorated'...269 
A fundamental shortfall of EIA, in its present project-based form, is its 
difficulty in addressing cumulative impacts of a project. These include: 'additive 
impacts' of proposals not requiring EIA, such as agricultural activity; 'synergistic 
impacts' whereby several projects' total impact exceeds the sum of their 
individual impacts; 'threshold or saturation impacts', concerned with the stage at 
which the environment becomes dangerously degraded; 'induced or indirect 
impacts' where one development serves to stimulate further secondary projects; 
and 'time crowded impacts' where the environment has insufficient time to 
recover from one impact before it is subject to another.270 The inter-dependence 
of fragile ecosystems and potentially far-reaching effects of many developments 
ensure that the inability to assess cumulative impacts is a very serious weakness of 
the planning process in this field. The failure is essentially due to a lack of 
knowledge of other development proposals, and ultimately a lack of control over 
them;2 7 1 it is hoped that recent acknowledgement272 of this will eventually lead to 
improvement. 
It is important to remember that EIA is merely one element of the planning 
process. Even if undertaken competently, it cannot guarantee that all 
environmental impacts will be minimised. Other material considerations, including 
economic and employment factors, justify decisions that embrace even serious 
environmental degradation.273 Ultimately, the decision to proceed with a proposal 
is based on a wide range of socio-political and economic issues, as well as 
environmental ones. EIA findings, however accurate and important, may be 
overridden in the national interest. Indeed, the RSPB 2 7 4 concluded that in most 
cases surveyed, ecological considerations carried very little weight — even where 
the target sites were of considerable ecological importance; engineering, 
economic and occasionally political factors generally prevailed. 
Therivel et al; op. cit @ p.21. 
Ibid pp. 20-21. 
See D. Pritchard, 'Towards sustainability in the planning process: the role of EIA' ; 
ECOS 14(3/4) 1993 10, p.13. 
See Annex III(l) E C Directive 97/5011: O. J. L73/5/97. 
E . Bichard & P. Davies; op. cit @ p.709. 
Op. cit @ para.4.24. 
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Whilst EIA is undoubtedly a useful tool for reconciling conservation and 
development, it is important to place both this and indeed nature conservation 
itself in the wider political perspective. As Pritchard275 says, much habitat 
protection occurs in an overlap between two legal regimes - the SSSI system is 
based on science; but the actual protection of such sites is a political issue. This 
field's political dimension should not be underestimated. 
Enforcement and Challenge 
1. European Enforcement and Locus Standi 
Environmental law suffers from an inherent enforcement weakness. Whilst 
legal implementation involving vested interests takes place in public discussion 
with representatives of those interests present, the environment itself has virtually 
no vested interest defenders.276 Furthermore, conservation organisations are 
generally too weak, both structurally and financially, to effectively defend the 
environment. Against a backdrop of conflict between diverging vested interests, 
law enforcement is difficult; the environment, effectively without a voice, is 
almost bound to lose in this scenario.277 
It is therefore appropriate that environmental protection has become one of 
the EU's essential objectives.278 However, this stance is undermined by inadequate 
use of the provisions in practice. As Kramer279 says, it is increasingly recognised 
that ineffective application of environmental measures is the most serious 
environmental law shortfall. He refers to four deficiencies in the field of public 
interest enforcement: 
Op. cit @ p.10. 
See L . Kramer, 'Public Interest Litigation in Environmental Matters Before European 
Courts'; [1996] J E L l . 
Ibid @p. l . 
See C-302/86 Commission v Denmark, E C R 1988 @ 4607. 
Op. cit @ pp.3-4. 
85 
• Art. 169 bestows no discretion upon the European Commission over initiating 
action -- yet in practice wide discretion is exercised; not least where States 
exercise political influence;280 
• individuals are powerless to compel the Commission to initiate proceedings 
under Art. 169; 
• the Commission's decision to issue a formal notice or reasoned opinion under 
Art. 169 is not published; 
• no legal Document summarising details of the complaints' procedure exists. 
In understanding this, the part played by the European Commission is crucial. 
It performs a reactive role within the complaints' process, following the 'top 
down' approach of Art. 169.281 It is therefore unable to initiate and maintain a self-
supporting investigation. As Kramer282 says, '...the European Commission — and 
its services — are over exposed to administrative, political or other influences in 
order to be able to exercise fully independently the role as 'guardian of the public 
interest environment''. 
Third party intervention is similarly frustrated. Whilst Art.37 ECJ Statute283 
theoretically facilitates this, the limitations of Art.37(2) effectively exclude it from 
almost all cases that reach the ECJ. 2 8 4 This undermines the potentially valuable 
role of voluntary conservation organisations. Similarly under Art. 173 EC 
Treaty,2 8 5 litigation in the public interest on the environment suffers from a barrier 
of 'direct and individual concern'.286 Environmental groups are generally 
incapable of clearing such an obstacle. Furthermore, measures to introduce public 
interest litigation for such groups may initiate pressure to grant the same rights to 
other representative organisations like trade unions; such 'floodgate' 
considerations may explain the general absence of an actio popularis within the 
judicial systems of the EU. 
See 'Cardiff Bay Barrage' below: pp.90-97; particularly @ pp.92-93. 
R. Macrory, 'The Enforcement of Community Environmental Laws: Some Critical 
Issues' CMLR (29) 1992, 347; pp.363 & 368. 
Op. cit @ p.9. 
Statute of the Court of Justice; 17.4.57 as amended. 
Kramer, op. cit @ pp.15-16. 
Which facilitates challenge of a measure adopted by a Community institution. 
Kramer, op. cit @ p. 16. 
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Such issues have political and pragmatic dimensions; they influence policy 
and practice behind domestic and European law. Indeed, political considerations 
are influential in deterring States themselves from challenging decisions in the 
wider EU context. For example, in cases such as Stichting Greenpeace v 
Commission,287 concerning European funding of environmentally harmful 
projects, challenges are unlikely to succeed as all States benefit from continued 
funding. This scenario carries a risk of a lacuna developing in law enforcement — 
political expedience subsuming the rule of law. 2 8 8 To address this, a change in 
traditional legal thinking within the EU is essential; ultimately, institutional 
resistance and the tendency to allow economic interests to prevail must be 
overcome.289 
Other barriers to enforcement within the environmental context have much 
more urbane origins. Wils 2 9 0 refers to high legal costs in the UK impeding direct 
effectiveness of Birds Directive provisions. Clearly this also frustrates challenges 
to planning decisions involving non-European sites; not least because those best 
placed to intervene are usually voluntary organisations obliged to use their funds 
prudently. Indeed, action in the domestic courts by such litigants is fraught with 
difficulty. The general position is that third parties, even if they have actively 
participated and expressed opinions, have no formal rights.2 9 1 However, they may 
have a voice where the vires of a decision fall to be questioned; judicial review 
being the discretionary means of such challenge. 
The principal barrier to judicial review is locus standi; it is apparent in nature 
conservation cases that this may be a particularly substantial one. It requires an 
applicant to demonstrate sufficient interest; a criterion that has been described292 
as a matter of judicial policy. It is therefore difficult to estimate with any certainty 
whether an organisation will have standing; the broad discretion exercised by the 
T-585/93; [1996] 7 WLAW 98. 
See R. Macrory, 'Environmental Citizenship and the law: Repairing the European 
Road'; [1996] J E L 219 @ p.228; andp.89 below. 
N. Gerard, 'Access to Justice on Environmental Matters - a Case of Double 
Standards?'; [1996] J E L 139 @ p.157. 
W. Wils, 'The Birds Directive 15 Years Later: A Survey of the Case Law and a 
Comparison with the Habitats Directive'; [1994] J E L 219(6) @ p.242, footnote 139. 
See J. Upson & D. Hughes, 'Locus Standi an essential hurdle injudicial review of 
environmental action'; [1994] E L M 136. 
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courts being sufficiently wide to decide the matter in accordance with political 
expediency. 
In Stichting Greenpeace v Commission, the applicants were denied standing 
as they were not affected by the decision in question in a way that differentiated 
them from others in the vicinity. This outcome, in which Greenpeace's relevant 
expertise counted for nothing, illustrates the difficulty in understanding the 
reasoning in judicial review cases. In R v City of Westminster, ex p. Hilditch, 2 9 3 it 
was held that a prolonged lapse of time was not necessarily fatal to an application 
where an unlawful policy was on-going. This can be compared, though not easily 
reconciled, with the refusal of the court in R v Swale BC, ex p. RSPB 2 9 4 to grant 
relief on the grounds of delay — notwithstanding the action was brought within 
the requisite three months. Stichting Greenpeace suggests that the more people 
adversely affected by a decision there are, the less chance there is of their being 
heard, as such litigation would be on too large a scale to satisfy the 'individual 
concern' requirement.295 This demonstrates a fundamental problem within 
environmental law. As Gerard2 9 6 says, emphasis upon individual interests is 
antithetical to the environment ~ a concept that clearly concerns the masses. Yet 
the courts adhere to the language of Plaumann297 notwithstanding that the EU 
now sees itself as environmental guardian, and despite the fact the EC J may 
depart from its own case law. 
A case in which locus standi was determined strictly was R v Secretary of 
State ex p, Rose Theatre Trust Co; 2 9 8 which, although not concerning habitats, is 
of relevance due to the involvement of a voluntary preservation group. The court 
declined to regard the applicants as having standing, essentially because it was not 
prepared to allow a group to claim greater rights than individuals. Whilst the 
judgment has not subsequently proved influential,299 it is certainly the case that it 
remains possible for no individual or group to have the standing to challenge a 
[1990] COD 434 
[1991] JPL 39; see above, pp.73-74. 
Gerard, Op. cit @ p.152. 
Ibid @ pp. 152-153. 
See Plaumann & Co. v Commission (1963) E C R 95. 
[1990] 1 QB 504. 
See R v HM Inspectorate of Pollution, ex p. Greenpeace (No. 2) [1994] 4 All E R 329 @ 
351. 
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contentious decision. As Schiemann says, '...the law regards it as preferable 
that an illegality should continue than that the person excluded should have access 
to the courts'. It is submitted that this is not an appropriate way to regulate 
challenge in the environmental ambit; not least because in practice the 
environment falls to be represented by voluntary bodies. The existence of such 
organisations is itself proof that they have a genuine and serious interest in 
conservation -- they may also possess a range of expertise greater than that of any 
individual301 — all the more important then to allow them access to the courts. 
Since the Rose Theatre case, there has been some movement away from a 
strict approach to locus standi.302 Courts have acknowledged the fact that such 
plaintiffs, in addition to raising worthy issues, are sometimes well established with 
a bona fide interest in the case. However, as long as the fundamental issue of 
standing can be decided 'on the merits of the case' -- simply a means of 
maintaining the courts' wide discretion — the enforcement process in 
environmental law will remain flawed. Indeed, as Upson and Hughes303 say, 
although the public nature of environmental law necessitates judicial review as the 
means of challenge, the increasing complexity of environmental issues renders 
protection via existing mechanisms untenable. Furthermore, it also intensifies the 
potential for abuse in the decision-making process. For example, under EIA, 
Annex I I projects require assessment only if significant environmental effects are 
anticipated; the discretion exercised in determining this issue is not reviewable.304 
Judicial review, and indeed English law generally, offers much greater 
305 306 
protection to material values than to abstract concepts. Whilst Riley 
maintains that there are factors capable of positively enhancing cultural interests, 
thus increasing their chances of clearing the locus standi hurdle, these merely 
serve to illustrate the wide range of potentially influential considerations vis-a-vis 
K. Schiemann; 'Locus Standi'; [1990] PL 342 @ p.342. 
See M. Supperstone & J. Gouldie; Judicial Review, London: Butterworths, 1992 @ 
p.339. 
See R v HM Inspectorate of Pollution & MAFF, ex p. Greenpeace [1993] 5 E L M 183. 
'Locus Standi an essential hurdle injudicial review of environmental action', [1994] 
E L M 136. 
R. Macrory, 'The Enforcement of Community Environmental Laws: Some Critical 
Issues', CMLR (29) 1992 347 @ p.360. 
J. Riley, 'Locus standi and Cultural Interests'; JPL January 1997, 20. 
Ibid @ pp.22-26. 
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judicial discretion. One such factor greatly influenced Rose LJ in Greenpeace 
(No.2)/ u / He was concerned that a lacuna situation, where a decision becomes 
unreviewable due to the absence of other challengers, might develop in response 
to unduly restrictive standing rules. However, this concern clearly did not trouble 
the judge in the Rose Theatre case. The courts thus retain the discretion to impose 
restrictive interpretations of locus standi. 
Notwithstanding public law principles governing the exercise of discretion,308 
planning authorities remain legally entitled to make inapt decisions. As Macrory 3 0 9 
suggests, the time has come to consider whether a decision to allow development 
in the face of overwhelming evidence of unacceptable impact ought to be 
actionable. It may be that, after years of habitat degradation and increasing 
pressure on undeveloped land, the discretion of planning authorities in habitat 
cases ought to be subject to more stringent administrative regulations. 
Where a planning authority fails to properly implement European legislation, 
the State remains liable. However, although the Secretary of State has a residual 
power to determine and revoke planning permission,310 it is not practicable for 
him to review all local decisions with potential impact upon European law. This 
represents another enforcement flaw at European level. Provision for direct action 
by the European Commission against local planning authorities would be 
consistent with the concept of a Community environmental law framework 
compatible with Member States' legal and planning systems.311 
In addition to the above, there are other avenues of habitat protection law 
enforcement within the planning context. For example, the Attorney General, as 
guardian of the public interest, has standing to enforce the law on behalf of third 
parties.312 However, he has absolute discretion over such proceedings;313 and as 
Schiemann says, such action has never been used to challenge a government 
[1995] 1 W L R 386 @ 393-5. 
See Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223. 
Op. cit @ p.360 
Under s.77 and s.100 TCPA 1990 respectively; see above pp.45 &46. 
See R. Macrory; op. cit @ p.357. 
See Stockport District Water Works Co. v Manchester Corporation (1862) 9 Jur.N.S. 
266. 
Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1978] A.C. 435. 
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department.314 This reflects the consensus of stagnation that pervades the 
enforcement ambit. 
2. Cardiff Bay Barrage 
With a tidal range of fourteen miles and mudflats extending to 169 square 
km, 3 1 5 Cardiff Bay represents one of the most important British sites for the 
feeding and shelter of waders and wildfowl. It additionally provides a refuge for 
migratory populations. Situated within the Severn Estuary, the habitat supports a 
disproportionately high number of birds; representing just 1% of the Severn's 
intertidal area, it holds 10% of the birds — including nationally significant 
populations of dunlin and redshank. However, the estuary itself is ecologically 
important; with its tidal area designated a SSSI, and over twenty separate SSSI 
located around its shore.316 The Severn's international significance was confirmed 
by designation as a SPA and Ramsar Site on 13 July 1995. 
However, Cardiff Bay was excluded from this designation so that 
construction of the Cardiff Bay Barrage could proceed. Initially proposed in 1986, 
it aimed to assist the regeneration of the Cardiff area by attracting new investment 
and raising the potential for future development. A barrage of 1.1km. would hold 
the rivers Taff and Ely at a permanently high level of 4.5m, creating a 500 acre 
freshwater bay and new waterfront of 12.8km.317 
As this would impede free navigation its proponent, CBDC, was obliged to 
present a Private Bill to Parliament;318 this was duly deposited in November 1987. 
Opposition to the project was considerable, encompassing all the major 
environmental organisations and interested local groups. The resultant delay saw 
the withdrawal and replacement of the Bill; its replacement including several 
changes to the mitigation package. This Bill generated over three hundred 
Op. cit @ p.343. Indeed, it is not realistically expected to; see I.R.C. v National 
Federation of Self Employed and Small Businesses [1982] A C 617 @ 644 per Lord 
Diplock. 
CBDC, 'Cardiff Bay Barrage'; Cardiff: 1995. 
Cardiff Friends of the Earth; The Cardiff Bay Barrage, Briefing Sheet; Cardiff: August 
1996. 
CBDC; op. cit, p.l. 
See Priesdey v Manchester and Leeds Rly Co (1840) 4 Y&C Ex 63. 
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amendments and ultimately succumbed to lack of Parliamentary time. In the 1991-
2 session the government, which had long supported Cardiff Bay Barrage, 
promoted a Hybrid Bill. Upon its principle being affirmed at Second Reading in 
November 1991, no further petitions on the construction of the Barrage could 
proceed. Future Parliamentary challenges were thus restricted to matters of detail 
in the Bill ; which duly received Royal Assent on 5 November 1993. 
However, hostility to the project remained strong; indeed the NCC had 
maintained its opposition throughout the Parliamentary stages. There was general 
dissatisfaction that the Bay had been excluded from SPA designation, and concern 
that its development in such circumstances directly conflicted with the Santona 
Marshes319 and Leybucht Dykes3 2 0 cases. The government cited overriding 
economic reasons as justifying exclusion; yet such mitigation is relevant only to 
the development of a non-priority SPA under Art.6(4) Habitats Directive. It was 
clear that Cardiff Bay ought to have been classified on the strength of its 
ornithological interest; any development issues being considered subsequently. 
There is no doubt that the government's actions were in breach of European law; 
such allegations at the time having subsequently been shown to have been well 
founded by the ECJ's decision over Lappel Bank.3 2 1 
Additionally, it was feared that the Bill's compensation measures were 
insufficient to comply with Art.4(2) Ramsar Convention.322 However, although 
the Convention is clear that exceptional restriction of a qualifying wetland should, 
as far as possible, be compensated for by the creation of additional reserves and 
the protection of an adequate portion of original habitat, it is by no means certain 
that this requirement is legally binding. 
Efforts were made to negotiate a compromise. The RSPB suggested a 
'mini-barrage' alternative that mitigated a smaller area of SSSI destruction by new 
bird feeding areas, and thus sought to reconcile development of the Bay with 
C355/90, [1993] Water Law 209; which established that a State must designate a site as 
a SPA where it fulfils the Birds Directive's ecological criteria. 
C57/89 [1991] E C R 1-883; which established that reduction of a SPA is justified on 
very limited grounds, excluding economic or recreational ones. 
See below, pp.97-109. 
Per Petition of Countryside Council for Wales --' Cardiff Bay Barrage - Against the 
Bill'; House of Lords Session 1992-93. 
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conservation. This was rejected by CBDC on the grounds that it failed to 
secure the quality or quantity of development required to achieve the aims of the 
Secretary of State.324 Cardiff Bay Barrage was clearly a project in which the 
political aims driving it precluded any useful form of compromise from a nature 
conservation perspective. 
With the options of the conservation movement thus limited, formal 
complaint was inevitable. Appeal was made, on behalf of the RSPB, WWF and 
FoE, to the ECJ alleging contravention of the Birds Directive. The European 
Commission agreed to investigate, and two Commissioners duly visited the site to 
meet objectors and developers on 13 and 14 December 1993. Although a decision 
was expected during April 1994, this was deferred in March amid suggestions that 
a Commissioner's letter confirming a breach of EU law had been received and 
concealed.325 
It then emerged that on 21 January 1994 a letter from the European 
Commission had been received by the Secretary of State for the Environment. Its 
timing, just over one month after the visit, is indicative of the Commission's 
unease over the project. However, it focused not upon unlawful exclusion from 
SPA designation but upon the inadequacy of compensation measures proposed. 
The Commission made several suggestions; including habitat creation to replace 
lost feeding grounds, preparation of a conservation management plan for the 
Severn, preparation of a national conservation plan for dunlin and redshank and a 
firm commitment to complete the classification of the remaining Severn SPA. 3 2 6 
Assurances were sought that such measures be undertaken before construction 
commenced. 
Thus, when development began on 25 May 1994327 it seemed that fears328 of 
a deal between the Department of the Environment and the European 
Commission, whereby Cardiff Bay would be destroyed in return for better 
It was not favoured by the planning authority; M. Boyce, South Glamorgan County 
Council; Documents for HC Select Committee, vol.2,1990. 
CBDC, Planning Update and Economic Appraisal Statement; Cardiff: 15.1.90. 
M. Havard; 'Cardiff Bay Barrage: in the balance', ECOS 15(1) 1994, 56 @ p.56. 
At this time only l,357ha. had been classified, out of over 21,000ha. which qualified 
ecologically; statistics quoted in the Commission's letter. 
It continues at the time of writing. 
See M. Havard; op. cit @ p.57. 
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protection of other sites, were realised. The complaint file was indeed closed, and 
has remained so notwithstanding an appeal by FoE to the EU Secretary General 
to re-examine the case in view of the lack of correspondence with complainants 
and failure to disclose documents. As the government has since confirmed, 3 2 9 the 
Commission did not proceed with the complaint because it was satisfied with the 
former's compensation measures. 
Cardiff Bay Barrage is thus an example of a clear breach of European law 
escaping enforcement action due to European Commission acquiescence. The UK 
government was able to avoid prosecution merely by promising to undertake 
measures required by law in any event. This demonstrates a fundamental problem 
in the operation of European law — that those charged with its enforcement often 
have more to gain by negotiation than by coercion. Meaningful implementation of 
law across a multinational framework like the EU relies on the continuing co-
operation of the miscreant; this limits the scope of punitive measures. In any 
event, mediation is always the easier option. 
However, we must not forget that compromise equates with habitat 
degradation. Continued losses of even small areas of habitat are extremely 
damaging in total; indeed it was the accumulation of small losses and the 
enormous destruction of habitat this represented that led to the adoption of the 
Birds Directive.3 3 0 Habitat protection is undermined by political expedience 
prevailing over the rule of law — epitomised by the response of the European 
Commission to Cardiff Bay's destruction. 
The case before the Commission turned on the compensation measures 
adopted; these also provide cause for concern. CBDC proposed a self-contained 
wildfowl lagoon with wildlife reserve island. Separate management of the island 
ecosystem (to protect it from serious pollution incidents) and the unfeasibility of 
mudflat creation by breakwater or vegetation transfer ensured this represented the 
only viable mitigation option within the Bay. 3 3 1 However, because it replaces tidal 
mudflat with recreational freshwater, it singularly fails as a compensatory 
3 2 9 Mr Clappison on behalf of the Secretary of State; HC Debs. 17 March 1997; Written 
Answers, Col .457. 
3 3 0 Comments of the Advocate General (AG); Opinion, para.93, C-44/95 (Lappel Bank); 
see below pp.105-106. 
3 3 1 E S , Cardiff Bay Barrage Bill; October 1991. 
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measure. Furthermore, as the ES concedes, the lagoon will replace only 25%-
33% of the high level mudflats and none of the low level mudflats lost. It will 
furnish just 15% of redshank and 33% of dunlin feeding grounds lost; predictions 
of other species accommodated are impossible. This fundamental inability of the 
central compensation measure to adequately compensate is implicit in CBDC's 
emphasis333 upon the opportunity to maximise wildlife within the new 
environment the lagoon represented. 
Two new reserves at Goldcliff and Uskmouth in the Gwent Levels, twelve 
miles from Cardiff Bay, were the means by which the UK government avoided 
prosecution. The initial site favoured for this was Redwick, but its owners were 
reluctant to sell. Notwithstanding the international significance of the habitat lost 
and the crucial importance of compensation to the Commission's decision to close 
the complaint, the Welsh Secretary John Redwood declined to use his compulsory 
purchase powers. Accordingly, the reserves at Goldcliff and Uskmouth fell 
considerably short of adequate compensation; replacing tidal mudflat with wet 
grassland.334 Contrary to Welsh Secretary William Hague's claim that they 
represent a substantial compensatory measure,335 it is anticipated that five 
thousand birds will be lost as a result of the project.3 3 6 Whilst nothing can 
compensate for the loss of a habitat such as Cardiff Bay, it is clear that the 
freshwater lagoon (accepted by the House of Lords Select Committee); and the 
new Gwent reserves (accepted by the European Commission), fall substantially 
short of reasonable compensation. The weakness of the measures with which the 
UK government was able to appease the Commission highlights an inherent flaw 
in European conservation law enforcement. 
EIA, compulsory under Parliamentary rules in respect of the Cardiff Bay 
Barrage Hybrid Bill, reflected many of the shortfalls later addressed by the RSPB 
in their comprehensive study.337 The Non-technical Summary338 commences with 
ES, Cardiff Bay Barrage Bill; @ para.D1.3. 
See CBDC; 'Environmental Strategy for the Bay'; Cardiff: June 1990 @ para.5.1. 
P. Lindford; 'For Bay Birds', South Wales Echo, 13.12.95. 
An oral statement reported in the South Wales Echo; P. Linford, 'Fears for wading 
birds as new mudflat plan is revealed', 18.1.96. 
Ibid. 
See above; pp.80-83. 
ES - Non-Technical Summary; Cardiff Bay Barrage, October 1991; see paras.2.2 & 
2.3. 
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a reference to the Bay's unattractiveness and pollution; descriptions of the 
ecological interest then follow in a tone implying this is present despite the 
former. There is much focus upon current leisure pursuits within the Bay, and 
ornithological references are restricted to this context. The EIA essentially draws 
attention to the perceived benefits of the Barrage and minimises references to 
negative ecological impacts. The SSSI loss, uncertain impact upon neighbouring 
bird populations and inherent limited effectiveness of mitigation measures is 
acknowledged; but only very briefly. In contrast, much emphasis is placed upon 
promoting other environmental issues; particularly those that are currently en 
vogue. (For example, proposals for post-development monitoring of water quality 
to guard against pollution, and claims that the barrage will help protect Cardiff 
from rising sea levels caused by global warming.) 
Ecological impacts that are addressed by the Non-technical Summary are 
essentially limited to ornithology. References to other species affected, such as 
stratiomys furcata (a red data book fly) and zannichellia (a nationally scarce 
plant) are found only in the full ES. The bias towards birds and minimal treatment 
of other organisms is difficult to reconcile with the ideal of EIA. 3 3 9 Of course, the 
site is of ornithological importance, as the controversy over SPA designation 
testifies, but it is additionally a SSSI supporting a range of rare fauna and flora. 
Maybe the controversy itself served to narrowly focus the minds of those involved 
upon ornithological impacts. This is a risk inherent in provisions such as the Birds 
Directive, which are aimed specifically at a limited range of organisms. It cannot 
be in the interests of habitat protection for the minds of developers and planning 
authorities to be arbitrarily focused upon selected species; as the Non-technical 
Summary in this case served to do. This risks overlooking less fashionable species 
that equally deserve protection. Both Summary and full ES in respect of important 
habitats ought to address the impact upon all species. 
The minimal influence of the NCC upon the Cardiff Bay Barrage reinforces 
the general criticisms of those agencies made above.340 During this case these 




A weakness also observed by the RSPB, op. cit; see paras.3.12-3.14. 
pp. 59-63. 
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position of opposing a development, yet being obliged at the same time to provide 
conservation advice and work with developers towards the best possible 
outcome.342 Indeed CBDC, 3 4 3 whilst acknowledging the NCC's fundamental 
opposition to the Barrage, trusted that it would co-operate on the management 
and design of alternative feeding grounds on a 'without prejudice' basis pending 
Royal Assent. Such a role undermines the NCC's position, and is clearly 
inconsistent with the maintenance of clear and influential opposition. 
However, the case study demonstrates that a high level of effective 
opposition may be maintained by voluntary organisations. Havard and Ferns344 
extol the great success of the coalition of environmental and conservation groups 
in Cardiff Bay Barrage; a tribute to the effectiveness of combined opposition 
forces. The latter applied considerable weight to conservation arguments; and 
their greater financial resources facilitated the procurement of expert advice. The 
opposition significantly delayed the project, during which time alternative 
arguments were aired; an important role during continuing ineffectiveness of the 
NCC. 
Cardiff Bay Barrage also demonstrates the ease with which planning 
controls may be circumvented by a government-sponsored Bill. A similar proposal 
today could be accommodated by s.3 Transport and Works Act 1992. which 
empowers the Secretary of State to make Statutory Instruments facilitating 
developments interfering with navigation rights. He is obliged by S.10(2) to take 
into account any objections received; unless he arranges a Public Local Inquiry 
under s . l l ( l ) . Thus, a government-backed development like the Barrage today 
would be subject to Public Inquiry, with objectors entitled to appear. However, 
the ultimate planning decision would remain within the Parliamentary sphere. Is 
Parliament preferable to the local forum from a nature conservation perspective? 
The performance of the House of Lords' Select Committee345 in Cardiff Bay 
Barrage would suggest not. Notwithstanding the obvious weakness of the 
compensation measures, it considered these sufficient to mitigate habitat loss to 
M. Havard & P. Ferns; @ p.51. 
Op. cit, para.4.2. 
Op. cit, p.50. 
House of Lords, Special Report from the Select Committee on the Cardiff Bay Barrage 
Bill; 13.6.89; Book of Documents for Select Committee, Vol.1. 
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the extent that this no longer outweighed the anticipated economic and social 
benefits. Its decision is certainly difficult to reconcile with its stated aim of striking 
a balance between ecological and economic considerations. However, we have 
seen346 that local planning authorities are no less enthusiastic about adopting poor 
compensation measures to excuse ecologically harmful development. 
Furthermore, projected benefits such as the creation of c.22,000347 jobs over ten 
years — compared to half that number otherwise -- will be equally influential 
whether the decision is taken by Parliament or a local planning authority. 
In any event, it may be argued that cases like Cardiff Bay Barrage ought to 
be considered centrally, under the call-in provisions of s.77 TCP A 1990, as they 
raise issues that go beyond local concern. Indeed, centralised decision-making 
would accord with current nature conservation legislation, which seeks to 
maintain networks on a national and international scale. 
The significance of this case study is the unlawful exclusion and destruction 
of an important habitat in a climate of ineffectual enforcement. It attests to the 
weakness of our national site protection legislation, and the disregard shown by 
governments to the spirit of international law. 3 4 8 Unfortunately, barriers to 
effective law enforcement by the European Commission vis-a-vis Member States 
ensure that habitat protection often relies upon the good will of those States in 
acting within the spirit of the law. Environmental issues are generally subservient 
to economic requirements; and it is the latter that determine the policy of 
governments. Political will necessarily prevails over law where the latter merely 
serves to regulate administration and policy decisions; and where political 
influence distorts the enforcement process. 
3. Lappel Bank 
Having reviewed a case of inadequate European Commission enforcement, it 
is now prudent to examine a project subject to judicial review and appeal. Lappel 
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bird habitat; however, the resulting opposition here was channelled into litigation. 
The case study therefore investigates direct enforcement of Community law 
before English courts. 
Lappel Bank was situated within the intertidal mudflats of the Medway 
Estuary. Providing 4,681 ha. of breeding, wintering and migratory resting grounds 
for wildfowl and waders, the estuary is an area of international ornithological 
importance. Indeed, in 1986 it was listed under the Ramsar Convention and 
became a candidate SPA. Lappel Bank itself, which accounted for 22ha.349 of the 
estuary, was included within the proposed SPA in 1991. Although not supporting 
any 'priority species' under Annex I to the Birds Directive, some species were 
present in significantly greater numbers than elsewhere in the Medway. The 
habitat provided good quality feeding and sheltering grounds for curlew, 
redshank, turnstone, dunlin, ringed plover and shelduck. Furthermore, its 
significance relative to the overall SPA was apparent from estimates that its 
destruction would actually lead to a reduction in species populations of the 
surrounding habitat.350 
The development threat came from the expanding port of Sheerness; by the 
late 1980s continued expansion was physically possible only by reclaiming Lappel 
Bank. The port is of great importance economically, in an area suffering from a 
serious unemployment problem. Further expansion into the final undeveloped area 
of Lappel Bank was accordingly sanctioned by Swale Borough Council in August 
1989.351 A subsequent application to develop Lappel Bank as a car and cargo 
park was called-in by the Secretary of State under s.77 TCPA 1990. The Public 
Inquiry concluded, in August 1991, that this threatened sufficiently adverse 
ornithological impacts to involve a breach of the Birds Directive.3 5 2 On the 
grounds that the conservation interest outweighed economic considerations, the 
inspector recommended a refusal of consent.353 However, he also acknowledged 
Per the agreed statement of facts, C-44/95 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, 
ex p. RSPB [1995] JPL. 842 @ 843. 
Ibid. 
This consent was subject to unsuccessful challenge over non-consultation: R v Swale 
Borough Council, ex.p, RSPB [1991] JPL 39; see above pp.73-74. 
Per C-44/95; AG Opinion, @ para.6; 21.3.96. 
This was accepted by the Secretary of State. 
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that any decision over the current application was undermined by the partly 
implemented consent granted in 1989. 
By 1993, the government was finalising the boundaries of the proposed 
Medway and Marshes SPA, amid controversy over whether the 1989 consent 
ought to be revoked. On 15 December 1993 the Secretary of State, John 
Gummer, announced classification of the SPA. He explained Lappel Bank's 
exclusion in the following terms: 
I am aware that Lappel Bank is an important component of the 
Medway estuarine system but it represents less than 1 per cent, of the 
total area of Medway SPA. I also recognise that further reclamation 
at Lappel Bank is essential to the continued viability of the Port of 
Sheerness. The Port is a significant contributor to the economy of the 
Isle of Sheppey, the South East Region and the UK, several hundred 
jobs are dependent on its operations...I have concluded that the need 
not to inhibit the commercial viability of the port, and the 
contribution that expansion into this area will play outweighs its 
i 354 
nature conservation value. 
Consent was granted and development duly commenced in June 1994, 
against a backdrop of intense opposition. The central issue in this conflict was 
whether the Secretary of State had been entitled to take account of economic 
requirements when delimitating the SPA; it not being in issue that he had done so. 
The RSPB contended that classification under the Birds Directive must proceed 
on ecological grounds only, Art.2 factors such as economic considerations being 
irrelevant to classification per se. On this basis, it sought judicial review of the 
Secretary of State's decision, citing Leybucht Dykes,3 5 5 Commission v Italy 3 5 6 
357 
and the Advocate General's Opinion in Commission v Belgium. 
Per C-44/95; A G Opinion @ para.7; 21.3.96. 
C-57/89 [1991] E C R 1-883. 
C-262/85 [1987] E C R 3073. 
C-247/85 [1987] E C R 3029. 
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The Queen's Bench Division of the Divisional Court refused the application 
on 8 July 1994, Rose LJ . and Smith J. concluding that economic considerations 
could be taken into account at classification. The court held that the matter was 
acte clair in the UK government's favour. 
An appeal against that decision was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 18 
August 1994. Construction of the Birds Directive, upon which the appeal turned, 
divided the court. Two Lord Justices of Appeal, Steyn and Hirst L.JJ., refused to 
countenance that European Law might exclude economic considerations from the 
decision-making process. They considered the matter to be acte clair that the 
Secretary of State was entitled to have regard to such considerations. The third, 
Hoffmann L.J., considered it to be acte clair the other way. However, the Court 
did not feel that such discord justified referral of the interpretative point to the 
ECJ. Hostility to referral is epitomised in the robust judgment of Steyn L.J. He 
denied that the differences of judicial opinion had anything to do with inarticulate 
major premises about environmental matters, and considered that the case turned 
merely on a difference of opinion as to the legal approach to construction. 
This refusal to refer notwithstanding fundamental disagreement at a senior 
judicial level has rightly attracted criticism.3 5 8 The A G 3 5 9 later commented that, 
whilst it was possible to reach a clear and unequivocal answer to the question 
raised, it was not certain that the correct application of Community law was so 
obvious as to leave no scope for doubt on the issue. Clearly the Court of Appeal 
must be free to discharge its appellate functions, and mere discord on the bench 
does not in itself justify referral to a higher court. However, conflict of opinion 
here went to the root of the dispute; and there can be no resolution without clarity 
as to the law. Furthermore, cases on the interpretation of European law embrace 
jurisprudence that is traditionally alien to the English legal system; prudence 
dictates that fundamental disagreements must be referred to the ECJ for final 
determination. Indeed, the importance of this case to both parties increased the 
likelihood of further appeal; referral direct from the Court of Appeal may have 
rendered appeal to the House of Lords unnecessary. In any event, it would have 
See R. Buxton; 'Bye Bye Bank Birds', The Times, 21 February 1995. 
C-44/95; Opinion, @ para. 38, 21.3.96. 
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reduced the delay in determining the appeal; a not insignificant benefit in the 
circumstances. Clear identification of issues by national courts and their speedy 
referral to the EC J '...is essential for the development of a clear and authoritative 
European environmental law'. 3 6 0 The English legal system is currently frustrating 
this development. 
The Court of Appeal focused upon the technicalities of the Birds Directive, 
as opposed to the substantive merits of the Secretary of State's decision; and thus 
remained within the usual parameters of public law. 3 6 1 However, the majority of 
the court attempted to find the underlying purpose of the legislation; an approach 
that, as Harte 3 6 2 claimed, was bound to result in value judgements about what that 
purpose should be. There is an inherent risk that this will lead to a result that 
conflicts with the consensus behind the enactment; although where an objective 
literal reading of legislation is problematic, courts have little alternative to 
searching for its rationale. In the present case, both the legislation and case law 
were sufficiently clear to facilitate a literal interpretation. That the majority in the 
Court of Appeal chose not to do so is an indication of its difficulty in accepting 
the irrelevancy of economic considerations to SPA designation 
This is linked to the peculiarly British characteristic of presuming that 
development is beneficial per se; a notion that seems to have influenced the Court 
of Appeal.3 6 3 Such ideology is indeed a major obstacle to protecting habitats from 
development. 
The RSPB appealed to the House of Lords, seeking certiorari to quash the 
Secretary of State's decision, a declaration as to its unlawfulness because it 
embraced economic considerations and mandamus requiring its reconsideration. 
Its case364 was essentially that Hirst and Steyn L.JJ. had misconstrued the Birds 
Directive in respect of its practical operation, had misunderstood the leading case 
of Santona Marshes365 and ignored European jurisprudence in adopting their own 
J. Harte; 'Nature Conservation: The Rule of Law in European Community 
Environmental Protection', [1997] 9 JEL 139 @ p. 179. 
See J. Harte; 'Nature Conservation: The Framework for Designating Special Protection 
Areas for Birds', [1995] 7 JEL 245 @ p.268. 
Ibid @ p.268. 
See J. Harte; 'Nature Conservation: The Rule of Law in European Community 
Environment Protection', [1997] 9 JEL 139 @ p.173. 
Per case papers retained by the RSPB's instructed solicitor. 
C-355/90 [1993] Water Law 209. 
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construction of the Directive. As their analysis relied upon its own interpretation 
of the Directive, this could not -- even if correct — be regarded as acte clair. 
Therefore, refusing a reference to the ECJ was unjustified.3 6 6 The RSPB 
essentially adopted Lord Hoffmann's dissenting judgment; Lappel Bank's 
inclusion within the SPA could be lawfully departed from only if there were 
ornithological reasons for doing so.3 6 7 
The UK government argued that, as the Birds Directive did not expressly 
take account of economic requirements, Member States were free to do so. It 
relied upon a paragraph of the AG's Opinion3 6 8 in Leybucht Dykes that referred 
to States' choice of designated sites; in particular that economic interests may be 
taken into account. 
Reclamation of Lappel Bank had been proceeding throughout the litigation 
stages. By 1 June 1995 approximately one third of the disputed area had been 
resurfaced and was in use by the Port; and it was anticipated that development 
would be complete within a matter of months.369 It was therefore likely that the 
site would be destroyed before a final decision could be obtained. Accordingly, 
the RSPB sought interim relief in the form of a declaration that the Secretary of 
State would be acting unlawfully if he failed to prevent the deterioration of Lappel 
Bank pending final judgment. An injunction to stay the development was not 
feasible; the 1989 consent could not be challenged370 and that of 1994 was prima 
facie lawful. Thus, any action over planning permission was restricted to 
Ministerial intervention. As the RSPB contended, the Secretary of State could 
have modified the terms of the consent or negotiated a moratorium with the 
developers. However, it was considered impossible to satisfactorily frame a 
mandatory injunction against him other than in general terms that he should 
comply with Arts.6 & 7 Habitats Directive.371 Dicta of Lord Bridge on interim 
relief in R v HM Treasury, ex p. BT 3 7 2 was cited. His Lordship said that the court 
The RSPB relied upon the case of Customs & Excise Commissioners v ApS Samex 
[1983] 1 All E R 1042 on this point. 
Observations of the RSPB before the ECJ; C-44/95; para.92(b). 
Para.28; [1991] E C R 1-883. 
C-44/95, A G Opinion @ para.9; 21.3.96. 
See R v Swale Borough Council, ex.p, RSPB [1991] JPL 39 above, pp.73-74. 
i.e. to assess projects having a significant environmental effect; the RSPB contending 
that Lappel Bank ought to be treated as though it were a designated SPA. 
[1994] 1 CMLR621. 
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should, in the interests of justice, make a prediction of the final outcome and give 
that prediction decisive weight in resolving the interlocutory issue. The RSPB 
argued that the ECJ would follow its previous approaches to Birds Directive 
construction and confirm the irrelevance of economic considerations to SPA 
classification; interim relief should therefore be granted on the basis of this likely 
outcome. 
The House of Lords acceded to the RSPB's request for referral to the ECJ. 
As Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle said,373 competing arguments of substance, and 
support for each in conflicting Court of Appeal judgments, made referral 
inevitable. With the agreement of the parties, the following two questions were 
referred by order of 9 February 1995:374 
(1) Is a Member State entitled to take account of the considerations 
mentioned in article 2 of Directive 79/409 of April 2, 1979 on the 
conservation of wild birds in classification of an area as a Special Protection 
Area and/or in defining the boundaries of such an area pursuant to article 4(1) 
and/or 4(2) of that Directive? 
(2) If the answer to question 1 is "no", may a Member State nevertheless take 
account of article 2 considerations in the classification process in so far as: 
(a) they amount to a general interest which is superior to the general 
interest which is represented by the ecological objective of the 
Directive (i.e. the test which the European Court has laid down in, e.g. 
The Commission v. Germany ("Leybucht Dykes") (Case 57/89) for 
derogation from the requirements of article 4(4)); or, 
(b) they amount to imperative reasons of overriding public interest such 
as might be taken into account under article 6(4) of Directive 
92/43 of May 21, 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats 
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Their Lordships then turned to the RSPB's application for interim declaratory 
relief. This was declined on the following grounds:376 
(1) the Secretary of State cannot know the proper basis upon which to make 
the assessment required until the ECJ has ruled upon the construction of 
Art.4; 
(2) the objective of the application — a suspension of further development 
pending the ECJ ruling — would be likely to result in very large commercial 
losses to the Port and possibly the planning authority. Such an application 
against the developer would have necessitated a cross undertaking in 
damages ~ the applicants here were seeking to achieve the same result 
without the risk of substantial expenditure; 
(3) the proposed order, declaring that the Secretary of State acts unlawfully 
i f he fails to act in a specific way, is not declaratory but mandatory which, if 
granted, would be in the form of an interim injunction; 
(4) in any event the declaration sought would not, per se, achieve the 
applicant's objectives as the extant consent allows the developers to proceed. 
Prevention of this would require the utilisation of further machinery; with 
very considerable financial considerations. 
Notwithstanding Lord Jauncey's supplication for an urgent consideration by 
the ECJ, 3 7 7 Lappel Bank was destroyed before a ruling could be obtained. The 
salient issue in the refusal of interim relief was the anticipated commercial losses if 
the application had succeeded. Thus, pecuniary considerations were ultimately 
more influential than the destruction of an internationally important habitat; a 
symptom of the supremacy of economics within judicial reasoning. Furthermore, 
the implication that voluntary bodies ought to be regarded as being analogous to 
[1995] JPL 842, pp. 847-848. 
Ibid @ 846. 
105 
companies or private litigants is unhelpful. As the appellants' solicitor said 
afterwards, no responsible charity could have given the undertaking required by 
the Lords. Such a requirement is unreasonable considering the vital role played by 
charitable organisations in habitat protection; it blunts the law's enforceability. 
This aspect of the case also demonstrates a weakness of the rule that restricts 
English courts to the consideration of matters for which there is a lis inter partes. 
Such inflexibility ensures that the risks attending litigation must be taken in order 
to test the law in relation to a specific issue. As Harte3 7 9 suggests, the justification 
for restricting courts to the consideration of disputes before them — protection 
from unnecessary litigation and ensuring decisions are taken in context — is now 
outmoded in public law. 
The ECJ was asked by the RSPB, though not by the House of Lords, to 
comment upon the refusal of interim relief. It followed the recommendation of the 
A G 3 8 0 and declined to comment. However, Buxton 3 8 1 predicts that the legality of 
requiring an undertaking before granting relief will eventually be reviewed by the 
ECJ. Interim relief may one day be available notwithstanding, or perhaps because, 
it is institutionally inappropriate for charitable applicants to provide financial 
guarantees. Indeed, this area may witness gradual change; with a progressive 
trend to directly effective EU law eventually leading to greater rights accorded to 
voluntary conservationist plaintiffs. If environmental protection is increasingly 
recognised as being capable of outweighing economic factors, the courts may be 
more willing to delay development, whatever the financial cost, rather than back 
irreversible loss of heritage.382 
The issues before the ECJ were orally heard on 7 February 1996; the Opinion 
of the AG, Mr Fennelly, being delivered on 21 March. He criticised the UK 
government's analogy between economic factors in derogating from Art.4(4) 
Birds Directive and in SPA classification. This was based on a misreading of the 
Leybucht judgment; where the court had clearly stated that a reduction of a SPA 
R. Buxton; 'Bye bye, Bank birds', The Times 21.2.95. 
'Nature Conservation: The Framework for Designating Special Protection Areas for 
Birds' [1995] 7 J E L 245 @ p.277. 
Footnote 5, para.10; Opinion; 21.3.96.. 
'Bye Bye, Bank birds', The Times, 21.2.95. 
See J. Harte, 'Nature Conservation: The Rule of Law in European Community 
Environment Protection' [1997] 9 J E L 139 @ p.178. 
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could not be justified by economic factors. Only those grounds corresponding to a 
general interest superior to the general ecological interest are capable of justifying 
reduction; economic interests do not qualify as such (para.81). Mr Fennelly also 
rejected a 'common sense' argument relied upon by the UK; this involved the 
hypothesis of two similar sites, one adjacent to an industrial area and the other 
remote from such activities, where conservation required the classification of only 
one. He confirmed that, providing both sites satisfy the criteria for classification, 
there is nothing to absolve a State from classifying both as SPAs (para.88). The 
AG answered the first question; whether Arts. 4(l)/(2) should be interpreted as to 
allow economic requirements to be taken into account at classification and 
boundary determination; in the negative. 
Part (a) of question 2, the relevance of economic requirements amounting to 
a superior general interest, related to the Leybucht Dykes case. That had 
recognised that superior general interests were capable of justifying the reduction 
of an already designated site. It would follow that they are also capable of 
influencing the classification of SPAs; although compensatory measures would be 
required. The AG ruled that economic interests could not constitute such a 
superior general interest (paras.92-94). 
Part (b) of question two; whether Art.2 considerations amounting to an 
overriding public interest, within the meaning of Art.6(4) Habitats Directive, can 
be taken into account in SPA classification; was also answered in the negative 
(paras. 95-99). The UK had argued that to exclude such considerations from the 
classification stage would be inviting unnecessary administration for those sites 
classified then immediately made subject to derogation. The AG rejected this 
approach, emphasising the compensation requirements attendant upon derogation 
that it would deny. 
In light of previous case law, it is difficult to contemplate the AG reaching a 
different conclusion on the matters referred. However, his attitude to the wider 
issues is also encouraging. He refers, in para.47, to wildlife being part of man's 
common heritage. This embracement of anthropocentric philosophy,383 whilst 
concerned with the protection of common human interests as opposed to the 
383 Harte, [1997] 9 JEL 139 @ p.178. 
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natural world per se, is a refreshing departure from the routine individual rights 
dicta of English judges. Future enactment and enforcement on this basis will 
encourage the emergence of an effective European environmental code. 
The questions referred to the ECJ were formally answered on 11 July 1996 
and, although not obliged to do so, the eleven members of the court followed the 
AG's Opinion. Arts.4(l)/(2) Birds Directive were interpreted as excluding 
economic considerations from SPA designation. Furthermore, such considerations 
could not amount to an interest superior to the ecological objective of the 
Directive; nor could they qualify as imperative reasons of overriding public 
interest under Art.6(4) Habitats Directive.3 8 4 At the time of writing we await the 
formality of the House of Lords' decision on the basis of the clarified law. 
Several implications flow from this case. In the wake of Lappel Bank's 
destruction, the RSPB 3 8 5 called upon the government to provide habitat 
compensation. However, the uniqueness of this internationally significant habitat, 
and the fact that all surrounding land of ecological interest is already under SPA 
designation, renders genuine compensation impossible. Winter 3 8 6 criticises 
Art. 169 EC Treaty for not empowering the court to order removal of the 
infringement in cases of unlawful exclusion and development. He also suggests 
that the decision in Santona, where the court stated that construction and non-
removal of the development in question was unlawful, may point to a right of 
removal of the Lappel Bank development. However, even if this was so, there 
would be little to gain in enforcing this right as reclamation has destroyed the 
habitat as an ecological entity. 
Jones387 refers to the likelihood that the JNCC and NCC will be obliged in 
future to provide more detailed scientific justification for proposed European 
sites; particularly those within or adjoining areas of economic development. 
Furthermore, provisional boundary delineation may preclude a later denial of 
suitability of the area; bearing in mind the strict rules on classification. I f so, it 
may be tempting to avoid discussion of preliminary boundaries at an early stage, 
pp.847-849, [1996] JPL. 
RSPB News, Sandy: 11.7.96. 
G. Winter, addendum to J. Harte, op. cit. @ p. 179. 
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focusing protection on as small an area as possible. Certainly it seems likely 
that the focus of conflict may shift from development to designation as a result of 
Lappel Bank; the need for voluntary conservation bodies to remain vigilant will 
continue to be as important as ever. 
Indeed, the decision also raises the possibility of such organisations litigating 
to compel designation of sites that are unlawfully excluded. Planning authorities 
thus far have usually been able to justify development by avoiding procedural 
irregularity; Lappel Bank now provides a strict rule that is incapable of being 
overridden by administrative preference for economic issues over conservation.389 
However, as this research demonstrates, barriers to law enforcement such as locus 
standi and interim relief, are not inconsiderable. 
Whilst Lappel Bank illustrates many of the shortfalls within legal habitat 
protection, it also clarified the law on European site3 9 0 designation. Economic 
reasons cannot excuse a failure to classify; although such considerations may be 
relevant subsequently, where development may proceed on economic grounds. 
The case is extremely important in the long term, representing a significant step 
towards a European legal principle that environmental protection '...may amount 
to an absolute, superior to economic considerations or to the priority normally 
given to development potential'.391 In essence the case establishes that where a 
site is worthy of European status but development is inevitable, it ought to be 
designated in the first instance and then declassified according to Art. 6 Habitats 
Directive; it thus strikes the correct balance between nature conservation and 
development. The alternative position, as maintained by the French government392 
in this case, considered that designation followed by immediate development was 
illogical. It would dilute the scope of SPA classification and encourage States to 
designate without alluding to imminent development proposals; consideration of 
the latter thus being postponed. However, if the French arguments had prevailed, 
there would have been an increased likelihood of sites being classified on their 
J. Harte, 'Nature Conservation: The Framework for Designating Special Protection 
Areas for Birds', [1995] 7 J E L 245 @ p.270. 
J. Harte, 'Nature Conservation: The Rule of Law in European Community 
Environment Protection', [1997] 9 JEL 139 @ p.172. 
It applies to SACs also. 
J. Harte; op. cit @ p. 169. 
Observations of the Government of the French Republic; C-44/95, Paris: 22.6.95. 
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lack of economic potential, as opposed to their ecological significance. Now that 
the Habitats Directive provides a clear and simple means of derogating from Birds 
Directive protection, there is no justification for reluctance to classify a site 
earmarked for development.393 The greater administrative burden this approach 
entails is the acceptable price of habitat protection. 
It must not be overlooked that the litigation reaffirming the proper balance 
between conservation and development ultimately failed to protect the habitat in 
question. Whilst this is an indictment of the English legal system, the European 
Commission also served to undermine the enforcement process by inviting the 
ECJ to treat Lappel Bank's exclusion as partial declassification.394 This was 
nothing less than an attempt to condone an unlawful act. 
The principal conclusion from Lappel Bank is that English courts fail to give 
sufficient weight to environmental considerations before them. Judicial preference 
for economic issues over conservation was compounded by the delay inherent in 
litigation, and institutional reluctance to refer matters to the ECJ. The English 
courts thus served to undermine clear and well-balanced habitat protection law. 
Conclusion 
The foregoing findings support the critical stance adopted by this paper in 
evaluating legal and regulatory processes' protection of habitats from harmful 
development. 
There are many laudable features of habitat protection law vis-a-vis the 
planning process; not least those emanating from the EU. However, planning 
necessarily seeks compromise; a fact evident in the cases examined. The 
overriding need for concessions manifested itself in the propensity of planning 
authorities to readily accept even weak compensation measures. Precedents thus 
set served to undermine the protective regime. Within an environment sensitive to 
political influences, nature conservation fell to be considered merely as another 
potential land use. The prevailing ideology is a propensity to favour economic 
See para.60, Observations of the RSPB before the ECJ; C-44/95. 
An invitation declined by the AG; para.62, Opinion, 21.3.96. 
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considerations, something that inevitably undermines attempts to reconcile 
conservation and development. Developers, with extensive resources and the 
benefit of EIA to enhance their case, are at a great advantage over voluntary 
environmental groups in planning disputes. 
Such economic disparity inherently weakens attempts by environmental 
organisations to enforce the law in this ambit; indeed, weak enforcement is one of 
the principal conclusions of this research. Problems were encountered in enforcing 
European provisions; both from the perspective of European Commission 
involvement and domestic litigation. Cardiff Bay Barrage testifies to the former; 
and emphasises the inherent difficulty in enforcement against a backdrop of 
compromise and political influence. Lappel Bank demonstrates how, in response 
to a similar set of circumstances, litigation proved no more successful; 
notwithstanding that the eventual outcome favoured the conservationists. 
The final part of this paper summarises the critique, and places the research 
into perspective by examining the wider issues raised. Suggestions are made for 
reform and indications given as to further appropriate work in this field. 
I l l 
Chapter 5: 
SUMMARY & CONCLUSION 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to distil the research into a concise, readily 
accessible form. Au fond, it outlines how the narrow field framed by the research 
question has been enhanced by this work. 
Three approaches are adopted: a summary of the critique, proposals for 
reform and overall conclusion. The former outlines the various strands that make 
up my line of reasoning in pursuing the research question. In response to 
criticisms made, proposals for reform are explored; as well as guidance on 
potential further work which naturally follows on from this research. Finally, it is 
important to place the study in perspective, both within the planning and 
environmental fields and the wider social context. This is essential to a full 
understanding of the subject matter. 
Summary 
The object of this thesis is to illustrate the extent to which wildlife habitat 
protection is accommodated by legal and regulatory processes; the focal point 
being development threat. The premise under-pinning this examination was that 
the faith demonstrated in the planning system by nature conservation law cannot 
be justified. 
This was borne out by the research, which concludes that legal and 
regulatory processes' protection of habitats from harmful development is 
inadequate; enforcement being a major weakness. The evaluation covered a range 
of local planning authority decisions, and two detailed case studies that allowed 
focus upon enforcement. 
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Historically, official habitat protection and planning emerged 
contemporaneously and have since maintained a close relationship. Indeed, the 
planning system's key role in nature conservation is to be expected since the use 
of land affects habitats in direct, indirect and cumulative ways.395 However we 
have also seen, especially during the 1980s and 1990s, that planning is a versatile 
tool which reflects the prevailing social and political consensus. The dependence 
of conservation upon planning, and the latter's role as an instrument of laissez 
faire economics during recent years, explains its current failure to adequately 
protect the nature conservation interest. Of course, there have been valuable 
developments in this field since its baptism in the 1940s. The vital role played by 
the NCC and the emergence of European environmental law have been, and will 
continue to be, of great benefit to the conservation cause. However, habitat 
protection is frustrated by inherent planning deficiencies and barriers to law 
enforcement; a state of affairs that, like the under-funding of the NCC, betrays a 
lack of political support for effective conservation. 
The research demonstrated the ultimate failure of the planning system to 
facilitate sustainable development. This is a fundamental aim of planning policy, 
and has been defined as development that '...meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs'.396 In terms of wildlife habitats, the key issues for sustainability are species 
conservation and the implementation of conservation policies throughout all 
relevant policy sectors.397 However, the research demonstrated that habitat, and 
ultimately species, conservation failed to carry sufficient weight in planning 
considerations. Conservation needs frequently capitulated before economic 
interests; planning authorities justifying this by the approval of compensation and 
mitigation measures that were rarely equal to their task. Refusal of consent on 
conservation grounds was seldom even contemplated. However in any event, as 
the construction of Cardiff Bay Barrage demonstrated, even an effective and 
strong planning system may be circumvented in favour of centralised decree. 
S. Owens, op. cit @ pp.20-21. 
World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1987 @ p.8. 
'Sustainable Development: The UK Strategy'; Cmnd. 2426, 1994 @ p.94. 
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EIA, introduced for the laudable reason of ensuring decisions were taken on 
the basis of the fullest environmental information, is little more than an effective 
servant of economic interests. Presented as part of the developers' case, its 
assessment of impact is necessarily consistent with this. Such disputable 
objectivity is compounded by a general failure to assess the cumulative and 
indirect effects of projects. 
Domestic provisions protecting habitats are complex and overlapping; the 
myriad designations delivering a hierarchy that has been exploited by developers 
under largely descriptive planning policy guidance. The research illustrated that 
such habitats were regarded merely as individual un-related sites by planning 
authorities, notwithstanding that these were originally intended to form a network 
of sufficient size to conserve the entire range of native wildlife. 3 9 8 
Whilst no provision exists in respect of domestically designated habitats for 
mandatory replacement of destroyed sites, this is the case in respect of sites 
designated under European law. Furthermore, as settled in R v. Secretary of 
State, ex p. RSPB, 3 9 9 classification of such sites does strike an appropriate 
balance. However, the analysis indicated that enforcement is the Achilles' heel of 
EU environmental law. In particular, there was reluctance on the part of English 
appellate courts both to adhere to European law and to refer ambiguous issues to 
the ECJ for clarification. Also, refusal to stay the destruction of Lappel Bank, 
pending the outcome of litigation, served to demonstrate the loyalty of English 
courts to property values; and illustrated the barriers to law enforcement faced by 
both individuals and voluntary groups. The case of Cardiff Bay Barrage raised 
issues over enforcement by the European Commission itself. Failure to 
adequately intervene over a clear breach of the law governing habitat 
classification, for reasons of political expediency, betrayed a grave weakness of 
European law enforcement. 
The analysis in the substantive sections of the thesis demonstrates shortfalls 
in enforcement and challenge generally. Thus unremedied-remedied failure to 
consult, a subjectively framed Public Inquiry system and narrow interpretation of 
Cmnd. 7122, 1947; @ p.17. 
[1997] 9 J E L 139. 
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locus standi all contributed to a sense of frustration in promoting conservation 
interests in the planning ambit. 
It is apparent that habitat protection is accommodated only marginally by 
legal and regulatory processes. Conservation's manifest subservience to economic 
interests in this vital area seriously undermines the efficacy of wildlife law. 
Reforms 
The dominance of economic interests generally and private property in 
particular within the planning ambit reflects the political consensus underpinning 
planning policy. This fails to accept nature conservation as a fundamentally 
important land use; a position which, if unchanged, will preclude successful 
introduction of the following suggested reforms. However, the continued growth 
of environmental awareness, as evidenced by increasing support for voluntary 
pressure groups,400 is a cause for optimism. 
Broadly speaking, conservation would be significantly enhanced if official 
conservation bodies were funded at a level consistent with full discharge of their 
duties according to the spirit of the law. 4 0 1 Equally beneficial would be a 
disinclination to interfere politically in issues that ought to be determined primarily 
on the basis of ecological factors. Such disinclination, however, is an unrealistic 
ideal. 
This research has demonstrated that the planning mechanism is unworthy of 
the confidence placed in it by nature conservation law. The essential reason for 
this is that nature conservation as a land use has not yet attained a status capable 
of realistically challenging economic interests. What is required is a forum that 
fully recognises the importance of habitats to sustainable development, and makes 
decisions acknowledging the irretrievable consequences of habitat destruction. It 
would also be useful in planning cases to extend the right of appeal to interested 
third parties where environmental matters are at issue. This would ensure the 
400 
401 
See R. Baggott, Pressure Groups Today, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1995 @ p.54. 
See comments by NCC (interview) @ pp.62-63 above. 
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conservation interest had an opportunity to be fully represented, thus countering 
the inherent bias towards economic interests.402 
A principal reason why habitats are inadequately protected under the law is 
the failure of the traditional property system to reflect ecological significance. 
Often marginal land, habitats are generally inexpensive to acquire and are 
therefore attractive to potential developers, who are not charged the true 
ecological cost of their destruction. Several suggestions have been made to rectify 
this, including the assertion of legal ownership in habitats themselves as tangible 
property.403 Habitat exploitation would be controlled by law via a property-based 
recognition of ecological significance. The law of property would therefore ensure 
that harmful interference carried a reflective financial cost. Similarly, the reform of 
intellectual property laws ~ which traditionally address the creations of man, not 
nature — could assist habitat protection. Legal status for natural genetic material 
would provide an economic incentive to preserve habitats; a suggestion of 
Walden's404 made in the context of the pharmaceutical industry, but which can be 
discussed in terms of nature conservation. The genetic material, in the form of 
fauna and flora present in habitats, could be recognised by law as having an 
economic value, which would then be accommodated in any decisions to interfere 
with habitats. This would require a change in the intellectual property system, 
which currently excludes from patentability plant and animal varieties occurring 
naturally 4 0 5 
The rights of habitat exploitation could be vested in the NCC, so that where a 
notified harmful operation occurred, that body would be entitled to financial 
compensation. Thus, as an enhancement of the current system, planning 
permission would continue to override designation, but the developer would be 
liable to pay an additional sum to reflect the ecological cost of his actions — funds 
Such an initiative has been recently dismissed by the government; see written 
statement by Mr Raynsford, Minister for London and Construction; HC Deb. 30 July 
1997, Col.409. 
I. Walden, 'Preserving biodiversity: the role of property rights', p.178; in: Intellectual 
Property Rights and Biodiversity Conservation: an interdisciplinary analysis of the 
values of medicinal plants, ed. T. Swanson; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995. 
Ibid @ p.182. 
See s. l(3)(b) Patents Act 1977 and Art. 53(b) European Patent Convention. Cmnd. 
7090, 1978. 
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that the NCC could then use to mitigate the damage, if appropriate, or enhance 
conservation elsewhere. A licensing system would serve to regulate the harmful 
interference and reciprocal compensation. 
There are logistical difficulties in using the property system to protect 
habitats, not least in calculating the precise value to be attributed to factors that 
do not easily lend themselves to material valuation. What price ought to be put on 
uniqueness? How should one quantify irretrievable loss? Additionally, there are 
issues of formality, such as ownership of the property rights and identification of 
their breach.406 Furthermore, the costs of establishing such a mechanism, and of 
funding the litigation that would be inevitable once designation carried significant 
pecuniary implications, are not to be underestimated. However, this is the price 
that must be paid if habitats are to be adequately protected in this avaricious age. 
There is a cynical, though sound, assumption underlying these particular reforms: 
that conservation will be more successful where there is a material advantage in 
furthering it, or where a material disadvantage accompanies its frustration. 
Whatever means of protection are adopted, they must ultimately be guided by 
sustainability. Protection according to such a code could be absolute or indeed 
could provide for exceptional damage subject to compensation rules. This would 
depend upon how the code was drafted. It would be crucial to identify the 
rrunimum stock of natural assets consistent with sustainability;407 this would form 
a national network of habitats in respect of which harmful development would be 
generally forbidden. It would be logical to extend protection on the European 
sites' model to current national sites, so that this new national network would 
include habitats currently designated as: SACs, SPAs, NNRs, MNRs, SSSI and 
Ramsar. 
Stricter protective laws would demand great prudence in selecting designated 
sites. A useful approach is that proposed by Buckley,408 whereby environmental 
limits are applied to the concept of Critical Natural Capital (CNC). This is an 
economic term, indicating that some aspects of natural capital ought to be 
I. Walden, op. cit @ p. 194. 
P. Hopkinson & J. Bowers, op. cit @ p. 12 
P. Buckley, 'Critical Natural Capital: operational flaws in a valid concept'; ECOS 16 
(3/4) 1995, 13;seepp.l3-16. 
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protected fully; irrespective of other potential gains lost. For our purposes CNC 
would represent habitat deemed irreplaceable. Buckley suggests linking the level 
of habitat CNC to biodiversity, so once actual levels of irreplaceable habitat fall 
below the critical level determined by biodiversity, further loss would be 
forbidden. In terms of designation, the critical levels of capital for all habitat types 
would determine the area of the national network. Clearly there would be a need 
to continually review designated sites to ensure the national network continues to 
represent CNC. 
An alternative reform would be retention of the present designation system 
and development criteria, but replacement of the local planning authority with a 
dedicated tribunal where important habitats are at stake. The involvement of what 
may be termed an 'Independent Conservation Tribunal' (ICT) would reflect the 
special considerations inherent in planning proposals affecting sustainability. 
Applications in respect of SSSI, NNRs, MNRs, European and Ramsar sites would 
be determined by the ICT; composed of ecological and planning experts. In this 
forum planning decisions would be free from the constraints of strict property 
value parameters; wider environmental considerations would be included within 
the ICT's terms of reference. Additionally, the tribunal's internal appeal 
mechanism would be open to interested third parties. Other habitats would 
continue to be dealt with under current planning procedure. 
To combat the problem of extant planning permission granted in times of 
poor environmental awareness or before the ecological significance of a site 
became appreciated, all consent attaching to nationally important habitats would 
be re-assessed as currently is the case with European sites. Where that consent is 
revoked or amended, equity requires compensation to be paid to those affected. 
This will potentially be very substantial, but such a drain on public funds is 
justified by the need to ensure land use remains consistent with principles of 
sustainable development. EIA would be required for both re-assessment and all 
initial applications in which the ICT was involved. However, this would be carried 
out under the independent jurisdiction of the tribunal itself to ensure objectivity. 
The ICT would be subject to judicial review; it would be prudent to secure 
the standing of all interested voluntary groups. This would ensure that planning 
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decisions affecting important habitats remained open to challenge by those with a 
tangible interest in the new environmental order. Legislation would be required to 
clarify locus standi; all bodies with interests in this field could be registered as 
having standing.409 This, and the maintenance of such details, would be the 
responsibility of the ICT. 
The tribunal would also be legally obliged to actively consult appropriate 
organisations, such as national groups with relevant expertise and local groups 
who express an interest. Breach of the consultation requirements would nullify the 
planning decision in question. Again, legislation would be required to effect this; 
either by amending the Town and Country Planning Acts or by provision within 
the Statute establishing the ICT. 
The above reforms would greatly strengthen the protection of important 
habitats from harmful development. Whilst a rule of total inviolability for such 
sites would be ideal, this is not viable with pressure on land continuing to intensify 
as we approach the next century. In any event there are no means of preventing 
future amendment of such a rule even if it could be introduced. Ultimately, 
continued lack of popular support for total inviolability ensures that compromise 
must remain the guiding principle of planning debate. 
However, permitting destruction only on grounds of human life and safety410 
is a viable and appropriate balance, and would place nature conservation in its 
rightful place within the land use planning context. Also, compulsory 
compensation measures for sites lost would ensure the maintenance of a national 
network. With all nationally and internationally significant habitats subject to one 
regime, the law governing their development would be simplified. Habitat 
protection would thus be liberated from the concept of hierarchy that is currently 
responsible for exerting disproportionate development pressure on less important 
sites. 
In terms of European Commission enforcement, there are several areas that 
would benefit from reform. A re-drafting of Art. 169 EC Treaty, so as to make the 
initiation of formal proceedings mandatory upon receipt of complaints, would 
See K. Schiemann, op. cit @ p.344. 
S. Owens, op. cit @ p.19. 
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reduce the scope for political interference. Full publication of the Commission's 
decision as to formal notice or reasoned opinion would also be conducive to this. 
Additionally, broadening the scope of Art. 138 EC Treaty,4" so that those 
representing the wider public interest may also exercise advisory and supervisory 
powers in relation to the EU, would provide stronger environmental safeguards 
and empower citizens to fully utilise the law and institutions they financially 
support. However, it must be acknowledged that such reforms would require 
political influence and change at the highest national levels; they are currently 
unlikely to be implemented. 
Reform is also required to alleviate the injustice caused by voluntary groups' 
inability to give the financial undertakings required by English courts for interim 
delay of development. In order to circumvent this barrier to enforcement, a central 
fund should be established as security for charitable litigants where planning 
consent is challenged and an interim order sought. Such an arrangement would 
have avoided the absurdity of Lappel Bank being destroyed during litigation that 
ultimately upheld the conservationists' case. The fund should be maintained from 
the public purse, with contributory arrangements in place per voluntary 
organisations. Such monies would not be used for litigation per se, merely to 
bridge the potential financial shortfalls that often frustrate interim relief sought by 
voluntary organisations — major players in the environmental field. 
With almost fifty years since the introduction of revolutionary post-war 
conservation legislation, it is time to undertake a wholesale review of this area. 
Society and its perceptions have altered much since Huxley's report of 1947; 
ever-increasing pressures upon fragile habitats make it all the more urgent that the 
correct balance between conservation and development is established and 
maintained. Legislative reform, and ultimately political will, are required to 
achieve this. 
Which governs the make-up of The Assembly. 
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Conclusion 
This research ascertains the extent to which wildlife habitats are protected 
from harmful development via legal and regulatory processes. Is this an 
appropriate way to conceptualise, from a legal perspective, conservation's current 
plight? Certainly, as continued green-field depletion shows, habitats remain under 
incessant threat from development.412 It is also apparent that their protection must 
necessarily depend upon the law; if not via continued ownership then by land use 
restrictions in conjunction with site designation. As State ownership or direct 
management on a sufficiently large scale has never been deemed practicable thus 
far in British conservation, the treatment of designated sites by the planning 
mechanism represents the obvious focal point for a topical assessment of nature 
conservation. Indeed, in a society of multifarious competing land uses, the success 
of conservation depends as much on planning acumen as ecological management; 
legal tools thus play a vital role. 
The many strands that make up the legal aspect of nature conservation must 
be emphasised. In addition to protection from development, the law has a role to 
play in meeting threats from land management, pollution and interference. 
Similarly, within the wider planning context nature conservation is merely one of 
many competing uses. However, restrictions upon time and space limit this work 
to a narrow focus, within which it can do no more than examine a modest range 
of planning decisions. The conclusions presented here must be viewed in this 
context. The study was further limited by difficulties in gaining access to 
information held by local authorities; which were unable to grant interviews or 
positively assist in data gathering. Also, research in respect of cases subject to 
formal inquiry or litigation was frustrated by issues of confidentiality. Thus, 
original research has been restricted to records kindly made available by planning 
authorities, solicitors and voluntary organisations. 
As this is an ambit in which competing claims for land use are routinely 
balanced, it is rarely possible to label a particular decision as being fundamentally 
erroneous. The political dimension inevitably clouds any conclusion to be drawn. 
412 See Annexes II & III. 
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Thus this paper, in presenting legal critique and suggested reforms, is based upon 
the assumption that the necessary political will to achieve change can be 
mobilised. 
In highlighting the enduring nature of development as a habitat threat, I 
conclude that current legal and regulatory processes do not provide adequate 
protection. Radical reforms are required within this specialised area in order for 
habitat conservation to genuinely succeed. 
The research raises several wider issues. Assuming inviolability of sites is 
untenable, under which circumstances should development be allowed; and how 
do we ensure that the rules defining these are adhered to in the spirit as well as the 
letter of the law? Within this convergence of disciplines, should the detenruning 
criteria for development be included in the designating code itself or be imposed 
by specific planning legislation? Does it matter where the impetus comes from? At 
a very basic level, interference in land planning for the benefit of wildlife must be 
justified. Whilst global species extinction is occurring at a much greater rate now 
than was the case pre-human times, it may be argued that this is simply the result 
of a new dominant species — man; and that the law ought to be limited to 
regulating those activities that directly benefit man. In practical terms, the most 
pertinent issue is whether the public are prepared to pay for the controls 
conservation demands; both in direct financial terms and in the price of intensified 
demand for that land less strictly controlled. Such questions are political of 
course; hard choices must be made. 
The contribution this work makes to the conservation-development debate is 
a summary of the reasons behind the continued failure of planning to adequately 
accommodate the nature conservation interest. Assuming political will is such as 
to give conservation a privileged position within the planning system, thus 
displacing the usual norms of private property dominance, this paper proposes the 
mechanics to achieve this. 
Scope for further work in this field is apparent. The law on designation of 
European sites, post-Lappel Bank, strikes an appropriate balance. In view of the 
strict rules regulating subsequent development of such habitats, and the 
irrelevance of economic factors to designation, the focus of conflict may move to 
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the latter process itself, with ecological evidence being increasingly challenged. 
Indeed, if reforms such as those suggested above are implemented, it is submitted 
that this would be a natural consequence. In any event, it would be prudent to 
monitor the designation of European sites in the wake of Lappel Bank to ascertain 
the quality of such decisions, evidence relied upon and the development of 
challenge tactics. Also, research upon the exertion of political influence, 
particularly with regard to EU law, would provide useful information on this 
crucial dimension. An examination of the rule of law within the European 
environmental context is long overdue. 
It is obvious that political acceptance of a high priority for nature 
conservation is the initial step towards an effective protective regime. Such a 
consensus must be based upon the recognition that the solution to the conflict 
between conservation and development lies in accepting that we cannot satisfy all 
existing and potential demand for the countryside. In other words, that it is futile 
to even attempt to match projected growth rates; this is increasingly apparent in 
the fields of rural housing and transport. As Lord Marlesford4 1 3 has said, we must 
recognise that the scope and extent of the countryside, and thus its capacity, is 
limited. ' I f we are to retain our countryside the government cannot seek to meet 
all the demands on it. The "predict and provide" approach to planning is 
unsustainable'. Consensus along such pragmatic lines would facilitate the legal 
changes which, as this paper shows, are necessary for effective habitat protection. 
Meanwhile legal and regulatory processes must remain flexible, so as to 
ensure all land uses are accorded genuine and balanced consideration; minimising 
as far as possible the destruction of areas with ecological value. Until political 
consensus embraces the conservationist cause, the vigilance of voluntary 
organisations and their willingness to utilise protective law will be vital to 
retaining as much as possible of what remains of our natural heritage. 
413 HL Deb. 16 June 1993, Vol.546, Col.1635. 
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Annex I 
Abbreviations used in the Thesis 
AG Advocate General 
AONB Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty 
Art. Article 
BES British Ecological Society 
CBDC Cardiff Bay Development Corporaion 
CNC Critical Natural Capital 
C(NH)R 1994 The Conservation (Natural Habitats &c.) Regulations 1994 
CPRE Council for the Protection of Rural England 
ECJ European Court of Justice 
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment 
EPA 1990 Environmental Protection Act 1990 
ES Environmental Statement 
FoE Friends of the Earth 
GDO General Development Order 
ICT Independent Conservation Tribunal 
JNCC Joint Nature Conservation Committee 
LNR Local Nature Reserve 
MNR Marine Nature Reserve 
NC Nature Conservancy 
NCC Nature Conservancy Council 
NCO Nature Conservation Order 
NNR National Nature Reserve 
NPACA 1949 National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949 
NRIC Nature Reserves Investigation Committee 
PPG Planning Policy Guidance Notes 
Reg. Regulation 
RSC Rules of the Supreme Court 
RSPB The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
SAC Special Area of Conservation 
SCA 1981 Supreme Court Act 1981 
SNC Special Nature Conservation Order 
SPA Special Protection Area 
SSSI Site(s) of Special Scientific Interest 
TCP A 1990 Town and Country Planning Act 1990 
TCP(GDP)0 Town and Country Planning (General Development Procedure) 
1995 Order 1995 
TCP(GPD)0 Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) 
1995 Order 1995 
WACA1981 Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 
WWF World Wide Fund for Nature 
Annex II 
Damage to UK SSSI Caused bv Activities given Planning 
Permission: 1990 -1995 
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Key: 
Long-term Damage English Nature & Scottish Natural Heritage: 'lasting reduction in 
the special interest'; 
Countryside Council for Wales: 'special interest will take more 
than 15 years to recover'. 
Short-term Damage English Nature: 'special interest could recover'; Scottish Natural 
Heritage: 'special interest could recover within 15 years with 
favourable management'; Countryside Council for Wales: 




Damage will result in denotification of part of the SSSI. 
Damage will result in denotification of the whole SSSI. 
Where it is impossible to identify a suitable damage category. 
Sources: 
Information supplied by the Joint Nature Conservation Committee. 
NB. Between 1990 and 1995, statistics in respect ofNCCs were correlated by the 
JNCC. This practice ceased after the year 1994-95, and the NCC and JNCC are 
currently developing and agreeing new common standards for, inter alia, 
damage reporting (these were expected to be in place by 1 April 1998). 
See Annex HI for the latest damage statistics; compiled separately from data 
supplied by the individual NCCs. 
Annex III 
Development Damage of English, Scottish and Welsh SSSI: 
1996-1997 





No Recovery (part of feature) 2 1.9 
Long-Term 2 2 
Unknown 4 9.45 
(Source: English Nature; 6th Report: 1996/97) 
Key: 
No Recovery (part of feature) Damage may result in denotification of part of the feature. 
Long-Term Recovery of the special interest will take more than 3 years. 
Unknown Likelyhood of recovery cannot be assessed. 
Development Damage of Scottish SSSI: 1 April 1996 - 31 March 1997 
•1 1>F 1 A< ' V H N P L A N N I N G PERMISSION 
!>AMA( il . 
Number of Cases Total Hectares 
Short-term 1 0 (linear feature of 300m) 
Long-term - -
Not likely 1 2 
Unknown - -
(Source: Scottish Natural Heritage & JNCC) 
Key; 
Short-term Recovery of the special interest likely in 3 years or less 
Long-Term Recovery of the special interest will take more than 3 years. 
Not Likely Special interest is unlikely to recover 
Development Damage of Welsh SSSI: 1 April 1996 - 31 March 1997 
SI \ L R U «M AC'S ! V i ! IhS U i V I . N P L A N N I N G PLK M I S S I O N 
Number of Cases Total Hectares 
Complete Loss - -
Partial Loss - -
Long-term - -
Short-term 1 2 
(Source: Countryside Council for Wales & JNCC) 
Key: 
Complete Loss Damage will lead to complete loss of the SSSI. 
Partial Loss Damage will lead to the loss of part of the SSSI. 
Long-term Recovery of the special interest will take longer than 15 years. 
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